Turkish - Israel Relations (Truman Institute Slideshow)

KONA, Gamze (2006). “Turkey and Israel – Destined to Eternal Neighborhood”. Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Truman Institute. March 30, 2006, Jerusalem – Israel

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Turkish Foreign Policy Under AKP Government (Bar Ilan University Slideshow)

KONA, Gamze Güngörmüş (2006). “Turkish Foreign Policy under AKP Government”. Bar Ilan University – Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Research, March 05, 2006, Ramat Gan – Israel

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Turkish-American Relations-English

KONA, Gamze Güngörmüş (2008). “Turkish-American Relations : Destined To Eternal Continuity”. The paper presented at the International Symposium on Democratization, Globalization and Turkey, Akdeniz University, 27-30 March 2008, Antalya.

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS : DESTINED TO ETERNAL CONTINUITY

TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ : SÜREKLİLİĞE YAZGILI BİR İLİŞKİ BİÇİMİ

Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona

ABSTRACT

The relations between the Turks and Americans dates back to the Ottoman Empire period. Familiarity with the Americans rose through the mass immigrations of the Ottoman Turks to the newly discovered world began in 1860s and also through the extension of the missionaries headed American colleges in Anatolia since the begining of 1870. In the Constitutional Era II, some Turkish students went to America for education. Moreover, the military staff and the Ottoman diplomats in America also accelerated this familiarity. Turkish interest in the U.S. grew more depending on U.S. determination not to wage war against the Ottoman Empire in the World War I and quite humanitarian 14 Points of Woodrow Wilson declared by the U.S. after the war. In line with this, even some Turkish intellectuals expressed their view that the sole solution was to accept the U.S. hegomony. After the War of Independence and the establishment of Turkish Republic, political, cultural and economic relations with the U.S. augmented gradually. In fact, the reason or reasons of two states’ relationship initiated after the World War II and intensified in time between a super power like U.S. and a medium power like Turkey has always aroused wonder. However, when we examine foreign policy patterns that these states adopt and opportunities that they present for each other we would realise that the relations between these two states are based on mutual benefits and common ideals. From the end of World War II to the begining of post-Cold War period the U.S. and Turkey shared approximately the same ideals related to security perception, defence policies, foreign policy principles through supporting each other in international platforms. Although there has been some disagreements regarding some foreign policy matters between these two states in the end they succeeded to find a solution. During the Cold War period while Turkey did its best to side with the U.S. in order to survive economically and politically U.S. did its utmost to benefit from its geopolitically important ally, Turkey, to reinforce its position and compansate its geopolitical deficiencies in the Middle East region against the Soviet Union. Following the demise of the Soviet Union the mentioned reciprocal advantages continued. The structural changes in the Balkans and Central Asian region and the plasticity appeared after the Gulf War II still necessitate both states’ cooperation in every field. In the first part of this article, Turkish-American relations will be explained through historical perspective, in the second part, in order to grasp the nature of those relations common foreign policy preferences that make those two states closer will be detailed and this close relationship will be identified along with examples. In the last part of the article, the problems faced by Turkey as the result of the mentioned close relationship between Turkey and the U.S. will be highlightened but it will also be mentioned that those problems were unable to detoriatate the continuity between Turkey and the U.S. In other words, in the article, it will be proved that the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. represents “strategic partnership” rather than “ordinary” and “temporary” through explaining the factors which necessitate “continuity” between those two states.

Key Words:Turkey, U.S., relations, problems, continuity, strategic partnership

ÖZET

Türk ve Amerikan halkları arasındaki ilişkilerin geçmişi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Osmanlı Türklerinin Amerikalılara yönelik ilgisi, 1860’larda yeni keşfedilen bu dünyaya yapılan toplu göçlerle ve 1870’lerden itibaren misyonerliğin Amerikan kolejlerinin önderliğinde Anadolu’da yayılmasıyla artmaya başladı. II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde bazı Türk öğrenciler tahsil için Amerika’ya gitti. Amerika’daki askeri kadro ve Osmanlı diplomatları da bu yakınlaşmayı hızlandırdı. Türklerin ABD’ye ilgisi, ABD’nin I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı savaş açmama kararı alması ve savaştan sonra Wilson barış prensiplerini açıklaması üzerine daha da arttı. Hatta bir kısım Osmanlı aydını tek çözümün ABD egemenliğini kabul etmek olduğu görüşünü bile dile getirir oldu. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kurulmasından sonra, ABD ile siyasal, kültürel ve ekonomik ilişkiler giderek gelişme gösterdi. Öte yandan, iki devletin II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra başlayan ve ABD gibi bir süper güçle Türkiye gibi orta büyüklükte bir ülke arasında zamanla artan ilişkinin nedenleri hep hayretle karşılanmıştır. Ancak, bu devletlerin benimsemiş olduğu dış politika davranış modellerini ve birbirlerine sundukları fırsatları incelediğimizde, bu iki devlet arasındaki ilişkilerin karşılıklı çıkarlara ve ortak ideallere dayandığını görürüz. II. Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesinden Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin başlangıcına kadar ABD ve Türkiye, uluslararası platformlarda birbirlerini destekleyerek güvenlik anlayışı, savunma politikaları, dış politika ilkeleriyle ilgili olarak hemen hemen aynı idealleri paylaşmışlardır. Bu iki devlet arasında bazı dış politika konularında anlaşmazlıklar çıkmış olsa da sonunda bir çözüm bulmayı başarmışlardır. Türkiye, Soğuk Savaş döneminde, ekonomik ve siyasal olarak ayakta kalabilmek amacıyla ABD’nin tarafında olmak için elinden gelen çabayı gösterirken, ABD de, Orta Doğu bölgesinde Sovyetler Birliği karşısındaki durumunu kuvvetlendirmek ve jeopolitik yetersizliklerini telafi etmek üzere jeopolitik önemi bulunan bu müttefikinden, Türkiye’den yararlanmak için büyük çaba harcamıştır. Bu karşılıklı avantajlar Sovyetler Birliği’nin sona ermesinden sonra da devam etmiştir. Balkanlar ve Orta Asya bölgesindeki yapısal değişiklikler, II. Irak operasyonundan sonra ortaya çıkan belirsizlik, günümüzde de her iki devletin her alanda işbirliğini gerektirmektedir. Yıllardır benimsedikleri ortak politikaların yanısıra, ABD ve Türkiye, birçok konuda birbirleri için önem taşımaktadır. Bu makale kapsamında, birinci bölümde Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki ilişkiler tarihsel perspektif kapsamında incelendikten sonra ikinci bölümde bu yakın ilişkinin tabiatını anlamak için bu devletleri yakınlaştıran ortak dış politika tercihleri açıklanacak, Türkiye’nin ABD için taşıdığı önem ve ABD’nin de Türkiye için arz ettiği önem örneklerle ifade edilecektir. Son bölümde ise Türkiye’nin ABD ile 1950’li yıllardan itibaren geliştirdiği yoğun ikili ilişkilerin Türkiye nezdinde yarattığı sorunsal örneklerle açıklanacak fakat bu sorunsalın ikili ilişkilerde sürekliliği engelleyici bir niteliğe sahip olmadığı belirtilecektir. Bir başka deyişle, Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde “sürekliliği” gerektiren faktörler açıklanmak suretiyle Türk-ABD ilişkilerinin sıradan ve geçici nitelik taşıyan bir ilişkiden çok öte, bir stratejik ortaklık olduğu ispatlanmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:Türkiye, ABD, ilişki, sorunlar, süreklilik, stratejik ortaklık

INTRODUCTION
The Cold War concept put forward an entire and continuous clash between the sides. The establishment of the blocks employed the credibility of that concept. The Cold War motto 'allied or enemy' in a way helped the foundation of the blocks. In other words, the founding concept of the blocks urged their supporters (the states) to adopt the way of life, different in the Eastern and Western blocks. By doing so, the block leaders could reinforce the values which provide the continuity of the blocks and solidarity among block supporters (Langlois et.al., 2000:277) Depending on the mentioned threat perception concept and block structures in the Cold War realities, Turkish officials developed security policies shaped by the newly-emerged security concerns at the very begining of 1950s. First of all, Turkey prefered to be a member of the Nato to preserve its territorial integrity and the right to self-determination against the Soviet Union. In the following years of the Cold War period, Turkish officials, in order to cover Turkey's economic and security needs, and to realise Westernization ideals, did their utmost to integrate with the security, military and economic organizations of the West, particularly the U.S. The period after the Cold War brought about both international and regional chaos and Turkey, suddenly and unexpectedly, found herself in this political mess. Along with the nationalist, religious and ethnic confrontations in the Balkan, Caucasus and Central Asian regions and with the changes in the Gulf, Turkey had to recall its security concerns and security policy in the new international environment (Fuller, 1992:30) Unlike the Cold War period, Turkey has to determine its security and foreign policy from a wider perspective. Since the begining of the post-Cold War period, far from being a ‘defensive’ process, the conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy orientation has involved political, economic and cultural factors all together. So, since 1990s Turkey has to make its security and foreign policy arrangements not only according to Russian threat, defence of its borders and attempts of Greece as in the Cold War period but also according to multi-dimentional changes in the balance of power in international system, and the mentioned political environment also necessitates Turkish-U.S. close cooperation in 21st century.
1.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE U.S.

The relations between the Turks and Americans dates back to the Ottoman Empire period. Since the Americans had given importance to trade they concluded treaties with Algeria, Tripoli and Tunisia which were under Ottoman domination then. The basic goal of America was to initiate trade with some Ottoman provinces. On May 7, 1831, Treaty of Commerce was signed by the Ottoman Empire and America. Following this treaty, both the number of American commercial ship visiting Izmir and the exportation rate grew largely. Along with the mentioned developments, America set up its consulate in İstanbul in 1831. Despite these efforts, the Ottoman society, except for the ones in state administration, had no detailed information about Americans. Familiarity with the Americans rose through the mass immigrations of the Ottoman Turks to the newly discovered world began in 1860s and also through the extension of the missionaries headed American colleges in Anatolia since the begining of 1870. In the Constitutional Era II, some Turkish students went to America for education. Moreover, the military staff and the Ottoman diplomats in America also accelerated this familiarity. (Kuran, 1994:39-43) Turkish interest in the U.S. grew more depending on U.S. determination not to wage war against the Ottoman Empire in the World War I and quite humanitarian 14 Points of Woodrow Wilson declared by the U.S. after the war. In line with this, even some Turkish intellectuals expressed their view that the sole solution was to accept the U.S. hegomony. After the War of Independence and the establishment of Turkish Republic, political, cultural and economic relations with the U.S. augmented gradually. It has been customary to view Turkish-American relations in four different periods. In an analytical setting, Truman Doctrine (1947) is regarded as the first step in bilateral relationship. In the first period (1945-1960), the relations between these two states represents full cooperation in every field from military to politics. In the second period (1960-1980), the relations have had some defects due to the changes in international system and some negaive changes in American policy toward Turkey. In the third period (1980-1990) Turkish-American relations turned out to be normal following the Islamic revolution in Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The fourth period still continues. In this period the relations between U.S. and Turkey necessitate full cooperation again. So as to explain the features of the relations between these two states we will draw an outline of the periods roughly.

a. Period I (1945-1960)
Political polarization of the international system, possible expansion of communist ideology and the Soviet threat have been the factors which provided U.S.-Turkish close-up. The U.S., in order to take the security of the Middle East under guarantee against Soviet Union and to prevent Soviet Union from enlarging its influence through the Meditarenean, began to reinforce relations with Turkey. The first concrete example of this warm relationship showed itself in financial assistance given by the U.S. to Turkey as the result of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and following Turkey’s Nato membership, strategic and political cooperation expanded the content of Turkish-U.S. relations. Turkey remained one of the most important and trustable ally of the U.S. between 1945 and 1960. During that period while Turkey was extremely contented to have integrated herself with the west and western institutions U.S. was totaly satisfied about Turkey since she was able to surround Soviet Union partly through Turkey by intensifying relations. So, we might say that neither Turkey nor U.S. have had such a nice experience in terms of bilateral relations after that period.

b. Period II (1960-1980)
It can be argued that between 1960 and 1980 Turkish-American relations could not keep their intensified level as between 1945 and 1960. The reasons of this downgrade were various. First of all, the detente occured in international system led both the U.S. and Turkey to initiate political relations with the Soviet Union. Deployment of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey for the exchange of removal of Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962, which caused discomfort in Turkey (Sander, 1979:209-225) and some other attempts to soften tight relations with the Soviet Union all affected Turkish-American relations negatively. In addition to this, the positive changes in Soviet political behaviour had also an impact on softening the tight bipolar system. However, apart from the changes in international system, the relations with the U.S. were heavily shaped by the American attitude toward Cyprus issue after 1960s. The U.S. has always regarded Cyprus problems as a serious handicap between two important Nato members and claimed that any problem that would possibly cause severe conflict between Turkey and Greece would give harm to Nato’s security responsibilities in the Balkans and Middle East particularly regarding the Soviet Union. For this reason, the U.S. opposed any attempt to solve the Cyprus issue through clash or war except for bilateral agreements. In addition to the U.S. security interests, the activities of the Greek Lobby also affected the U.S. policy toward Cyprus since the mid-1950s. While the Greek Lobby was influential over the President (the then President Johnson) in 1963-64 Cyprus crisis, Greek Americans successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress during 1974 Cyprus crisis. (Bölükbaşı, 1992:66) In 1964, when Turkish authorities decided to send troops to Cyprus, U.S. openly represented her opposition against Turkey within the letter sent by the U.S. president Lyndon Johnson on June 1964. In president Johnson’s letter U.S. supported the idea that the military attack to be realised by Turkey would result with direct Soviet interference with the issue and expressed that she would hinder Turkey to use the military device supplied by the U.S. for Turkey in this attack.

Following the Johnson letter the relations between Turkey and U.S. began to lessen and even became negative. In 1965, Turkey rejected MLF (Multi Lateral Force) Project. In the same year, Turkey refused to augment its military force within Nato complaining about the insufficiency of military assistance given to her by Nato. Moreover, Turkey criticised U.S. in relation with the Vietnam War declaring that she is not infavour of using force in Vietnam. In addition to these, use of American bases and joint defence installations in Turkey was rearranged by Turkey in 1968 and 1969. The mentioned rearrangement restricted the unlimited activities of the U.S. in Turkey through these bases and installations. Turkey also forced U.S. to decrease the number of the American personnel in Turkey. Furthermore, the coalition government headed by Premier Bulent Ecevit resumed the poppy growing ban in 1974. The gradual reduction in the amount of financial assistance given to Turkey by the U.S. appeared unexpectedly as a kind of punishment after 1968. So, we can argue that both the changes in international political system and Cyprus crisis in 1964 had been the determinants of Turkish-American relations between 1964 and 1974. (See Sönmezoğlu, 1995:29-84) The second phase after 1974 respresented more complexity in terms of Turkish-American relations. Following the second peace attack of Turkey in Cyprus, the U.S. cancelled the military assistance to Turkey and on 5 February 1975 U.S. arms ambargo on Turkey began. Just after the ambargo decision was put into force Turkey began to show opposition. On 13 February 1975 Turkey declared the establishment of Cyprus Turkish Federative state and on 26 February she expressed that she will not join the Nato Winter Practices to be realised in February-March. In addition to these, on 25 July 1975 Turkish government cancelled the 1969 U.S.-Turkish Treaty and banned the activities of all American bases/installations in Turkey. (see Campany, 1986) Although the U.S. government softened the conditions of the ambargo in late 1975, during the period in which the ambargo kept its relevance, Turkey was badly affected economically. From the begining of ambargo decision to the removal of it, Turkey felt the necessity to reevaluate her relations and position in Western alliance. The idea that Turkey should give more importance to her own national benefits than devoting herself fully to the U.S. began to be widely pronounced.

c. Period III (1980-1990)
Following the lifting of the U.S. ambargo on Turkey, the relations between two states turned to normality. However, it should be taken into consideration that removal of the U.S. ambargo on Turkey was not only and the most important reason which made the relations better. In this context, the changes in international system consisted the other side of the coin. Since the changes directly affected American attitude toward Turkey we will mention these changes roughly.

As we pointed out before one of the reasons which helped Turkish-American relations be less intimate had been the improvement in Soviet-American relations. During the detente period in which the Soviet threat had been softened as the result of bilateral agreements reached by two parties, Turkey’s importance before the U.S. diminished. Following the upgrading relations with the Soviet Union, American security perception in the Middle East had lost its severeness and parallel to this development American policy on Turkey, which was believed to be the most important state against any Soviet expansion in the Middle East region, had changed profoundly and unexpectedly. From then on, U.S. concentrated its attention on Cyprus matter between Greece and Turkey and disappointed Turkey several times through taking negative decisions in the Congress. However, two important developments in 1979, Islamic Revolution in Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, resulted with total satisfaction in terms of Turkey. Along with the regime change in Iran, U.S. lost one of the two important pillars in the Middle East. Following the dismantlement of pro-American Shah Rıza Pehlevi, the new leader Ayetollah Homeyni declared the U.S. as the Great Satan and adopted rather hostile policy toward American supporters. Furthermore, Soviet Union, in order to fill the gap emerged as the result of the regime change in Iran and to have advantages in the Middle East region, began to increase relations with Iran. The Soviet Union was also intensifying relations, particularly economic relations, with Turkey. In addition to the developments mentioned above, Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979, which severely affected promising Soviet-American relations. These all gave the signals of a possible radical change in Soviet foreign policy behaviour and forced U.S. to rearrange its policies related to the Soviet Union. Along with revival of Soviet interest in the Middle East region Turkey regained its importance before the U.S. regarding its role in the Middle East, eastern Mediterranean and Balkans against Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, vital importance of Adana-Incirlik Air Base began to be more emphasized by the U.S. (see Sezer, 1981) Besides the decreasing level of oppression by the U.S. on Turkey related to the Cyprus matter, U.S. also increased the amount of assistance given to Turkey. While the reason of less strict American attitude towards Turkey related to the Cyprus matter was that Cyprus matter began to consist only a small part of American foreign policy agenda since she had to focus on the changes occured in late 1970s, the reason of an increase in American assistance to Turkey was to make Turkey be better off in order to guarantee the security of the Middle East, eastern Mediterranean and Balkans against Soviet Union.

d. Period IV (1991- )
The post-Cold War realities of international political system necessitated both the U.S. and Turkey to forget misconceptions, bad experiences felt in the Cold War period. The changes in international system did not loose the ties with the U.S.. On the contrary, along with the development, Turkey became more indispensable for U.S. and vice versa. Gulf Crisis and Gulf War in 1990-1991, the new order in Central Asian region and disorder in the Balkans, terrorist attack on World Trade Center all proved the necessity and reinforced the mentioned Turkish-U.S. relationship. However, the most critical factor that rises coflict in regard to Turkish-U.S. relations presently has been the different political approaches of Turkish and American sides to the developments in Iraq following the second U.S. operation in Iraq. Turkish decision-makers strongly believe that the prevailing chaos in Iraq would lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq and this would result in the threat of that state against Turkish national security. Despite the guarantees and promises given by the American political elite related with the preservation of Turkish national security, Turkish side still feels a profound hesitation on the issue and that makes the relations rather tense recently.
2. THE FACTORS LEADING TURKEY AND THE U.S. TO BECOME ALLIES
In fact, the reason or reasons of two states’ relationship initiated after the World War II and intensified in time between a super power like U.S. and a medium power like Turkey has always aroused wonder. However, when we examine foreign policy patterns that these states adopt and opportunities that they present for each other we would realise that the relations between these two states are based on mutual benefits and common ideals. So, in order to understand the nature of this intimate relationship, we would emphasize common foreign policy preferences that lead these states to become closer and importance of Turkey for the U.S. and importance of U.S. for Turkey. In other words we would mention the factors which necessitate “continuity” in Turkish-American relations.
a. Common Foreign Policy Preferences
Although American foreign policy is much more diversified and complex compared to Turkish foreign policy the similarities between these two states’ foreign policy behaviour have been astonishingly high. From the end of World War II to the begining of post-Cold War period the U.S. and Turkey shared approximately the same ideals related to security perception, defence policies, foreign policy principles through supporting each other in international platforms.

So, it would be ideal to give some examples which would make it clear that Turkey and U.S. have had some common foreign policy preferences during the Cold War years and in post-Cold War period: 1. During the Cold War years both U.S. and Turkey were determined to take precautions against communist ideology and Soviet Union’s expansionist threat. While U.S. developed policies to make Soviet expansionist threat ineffective (see MFA Working Group Paper, pp.200-207) and “determined to rescue the world from Stalin as they did from Hitler” (Ambrose, 1992:xi), Turkey, in order to defend its territorial unity, not only adopted these policies also actively involved in structures developed for the containment of the Soviet Union. Nato and Baghdad Pact were among these structures; 2. Both the U.S. and Turkey were in favour of maintaining international political order established after the World War II. As the American strategist John Spkyman indicated, the main notion that the U.S. strategy is based on during the World War II and after this war has been to hinder the emergence of any states’ hegemony over other states in Europe and Asia. For this reason, U.S. has found it evitable that she has to continue her existence in these regions. (Elekdağ, 1999) After the World War II, Turkey shared the same idea with the U.S.. She speculated that Soviet political and economic influence or hegemony particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean would create catastrophic results which would threaten her independence; 3. Following the demise of the Soviet Union this mentioned policy remained unchanged. American attitude in the Gulf Crisis II has been the first example which proved the continuation of U.S.’ policy. Saddam Hussein who started the war with Kuwait in order to enlarge Iraq’s sphere of influence in the Middle East region came accross with U.S. objection. The attempts of the Russian Federation to fill the political, military and economic vacuum in the Central Asian region occured as the result of the break up of the Soviet Union led the reinforcement of the U.S. interest in the region. In this newly- shaped world order Turkey does not approve any states’ hegemony especially nearby. The most important reason of the U.S., according to Buzan “undoubtedly greatest of the great powers” (Buzan, 1991:434) after 1990s, to continue this policy in the new world order is to emphasize its super power position in international arena. One of the most important issue disscussed among foreign policy decision makers in Washington after the Cold War period was how to prepare the conditions that would lead the U.S. to last its global hegemony. (Gürses, 1999) However, the idea of Turkey in regard to following this policy in this new world order is much less sophisticated compared to the U.S.. Turkey only wishes to gain advantages through using cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious ties with the Central Asian republics in the Central Asian region, be the most powerful regional state in Middle East and the Balkans. Turkey believes that as long as the status quo is kept in these regions she would be advantageous; 4. In the new world order both U.S. and Turkey, as in the Cold War period, have been tightly sticked with the existence and reinforcement of Nato. Although Nato connotates different meanings for the U.S. and Turkey, these two states develop policies which support Nato fully. The following two quotations by two Turkish journalists explain the importance of the Nato both for Turkey and the U.S. “Turkey, through its Nato membership, could maintain its territorial unity and security, survive despite Moscow’s expansionist ideals. By the help of Nato membership Turkey could modernise and strengthten its military forces; provide foreign support necessary for economic development and have an important position in the West...” (Kohen, 1999) “According to Washington, the most important function of Nato has been to last U.S.’ military and political existence in Europe and to provide a legal basis for the mentioned existence”. (Elekdağ, 1999); 5. Different from the Cold War period, ethnic and religious conflicts and economic inequality began to be uttered more often in stead of inter-state ideological, political and military wars. While the solution to East-West conflict was mainly based on “deterence” in the Cold War period, the solution to ethnic and religious conflict is based on “peace operations” in the post-Cold War period. As seen in the Gulf War II, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova these peace operations have become widely spread. While the U.S., as the leader of Nato, directs these operations, Turkey is directly involved in the mentioned operations either by providing logistic and military support, financial assistance or humanitarian aid. Since peace operations bear importance for both the U.S. and Turkey, they prefer acting together. Although the reason of the U.S. and Turkey’s participation in peace operations is completely different, their cooperation in these make them more intimate. It is obvious that U.S. plays primarily important role in peace operations in order to prevent any state’s attempt to gain influence as the result of power vacuum occured by religious or ethnic conflicts in some regions; Turkey, through siding with the U.S., intends to gain political, economic and military support of the U.S. and to augment its prestige with in the Nato; 6. Turkey and the U.S. share the same ideas about the necessity of democratic government systems and market economy. While U.S. emphasises her proud regarding her initiatives to establish institutions and norms of democracy and market economy in the newly independent states which lack these and also her attemps to help the countries to preserve their democratic structures and market economies, Turkey does not hesitate to point out its uniqueness particularly in the Middle East region since she is the only democratic and laic country which represents unique example in the region. In the post-Cold War order, the U.S. as the global super power supports attempts of democratization and transition to market economy. The U.S. believes that as long as democratic institutions are established and economic wellfare is maintained the world would be less chaotic. As for Turkey’s support to the establishment of democracy and market economy, Turkey’s policy is quite clear, Turkey assumes that the newly-independent Central Asian republics would be able to last their independence and refrain from going under the influence of any regional or global power, such as Russian Federation, through adopting norms of democracy and market economy.

However, the wildcard scenario in regard to those common foreign policy preferences appeared following the Iraqi operation of the U.S. after 9/11. Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, inspired by the ongoing chaos in Iraq, very often points out their determination to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq through intensifying their anti-Turkish political discourse and propaganda. And the PKK, reinforced indirectly by those negative developments, has increased its attacks against Turkey. American neutral stand toward the activities of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and the attacks of the PKK against Turkey rises and intensifies negative concern among Turkish political elite.

b. Importance of Turkey and U.S. for each other
In addition to the common policies that these two states have adopted for years, both U.S. and Turkey represent importance for each other in many issues. Firstly we will mention the importance of Turkey for the U.S. then importance of the U.S. for Turkey.
What Does Turkey Mean For The U.S.
It might sound rather ego-centric to other states that Turkish foreign-policy makers overemphasize the geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of Turkey before some other regional or international powers particularly before the U.S. However, along with the begining of the post-Cold War period the explanations in regard to the strategic importance of Turkey made by the U.S. officials back this widely held view strongly even they make it clear that geo-strategic importance of Turkey taking its functions in various regions in the post-Cold War period compared to the functions she had in certain regions in the Cold War period increased immensely. The following explanations of Arthur Cry, the former vice-president and programme director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, resumes the reasons why Turkey has represented importance since the Cold War and why this importance is getting more remarkable since the begining of the post-Cold War period for the U.S. According to Cry, “Turkey remains distinctive in several respects from the perspective of American foreign policy. First, the nation is one of the most faithful and reliable allies. The large number of Turkish as well as American graves at the special United Nations cemetery at Pusan at South Corea, a moving legacy of fighting together to defend that nation during the 1950-1953 Korean War, are among the most dramatic testimonies available for that fact. More recently, Turkey stood with the U.S. and other UN forces in the coalition which drove Iraq out of Kuwait in early 1991. Secondly, Turkey is at geopolitical crossroads, now as it was in the past. Turkey, rightly, is both a traditional great power and one with a pivotal role in the contemporary fluid international system; she holds control of the straits linking the Black and Mediterranean seas, is located at the southern end of a region which has known almost constant tension and strife since the Crimean War of the mid-nineteen century and has a powerful national military tradition. At the same time, the end of the Cold War provides an incentive to move beyond the Western tendency to view Turkey, at times in an off-hand manner, as simply a buffer and barrier against possible expansion by the Soviet Union. Thirdly, Turkey is at religious and cultural crossroads as well, blending Christian and Muslim populations, at the border of the Judaeo, Christian West and Muslim East. Turkey is confronted with a changing national population pattern at the same time that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and associated movements and immigration from Islamic nations to Europe is generating political concern and social tension in the West”. (Cry, 1996:108) In addition to the explanations above the following items will also help us understand the importance of Turkey for the U.S. better:

Nato’s Milestone: During the Cold War period and in the new world order Turkey has played an important role with in the Nato. Kuniholm explains the mentioned crucial role that Turkey holds in the following words; “...as the strongest anti-Communist country on the periphery of the Soviet Union, only country in the eastern Mediterranean capable of substantial resistance to the Soviets; it constituted a deterrent to Soviet aggression and provided something of a protective screen for the region”. (Kuniholm, 1983:422) According to the U.S., Nato’s realisation of its defence role and reinforcement of this role is regarded as the primarily important for global security. Turkey, being a Nato member, showed a great performance in the Middle East region and against the Soviet Union during the Cold War years. In the post-Cold War period Turkey’s importance with in Nato increased in relation with its geographical capabilities in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia. Arık expresses this upgrading importance and influence of Turkey in these words “Turkey has moved on from its marginal position of merely being a southern flank country of Nato, to become a common center and platform where what we can briefly call rings of Eurasian regional security are emerging. Central and eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central Asia, all of these Circles of Security, are clamped together and intersect where Turkey is located”. (Arık, 1995/96:8) So, we can argue that from the U.S. point of view, Turkey will remain one of the most important Nato ally of the U.S. through assisting the well-being of global security.
Trustable Ally: History of Turkish-American relations proved the fact that although the U.S. caused threat to Turkey’s defence and security (Cuba missile crisis in 1962); directly interfered with Turkey’s own security issues (1965 Johnson Letter); cancelled military and economic assistance (1975 U.S. arms ambargo); gave harm to Turkish economy (Turkey’s economic loss in the end of Gulf War II) and realised policies which affected Turkey’s internal stability negatively (security zone above 36 parallel emerged along with the Gulf War II in the northern Iraq), Turkey did not give up siding with the U.S. and remained as the most faithful ally of her.
An Important State against the Soviet Union/Russian Federation: During the Cold War period, Turkey actively took part in containment policy designed to keep the Soviet Union under pressure militarily and politically in order to prevent it from causing military and political threat in the regions geographically close to it and also against the Western block. Turkey’s activities within the containment policy gave practical results against the Soviet Union particularly in the Middle East region. Although the communist threat removed in the post-Cold War order, Russian Federation, the successor of the Soviet Union, still causes discomfort in Nato and Central Asian region. Nationalist attitude of some of the leaders, the policies adopted against Nato enlargement, near abroad policy based on keeping formerly Soviet states under its own political and economic authority are the sources of threat in the Russian Federation. In this new structure, Turkey also has an important mission in the region. She both helps the U.S. be closer to political and economic developments in the Central Asian republics and control the Russian policies related to these republics. In other words, Turkey provides suitable environment for the U.S. to realise its own policies in the Central Asian region.
Geopolitically well-situated State: Fortunately, this faithful ally of the U.S. represents a geopolitical miracle for her. She is located on the passing routes of the regions which bear vital importance for the U.S. In this light, it would be a must to evaluate Turkey’s geopolitical importance for the U.S., say, what does Turkey represent for the U.S. in terms of geopolitics? The answer to be given would also enlighten Turkey’s credibility before the U.S. According to Oral Sander, geographic location of Turkey which has influenced U.S. geostrategic perception about Turkey should be assessed on two levels. Firstly, Turkey’s importance regarding the Middle East region and secondly Turkey’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. (Sander, 1980:112) Turkey has been one of the most important regional actors in the Middle East region. During the Cold War years and also at present U.S. did strongly need and still needs the existence and prosperity of Turkey taking its economic and political interests into consideration. Maintaining free flow of oil into world markets, safeguarding the security of transportation routes in the Mediterranean; providing continuity of the status quo in the Middle East region, supporting Israel state’s independence and deterring any Soviet military attack will remain primarily important issues for the U.S. Turkey’s remarkable geographic location in the Middle East directly affects capability of the U.S. to realise military attack or counterattack in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition to this, U.S. via Turkey can have the chance of interfering in regional wars in the Middle East region as experienced in the Gulf War II. Furthermore, Turkey has been the most suitable state to eliminate any Soviet military adventure in the region. (Sander, p.113) Besides the importance of Turkey in the Middle East region, Turkey’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation is also significant for the U.S. global defence requirements. During the Cold War period, U.S. installed several military bases to be used in case of any Soviet military attack. Although the Soviet threat lost its priority in U.S. defence perception following its disintegration, Turkey’s geographic proximity to the Russian Federation is still important considering political, economic and military ideals of the Russian Federation, the successor to the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period Turkey would possibly play an important role in the conflicts to occure in the Central Asian region and Balkans which would necessitate U.S. involvement.

The points mentioned above only consist half of the reasons which provide continuity in Turkish-American relations. The panorama will be complete when we indicate reasons of indispensibility of the U.S. for Turkey since 1945.
What Does The U.S. Mean For Turkey
Since the end of the World War II and the begining of East-West confrontation, the U.S. has meant several meanings for Turkey in terms of Turkey’s defense requirements, economic needs, political and economic support in international organizations and security. In the following items we will try to explain the reasons of Turkey’s close relationship with the U.S. for years.

Military and Economic Assistance: Parallel to the Cold War period Nato security concept, Turkey was obliged to fulfill tasks in the regions in which the U.S. interests are important. For the realisation of these duties Turkey was supported militarily and economically by the U.S. Although the Soviet threat was removed U.S. government finds it necessary to continue to give military and economic assistance to Turkey. As mentioned before, although Turkey’s mission to play the role imposed by the U.S. against the Soviet Union’s expansionist policy was reduced due to the changes in international system at the begining of the post-Cold period, some other developments which urged the West and U.S. to reevaluate Turkey’s position in the region made the global powers to direct their attention to Turkey again. According to the Nato members, particularly the U.S., despite the fact that Turkey’s responsibility as the southern flank ally of Nato in the Cold War period was eliminated Turkey has suddenly become more important regarding the ethnic, religious and political conflicts and also economic problems in the formerly Russian communities. Turkey started to be viewed as a state which can make a crucial contribution to integrating these newly emerging states into a broader Euro-Atlantic structure of security and cooperation and also which can serve as a model and guide for those states which aspire to follow the path of secular democracy. (Solana, 1996:17) For the reasons mentioned above Turkey’s downgrading importance at the very begining of the post-Cold War period was replaced and increased regarding international changes. So, in this new system, the U.S. is in favour of assisting Turkey militarily, politically and economically. Turkey, taking the fact that she could realise her economic and military development after the World War II largely by the U.S. assistance into consideration, has always been in need of U.S. financial support. Due to this reason, Turkey’s one of the most important concerns in the context of Turkish-American relations has been the continuation of American financial assistance during the Cold War period and in the post-Cold War order. Turkey shows great attention to her relationship with the U.S. for the continuation and increase of this financial assistance.
Security: It can be argued that Turkey has always felt discomfort about sharing 600 kilometres border with such a big neighbour like Soviet Union during the Cold War years. The Ottoman Turks had enough experience about Soviet Empire for 400 years due to the long and often wars. Along with the establishment of the Soviet Union, following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, except for the first few decades, Turkey began to experience direct threat from the Soviet Union. Soviet demand to have bases on the straits and to annex Kars and Ardahan prepared a suitable milieu for Turkish agitatation against the Soviet Union. From then on, Turkey began to look for the ways to take its security and defence under guarantee. Although the U.S. refused Turkey’s proposal to side with her against the Soviet Union for several times, in the end she adopted pro-Turkish policy against the common threat, the Soviet Union. Especially after Nato membership, Turkey found a strong ally, like the U.S. and provided Western support for its security needs against the Soviet Union. Since the begining of 1945, for Turkey the U.S. refered to a kind of partner which can eliminate Turkey’s security worries. Although the Soviet threat was removed, new threats emerged and Turkey still requires the U.S. back in the pot-Cold War order. So, it is obvious that security concerns of Turkey constitutes a large part of its intimate relationship with the U.S.
Integration with the Western Institution: The desire of the founder of Turkish Republic was to reach the level of Western states, in other words Westernisation was a kind of state policy. Adaptation of western law and tradition were among the first attempts that new Turkish Republic realised. After the World War II, Turkey accelerated this process due to its security, defence and economic concerns. Regarding the changes in the balance of power and polarization, Turkey deeply involved itself in joining Western institutions. In connection with this involvement U.S. played an important role. U.S. facilitated Turkey’s integration process with the western institutions through providing political support in international platforms.


3. THE PROBLEMS FACED BY TURKEY AS THE RESULT OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE U.S.
According to the explanations given above we can prove the fact that Turkish-American foreign policy preferences coincide with eachother and there have been many factors which make these two states set up close relationship. When we overview the period during which Turkey and U.S. have been the closest allies, it would become obvious that Turkey in order to benefit from the U.S. support had to make several concessions and experience some disadvantages while the U.S. stood more powerfully before Soviet Union in some regions such as Middle East and eastern Mediterranean by the help of Turkey. In order to explain the mentioned concessions and disadvantages that Turkey has had in regard to this close relationship with the U.S., we would give some examples. First of all, Turkey made the Middle East Arab states alienated for the sake of U.S.. Turkey while intensifying relations with the U.S. and the West developed anti-Arab policies. So, this caused both the increase in Arab hatred against Turkey and resulted with the elimination of Middle East states’ political and economic support that Turkey planned to have under the conditions that she strongly needed. Secondly, from time to time Turkish authorities had to tackle with domestic policy chaos caused by Turkey’s long standing dependency on the U.S. and rather permissive attitude toward this state. Anti-Americanism, which emerged in late 1960 and became virulent in 1970s, provoked rightists and leftists in Turkey and shared the responsibility of destabilising domestic policy order. Thirdly, Turkey, taking her security and economic needs and also Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s goals based on westernization and economic development into account, had to be dependent on the U.S. fully. This complete dependence on the U.S. refrained Turkey from determining her foreign policy strategies related to the regions in which Turkey is geographically situated, from adopting multi-dimensional foreign policy and diversifying its foreign policy agenda. This also resulted in isolation of Turkey in international political arena. Turkey felt the need of other states’ political and economic support particularly whenever its relations became worse with the U.S. but could not obtain she expected. Fourthly, Turkey’s determination to cooperate only with the U.S. after the World War II made her incapable of emphasising its economic and military power before the U.S.’ immense military and economic power. But, if Turkey had developed cooperation particularly with the regional states, the political and military potential she had would have given her the chance of being a regional power. Lastly, Turkish decision-makers had clearly declared its stand as regard the northern Iraq, an independent Kurdish state in the region just before the second U.S. operation in Iraq and warned the sides against the probable establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Kurdish groups attempted to enlarge their sphere of influence in Iraq following the U.S. disappointment as the result of negative decision given by Turkish Grand National Assembly in March. From then on, almost every political attempt of Turkey related with Northern Iraq faced both the U.S. and the Kurdish groups. Moreover, the attempts to establish federal Kurdish region in northern Iraq resulted in favour of the Kurds. In this process, the U.S. anti-Turkish approach might be evaluated as the negative result of that mentioned disappointment.
CONCLUSION
Despite the disadvantages Turkey had to experience and also considering Turkey’s economic and military development partly supported by the U.S., we can support the idea that “Turkey’s foreign policy, in the foreseeable conjunctures of the late twentieth century, can not be conceived in terms of whether one takes one’s coffee with milk or not-that is, whether one takes Turkish foreign policy with the U.S. or without the U.S.. The parameters of Turkish foreign policy are such that Turkey is almost destined to take its coffee with milk particularly given the proven strategic antics of our European friends and the vast uncertainties of an apres Yeltsin situation in Russia”. (Borovalı, 1996:74)

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Zionism and Palestine-Israeli Conflict

The Palestine-Israeli Conflict in regard to Zionist Practices (unpublished article)

Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş KONA

Abstract:There have been several political problems in the Middle East region. However, Jewish-laic Israeli state’s enlargement policies which caused a direct negative impact on Palestine-İsraeli relations has been the most important among those problems in the Arab-Muslim Middle East region. The mentioned conflict, which began along with the Zionist policies and intensified parallel to the establishment of Israel state, has become much more complex throughout the years. Following this process, several Arab-Israel wars have been experienced which resulted in huge loss for both sides. The peace plans aimed at terminating the conflict could not bring a permanent solution to the problem, on the contrary, along with those plans Israeli state could have enlarged its sphere of influence in the region. The conflict, that remained unsolved due to the clashing interests of the sides and due to the interventionist policies of the big powers, is being tried to be solved through the Road Map peace plan currently. However, just after the application of the first level of that last plan the clashes have increased., and İsraeli state has placed itself in a position which can not be controled easily. In this study, on the one hand, it was explained that the political attempts that the Jews had made from the second half of the 19th century along with the zionist policies to the establishment of the Israel state did affect Arab-Jewish relations in the Middle East region , on the other hand, it was also pointed out that in what ways three important Arab-Israeli wars and the peace plans/negotiation attempts affected Israeli state’s status and political stand in the Middle East region before both the Palestinians and the Arabs, and how the Israel state gained that political power in time in the region.

Key Words: Zionism, Palestine-Israeli conflict, Arab-Israeli wars, Palestine, peace process, Road Map.

İntroduction: The Source of the Problem - Zionism and the Israeli Settlement Until the World War I

In the period until the World War I, not a İsraeli state or the enlargement policies of that state but only the efforts of the Jews so as to obtain a land and to settle on that land can be mentioned. The first of those efforts started with the application of Zionist policies. So, Zionism has been regarded as the most influencial among those efforts. “Zionism, as a European movement came to be seen initially as another attempt by Western imperialism to subordinate Muslims to Europeans and became even more threatening once it was realized that the Zionists wished to take part of, what had been Arab lands for centuries and remake it into a Jewish homeland” (Smith, 1996: 33-34).



Modern Zionism dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, which refers the wish to establish an independent Jewish existence in Palestine. That modern zionism differed from the traditional zionism, that traditional zionism sees the establishment of Jewish state as a religious reward that can be given only by the Yahweh. However, modern zionism is secular and aims to use political activity to establish Israel state. Mainly, the prosecutions Jewish people underwent, discrimination and hostility that is shown to them gave rise to zionism. Jews became more adherent to their distinctive community life, after the harsh reactions coming from society. Especially, attacks on Jewish communities in Russia and Eastern Europe made them more reluctant to leave the country and some Jews immigrated to Palestine. These reople begun to set up Jewish agricultural settlement which was supported by wealthy western Jews.

Moreover, an important event took place for Jews, in 1897, that The First Zionist Congress was realised in Basel by Theodor Herzl. The founding elements of zionist policy were determined in that congress. The plan that Herzl proposed mainly conveyed the essence of decisions. According to this plan; an organized Jewish colonization in Palestine should be materialized, an internationally recognised legitimate right for the colonization of Palestine should be obtained, and the establishment of a permanent organization for Jewish people unity should be realised (Taylor, 2001: 18). The congress declared its goal as the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law. It was obvious that the main purpose of that congress was to create a Jewish State but it could not openly declare that, due to the probable reaction of the Ottoman Empire to the notion of a Jewish state on a land which it was controlling.

During that time, Jewish imigrants in Palestine purchased lands by the aid of foreign consuls, despite the fact that Ottoman officials opposed those purchasings. Between 1904 and 1914 a second wave of Jewish imigration came to Palestine, that intensified the Jewish population in the region. Consequently, Arab people became worried about the increase in population of Jews. Despite the fact that Jewish settlement created a common discontentment among Arabs, no direct action was taken to stop Jewish settlement. There were just individual protests against those settlements.

Zionist Movement During the World Wars I-II

For the first years of war, Palestine had no strategic importance except for the fact that, after the war Palestine would be a buffer-zone between Syria and Lebanon under the control of French and British-held Egypt. However, after the Revolution in Russia, British was alarmed that Germany would then use all its power against the Entente Powers. As a result, Britain decided to support zionists in Palestine, in return to support of Jews in Russia would be gained and would take Russia back to war. Moreover, British government would gain the support of Jews in U.S.A., so Jewish lobby would urge U.S. government to join the war on the side of Entente powers. In order to get the support of Jews, foreign minister of Britain Arthur James Balfour sent a letter to the Jewish member of British parliament Lord Lionel Walter Rothchild on 2 November 1917. The following points were mentioned in the letter known as Balfour Decleration:

“I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of symphaty with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet. His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it is being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be Grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation” (Landen, 1970: 197 ; TIPH, 1997: 117-119).

However, while Britain was backing Jews for independence, they also made promises to Arabs. Britain promised to support the independence of Arab states, thus Britain intended to promote Arab revolts against Turkish army, that would draw Turks from Suez Canal and weaken the Ottoman Empire in the region. It was obvious that such promises to both Arabs and Jews were contradictory, but Britain assumed that they would iron out conflicts among them, after the war.

After the World War I, Syria and Lebanon were under the mandate of France, and Paletsine, Iraq, Trans-Jordan under the mandate of Britain. Britain was responsible for the administration of both Arabs and Jews in Palestine. However, during this period, Arabs were not represented equally, despite their majority population in the region but Jews became more influential and powerful in all departments of government, that gradually Arabs were excluded from economic and political life. Furthermore, land purchases by Jews increased. Due to the lack of capital, Arabs could not catch up with the economic development of Jews. Therefore Arabs had to sell their lands. Those new Jewish-owners did not want to see Arab tenants, peasants on their lands. These people were taken away from their lands and became landless and discontented class, also transfer of land to non-Arabs caused agitation among Arabs.

Consequently, Arab riots broke out in 1929 against Jews. Head of the British commission responsible for investigation of riots, Walter Shaw stated not only the reasons of riots, but also the basis of Arab-Israeli conflict in general: “The fundamental cause (of the outbreak) is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent on the disoppointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future... The feeling as it exists today is based on the two-fold fear of the Arabs that by Jewish immigration and land purchases they may be deprived of their livelihood and placed under the economic domination of Jews” (Smith, 1996: 90).

Enlargement of Israeli Influence in the Middle East: Establishment of Israel State and 1948-1967-1973 Wars

After Nazi government’s oppressions on German Jews, another Jewish immigration wave came to Palestine. This event intensified Jewish population in Palestine, also led the enforcement of Arab discontent. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly approved the plan that Palestine would be shared by two states to be established by Jews and Arabs, and that Jarusalem and nearby would be given an international status (Bilen, 1996:12-13). Despite the fact that Jewish population was minority on the land, the independence of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948 following the UN partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

All Arab regimes including Palestinian leader of the time rejected the partition plan and woved to destroy Israel, and the first Arab-Israel War began (McKinley, 1972: 87). Early on 15 May 1948 regular troops from Egypt, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq entered Palestine to support the local Palestinian Arabs (www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm,Israel’s War of Independence). By July 1949 Israel had repulsed the invasion, joined the UN, and been recognized by more than 50 governments around the world. In serious armistices with Egypt Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in 1949, Israel established borders similar to those of Palestine during the British mandate. Jordan retained the West Bank of the Jordan River, Egypt took over the administration of the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem was divided under Israeli and Jordanian rule.

The Year 1949, in which the first Arab-Israel War ended, has many meanings for Palestinians. It means the year in which they lost their country, in which about 1.000.000 of the total Palestinian population of 1.4 million people became refugees (Benny, 1989: 297). So, during the war of 1948, Israeli gained some of territories held by Arabs, and expelled them from these territories. According to Israel officials, those Arabs who did not run away became today’s Israeli Arab citizens and those who fled became the seeds of the first wave of Palestinian Arab refugees (www.masada2000.org/historical.html, Palestinian Arab Refugees).

“The Arabs rejected the legitimacy of the Jewish state, whereas the Israelis were determined to convince the Arabs that they could not threaten their existence. A new phase of the conflict now began, focusing on Arab-Israeli state and affected to a much greater degree than previously by great power rivalries and the contiuing confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the western powers” (Smith, 1996:148). It was obuious Arab aggression toward Israeli was because of their perception that Jews captured their homelands by the help of Western Imperialsm. So, Israeli was seen as a tool of imperialists in the region.

An important event took place in the Middle East, after the revolution in Eygpt (1952), Eygpt defeated French-British-Israeli troops in Suez War. This event had two important results, one was that Eygpt gained prestige and became the leader of the Arab world, so Eygpt pursued an anti-Israeli policy, that it was an important side in Arab-Israeli conflict. Second results was that while British influence was lessened, Soviet and American influence increased.

In the history of Arab-Israeli conflict, second important war occured in 1967, after the war of 1948. Six day war of 1967 was mainly the result of the Israel’s existence on Arabian lands. Another reason was the Eygpt’s anti-Israeli policy in order to gain power among Arab states. Eygpt, Syria and Jordan attacked Israelis. However, Israeli defeated Arab powers and Israeli armies conquered the West Bank, including the old city of Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the Syrian Golan Heights, defeating the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. But more than that, Israel created a new reality in the Middle East and sowed the seeds for deep dissent within its own society, and ideological settlers quickly moved into the West Bank, Golan, and Gaza and created new settlements (www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm, An Incredible Six Days). Today over 400.000 Israelis live on the land conquered in the 1967 war. The Six Day War had a profound effect on the Arab world and in its aftermanth many of the leaders held responsible for the defeat. It also led the increase of anti-Western feeling, since the West was seen as having supported Israel. It also led the restructure of the Arab guerilla movement and the emerge of the Palestinian state (www.historychanel.com, A Brief History of Palestine).

Until the war of 1973 - the third important war in Arab-Israeli conflict - many clashes took place between Arabs and Israelis. On 6 October 1973, it was Israel’s turn to be taken by surprise, the October War between Israel and Arab states broke out. Egyptian forces blasted their way through the sand defenses built around the Israeli lines at the Suez Canal and succeeded in crossing the waterway (www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm, Israel Caught On the Hop, 1973). The Arabs showed that they had improved their strategy since 1967. But in fact, it gave Egypt the political victory it needed to sue for peace with honor. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat went on to fly to Jerusalem in 1977 and became the first Arab leader to make peace with Israel. In 1979 Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in a peace treaty that formally ended the 30 year state of war between the two countries. Egypt in return, recongnized Israel’s right to exist. Since then, Arab-Israeli conflict turned into the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

Negotiation Attempts-Camp David Accords and the Advantages İsraeli State Had

Prior to the 1973 war, efforts at peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis had been ineffective. After the war, there was a heightened sense of interest in resolving the outstanding issues between those actors. For Israel the 1973 war had shown that it was not invincible as the Arabs had been able to inflict a massive military blow to the country. For the Arab states and the Palestinians there was a strong desire to achieve some territorial adjustments (www.davem2.colf.edu, The Peace Process). The war also gave impetus to the international peace efforts in the region, as the European countries in particular began to interpret UN resolutions on the conflict in a more pro-Arab light. Also the United States now accepted the need to play in the peace process, both out of a desire to maintain regional stability but also to limit the changes of a superpower confrontation such as occurred during the 1973 war.

The first major event in the peace process was the Camp David Accords of 1978. President Jimmy Carter invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Camp David to aggree on a peace treaty. There were two parts, the first was a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. In the treaty, a formal peace was to be established, a definite border between two states was to be created, and there would be the beginnings of diplomatic and economic interaction between two states. In return, Israel would withdraw from the Sinai, returning control of this land to Egypt. The second part, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” was an agreement to seek solutions to the regional issues that remained. The framework included a provision for a five year period of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza during which time negotiations were to take place as to the final settlements of those areas.

However, autonomy agreement was never implemented. In the Arab world, Sadat was branded a traitor. They saw Camp David as a separate peace with Israel, thereby weakening the unity of the Arab camp in its efforts to resolve other issues involving Israel. Sadat was later assassinated in 1981 in part because of Camp David. The removal of Egypt, the largest, and the most powerful Arab state guaranteed that no other Arab state would be willing to risque another war against Israel (www.davem2.colf.edu, The Peace Process).

During the 1980’s, there was virtually no progress on the peace front between either Israel and the Palestinians or between Israel and the Arab states. On December 6, six Palestinian workers were killed in the Gaza Strip. It was the start of the Intifada, the revolution of the stones. In December 1987, the Intifada, the Palestine uprising in the occupied territories, began. Intifada is an Arabic world which means shaking. Palestinian youth were trying to shake off, or shake themselves free of 20 years of abject colonial humiliation by Israel. It was the movement of masses and the uprising in the occupied territories, after 20 years of Israeli rule, took everyone by surprise. Israel did not know how to react because it was difficult to denounce such a popular movement as the work of terrorists. After the Intifada 1.300 Palestinians, including 300 children, are said to have been killed, but the Palestinians had the sympathy of the world and also the Intifada pushed the PLO to moderate its position and moved them into a dialogue with the UN (www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm, Intifada – Sticks and Stones and Broken Bones).

Rabin and the Peace Process in the 1990s - The Madrid Conference

There was a resurgence of interest in the peace process following the 1991 Gulf War. The collapse of the Soviet Union as an Arab ally gave the signals of ending strategy which argued that Israel could be forced to negotiate due to the Arab strength. Also, the Palestinian support of Iraq during the Cold War had made it an international outcast. There were hopes that coming back to the negotiating table would generate positive feelings towards the Palestinians. Finally, a change in the Israeli government in 1992 brought into power a new leadership under Rabin, and that was considered to be more supportive for the peace process. One important effort towards those issues was the Madrid Talks of October 1991. The idea was to begin a series of bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestine. The Madrid Conference in 1991 was important because, for the first time, the representatives of Palestine and Israel met together to discuss their problems and peace (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1993: 9). Overall, the Madrid process has made little headway, though multilateral working groups continued to operate. After the Madrid conference, Israel and Palestinians agreed to mutual recognition and limited self rule for Palestinians in Jericho and Gaza. They also agreed to conclude a permanent treaty that would resolve the status of Gaza and the West Bank. But the more difficult issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the rights of Palestinian refugees were postponed to other peace talks.

Negotiations between Israel and Palestinians today are based on the principles set down in the 1993 accords (Declaration of Principles). In this accord, Israel and PLO announced a major breakthrough in their relations and Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338, renounced terrorism and rejected the PLO Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. In a following agreement known as Oslo II, Israel and Palestinians agreed to the holding of elections for a Palestine Council. Israeli also agreed to a withdrawal from the major cities of the West Bank, turning administration Palestinian National Authority. In exchange the Palestinians agreed to make efforts to guarantee the security of Israelis (Abu-Amr, 1994: 74-78).

The positive attempts also continued in Ehud Barak period. By the mid year 2000, Clinton invited Barak and Arafat to a three way summit at Camp David, and the talks ended with no agreement, the two sides concentrated largely over the sovereignty and the control of Jerusalem. Since the election of Barak, there has been a renewed interest among all parties to move towards meaningful negotiations on a number of front. On the Palestinian-Israel track there have been a number of meetings between Barak and Arafat. In the recent Camp David talks, although the talks ended with no agreement, both parties seemed to be closer to a final solution.

However something in the peace process has changed with the election of Ariel Sharon, the leader of hard-line Likud Party complicated the peace process. Since Sharon’s controversial Semtember 28, 2000 visit to the Temple Mount, more than 400 people were killed in violent clashes between Palestinians and Israel. Both sides blamed the other for the violence, and each held the other responsible for ending it. The internal Israeli politics are further complicating the peace process. Sharon has said he would not give the Palestinians any more territory than they now control under interim accords-42 percent of the West Bank and two thirds of Gaza. Sharon also said he would continue to seek peace with the Palestinians but not on the basis of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which led the current peace talks, or ideas proposed by former US president Bill Clinton before he left the office in January. Sharon’s there main focus is on security, different kind of peace process, and united Jerusalem. Although the Israeli public voted in protest against Mr. Barak’s handling of negotiations with the Palestinians, they did not vote against the peace process. Mr. Sharon’s campaign promises included bringing both security and peace, but he insists he will not talk to the Palestinians until their four-month old uprising ends. Palestinians groups, however, insists that the violence will continue.

On the other hand, after the election of Sharon, Hamas (the military mean of Muslim Brothers) which is opposed to the peace process, increased its terrorist activities against Israel (Hürriyet News, 07.02.2001). Hamas is believed to be the most effective political movement in Gaza in which almost 750.000 Palastinians live. For Hamas, the main aim is that the land of Muslims should be free of Zionists and the only possible solution is jihad (Sel, 1993: 44-49).

As cited in The Economist in April 2001, Yasser Arafat is held personally to blame not only for what is perceived as a historic missed opportunity, but also for the escalating violence. Military sources argue anonymously in the press over whether Mr. Arafat explicitly orders specific acts of terrorism, or merely condones the violence in general. The Palestinian leader had expressed readiness to discuss a joint Egyptian and Jordanian proposal, which was raised by Hosni Mubarak in his meeting with George Bush in Washington on April 2nd. The proposal amounts to a package of reciprocal measures. Israael would lift its siege of Palestinian areas, and the Palestinian security forces would resume cooperation with their Israeli counterparts (The Economist, April 7th-13th 2001: 45-46).

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat got calls from US President George W. Bush urging them to halt the violence in the Middle East. An independent, international committee headed by the former US Senator George Mitchell issued its Mideast report calling for a halt to the violence, a timetable for a return to negotiations(http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/printThis?clickMap, May 23, 2001). Furthermore, the USA sent George Tenet, the CIA chief, to talk about how the ceasefire is to be monitored, and how to reinstate the long-lapsed ‘security cooperation’ between the two sides (The Economist, June 9th-15th 2001: 54). Tenet held separate talks with both sides as part of renewed US involvement in the Palastinian-Israeli crisis after Bush took Office in January, and also Tenet met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Despite those international efforts and despite Sharon and Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat have publicly committed to breaking the cycle of violence, neither believes the other’s pledge. The Israelis were complaining that the Sharon Government has not done enough to protect the settlements from Palestinian attack. Many people regard Israel’s unilateral decleration of a ceasefire as a sign of weakness. There appeared little criticism of Arafat’s unilateral commitment to halt armed attacks against Israeli targets. But it has been made clear that Palestinians have a perceived right to continue to intifada or uprising with the aim of achieving an end to Israeli occupation. In eight months of violence, more than 480 Palestinians and nearly 110 Israelis died. The violence continued until September 11, 2001.

A New Possibility For Israeli Enlargement - The Road Map

The Decleration of the Road Map, which was firstly mentioned by the U.S. president George W. Bush, in his speech dated 24 June 2002, appeared on April 30, 2003 following Israeli parliament elections and the end of Iraq War. That Road Map is aimed at the establishment of Palestine state and finding a permament solution to Arab-Israel conflict (http://www.palastinemonitor.org/special %20 section/road %20 map/Roadmap-fulltext.htm).

The Road Map, prepared by the US, EU, Russian Federation and UK, includes a three-level period. (Dalgıç, 2003: 16-17). The first level contains the arrangements referring to the period between 24 June 2002 and May 2003. In that period it is assumed that Palestinian side would cease violation and the security cooperation between the sides would be restored based upon Tenet Plan. In that one-year period, while the Palestinian administration is to maintain detailed reforms such as the preparation of Palestine constitution and the realisation of free and fair elections. Israeli government is obliged to normalize the daily life of Palestinians, withdraw the lands occupied on 28 September 2000 and terminate the attempts in regard to the establishment of Jewish settlements.
In the second level, which is between June-December 2003, the attempts would concentrate on the establishment of an independent Palestine state having temporary borders. In that level, following elections, economic development of Palestine would also be supported.
The third level would contain the years 2004 and 2005. In 2005, Israel-Palestine talks would be provided in order to reach permanent status agreement. In those talks, refugees and the status of Jarusalem would be argued and ‘dual-state’ ideal which is based on the idea that Israel and independent, democratic Palestine would live in peace.

Although the Road Map pretended to be different and more promising than the previous peace plans and negotiation attempts, just after declaration of the Road Map, both sides hesitated to fulfill the requirements and put forward their own demands.

Conclusion
Currently, what will happen in the peace process is a controversial issue. There are five core issues that separate two sides. The first one is the fate of Jerusalem which is a city sacred to both sides and claimed by both sides as the capital. The second one is the status of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees and their descendants who want to return to the lands they lost when Israel became independent in 1948. The property loss and long years in exile have generated deep anger against Israel. So far, Mr. Arafat has remained firm on the right of return, and he has been backed by Arab leaders. However, it seems that Israel will never accept an influx of Palestinians that would change its character as homeland created for Jews. Probably the only return these refugees can hope is the chance to live in a small and crowded Palestinian state into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The third issue which separates two sides is the borders of a Palestinian state. This also means that what security measures should be taken to ensure the safety of both people. The negative stand of some groups and political parties which have been against Palestine-Israel peace since the begining of peace process should be regarded as the fifth issue which seperates two sides. While in Palestine, those anti-peace process attempts depend on radical Islamist groups, in Israel, rightist and religious parties have been the source of those anti-peace process attempts. Since those groups and parties assume that they would directly be excluded from the system/order to be established along with the materialization of peace in the region, they do their utmost to prevent peace process. The last issue in peace process is the policy of global powers aimed at enlarging their sphere of influence through being a mediator between the conflicting sides. In order to have the possibility of intervention, they usually favour the continuity of conflict. By doing so, on the one hand, they shape the Middle East region according to their own desire, on the other hand, they convince the disputing sides that they would be unable to survive without the support of those big powers. So, this makes all peace plans invalid in time.

To sum up, it can be said that since the begining of the establishment of İsraeli state and following each peace plan or any negotiation attempt while the Palestinians lost their strength, Israeli state succeeded to enlarge its sphere of influence in the Middle East region.

References
Abu-Amr, Ziad (1994) “The View from Palastine: In the Wake of the Agreement”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 23 (2).
“After Tel Aviv Suicide Bomb”, The Economist, June 9th-15th 2001.
Benny, Moris (1989) The Birth of Palestinian Refuge Problem 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Bilen, Özden (1996) Orta Doğu’da Su Sorunları ve Türkiye, Tesav Vakfı Yy., Ankara.
Dalgıç, Gökçe (2003) “Barış Sürecinde Yeni Bir Başlangıç? ‘Yol Haritası’”, Stratejik Analiz Dergisi, 4 (38).
“Dark Shadows Over Israel and Palestine”, The Economist, April 7th-13th 2001, 45-46.
Hürriyet News, 07.02.2001.
Landen, Robert G. (1970) The Emergence of Modern Middle East Selected Readings. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.
McKinley, Webb (1972) Trouble in the Middle East, New York.
Sel, Fatma (1993) “Filistin’de İslamın Yükselişi ve Örgütsel Hareketlilik”, Dünya ve İslam Dergisi.
Smith, Charles D. (1996) Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
Taylor, Alan R. (2001) İsrail’in Doğuşu 1897-1947 Siyonist Diplomasinin Analizi, Çev: Mesut Karaşahan, Üçüncü Basım, Pınar Yayınları, İstanbul.
“The Oslo Agreement: An Interview with Nabil Shaath”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 22 (1), Spring 1993.
Tiph (Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron), Introduction Program for the New TIPH Members, Hebron, 1997.

Internet

“A Brief History of Paletsine”, www.historychanel.com
“An Incredible Six Days”, www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm.
“Intifada-Sticks and Stones and BrokenBones”, www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm
“Israel’s War of Independence”, www.megastrories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm.
“Israel Caught On the Hop”, 1973, www.megastories.com/mideast/wars/1948.htm.
“Palestinian Arab Refugees”, www.masada2000.org/historical.html.
“Road Map”, http://www.palastinemonitor.org/special %20 section/road %20 map/Roadmap-fulltext.htm.
“Sharon and Arafat Get Calls From Bush Urging End to Violence”, May 23, 2001, http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/clickmap
“The Peace Process”, www.davem2.colf.edu.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Security

KONA, Gamze Güngörmüş (2006). “Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Collective Security Treaty Organization / Capabilities in Dealing with the Central Asian Security Issues and Perspectives of Enlargement”, the Paper presented at the international conference on ‘Central Asian Security, Regional Organizations and the Role of Turkey’, organized by Bogazici University-Tusiad Foreign Policy Forum in association with the NATO-OTAN Public Policy Division. 09-10 May 2006, İstanbul.

Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona

SCO and CSTO Capabilities in Dealing with the Security of Central Asia, The Enlargement Perspectives and the Role of Turkey
Abstract
The purpose of this paper will be to discuss and analyze SCO – CSTO capabilities in dealing with the Central Asian security issues and perspectives of enlargement. Following the official disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of newly independent states in Central Asia, the security situation in the region was thrown into turmoil and uncertainty. With the Russian state increasingly concerned with it’s internal woes, from Chechnya as well as severe economic problems in the transition from communism to capitalism; Central Asia’s security scenario was filled with potential problems such as religious extremism of the Islamic variety, ultra-nationalist impulses, border conflicts, sensitive water and environmental concerns, terrorism, the drug trade, safeguarding the oil and gas resources of the region, the lack of democratization and human rights. In dealing with those security issues; while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the internal actors, RF, Turkey and Iran as the regional actors and the U.S. as the international actor have been attempting to have a role in security arrangement of the region; EU, Nato, OSCE as the international organizations and CSTO, SCO as regional organizations seemed to be very willing to play a role in designing security environment of the Central Asian region. However, following the U.S.’ profound involvement in Central Asian states’ internal affairs under the cover of “fight against terrorism”, these states prefered to set up multi-lateral security cooperations with the RF. In this process, CSTO and SCO have appeared as the most reliable and detailed security organizations for the Central Asian states. Both of these organizations have their own priorities in the field of security. While the SCO is aimed at creating confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solving the border disputes, preventing conflict and reducing the military forces in the border areas, the CSTO is aimed at consolidating the Russian influence in the territory of the former U.S.S.R., fighting terrorism, regaining global power-projection capabilities, cooperation in air defense, manufacturing of weapons, preparation of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities. Unfortunately, it should be noted that until now very few of these ideals were achieved but others remained as sole ideals. So, I will also put forward the reasons of the the failure of the CSTO and the SCO such as lack of cooperation, opposite views on financing the CSTO, decrease in Russian military expenditure,
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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bipolarity within the CSTO, preference of bilateral security arrangement. And the last part of the paper will focus on the perspectives of enlargement of the CSTO and the SCO.
Introduction
First of all, it sounds reasonable to start with answering the question whether the SCO and the CSTO were established to cover the foreign policy and security needs of the central asian republics or to cover the needs of the foreign and security needs of their own. So, in order to determine that those two organizations were established to serve their own needs or central asian republics’ needs, I will make a comparison between the foreign policy/security priorities of the SCO and CSTO and the foreign policy/security priorities leading powers of those two organizations RF and China in regard to the central asian region through explaining each one of the priorities. By doing so, I will also try to prove the fact that the main aim of these two organizations is designed by the main aim of the RF and China, which is based upon enlarging their sphere influence in the CAR, dominating the energy resources in the region and deepening bi-lateral cooperation against the U.S. In the second part, I will mention to what extend those two organizations have been capable or not of solving the security problems of the central asian republics. And in the last part I will present the perspective of enlargement of the SCO and CSTO.
Foreign policy priorities of china in central asia ;
China has been determined to develop bilateral and multilateral relations with the CAR, based upon confidence.
Since china is worried about the U.S. probable attempt to block energy transportation, she tries to reinforce its influence in central asia. Parallel to this assumption china held some oil platforms in kazakistan and turkmenistan.
Chine is deeply interested in the region’s welfare and stability. She believes that as long as the region continues to be stable, both the separatist powers in eastern turkistan would be blocked, and the energy security would be maintained.
China assumes that the multi-faceted relationship to be developed with the central asian republics would both balance the russian influence in the region, and would limit the U.S. power in the same region.
The central asian market is also willing to import relatively high quality and cheap chineese goods. China believes that the effects of those attempts would result in the break up of russian influence in the central asian region an in the end Russian withdrawal.
After september 11, some poitical interests of china appeared besides its security and economic interests.

For example :

The manas american base, established in kırgızistan by the u.s. to back the bagram base in afghanistan, should be regarded as a precaution taken against the enlarging chineese threat.

the planes taking off manas base arrive in eastern turkistan in 10-20 minutes.

All those U.S. attempts in kırgızistan cause a direct threat toward eastern turkistan and indirect threat toward china.

The coup d’etat emerged in kırgızistan intensified the feelingof containment.

And china started to give logistic and economic support to china

China for the first time executed military exercise outside its borders in china.

Center for struggle against terrorism of the SCO was established in kırgızistan,and china financed this center.

RF

It is a well known fact that under yeltsin administration Russia had various foreign, security and military interersts in the central asian region, however, under putin administration the Russian increasing interest in Central asia has been approved up to now by three concrete documents :

1. The document, “Russia Federation’s National Security Doctrine”, pointed out the country’s determined and absolute will to safeguard national security. In short, the upshot of this document is that Russia wishes to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the West while keeping its hold on the CIS by guaranteeing frontiers, disallowing break up and securing itself.

2. “Russian Federation’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine” document, approved on April 21, 2000 just after National Security Doctrine was accepted, is focused on Russia’s economic profits and status in the other countries, especially the former soviet republics.


3. In the New Military Doctrine, Russia applies a policy that makes itself the only nuclear power in the CIS. According to this, the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Belarus are turned over to Russia. In spite of decrease in NATO’s nuclear power, Russia still keeps its many weapons.

In the CIS Summit of 2000, it was proved that RF would enlarge its sphere of influence on the former Soviet territory.

PRIORITIES OF THE C.S.T.O.
According to the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the priorities of the C.S.T.O. include:
- manufacturing of weapons,
- To train the military personnel
- To increase peacekeeping activities.
- To replace the air defense system of the C.I.S. with the integrated system of the C.S.T.O.
- To counter Afghanistan threat
which has not ceased to be a source of Islamic fundamentalism, and which remains the main producer of narcotics in the region, the eradication of which has become one of the main priorities of the C.S.T.O.
- To cooperate against terrorism
Another important field of cooperation is the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that this fight is being used as an excuse for repression against domestic political adversaries. Nonetheless, counter-terrorism is one of the highest priorities for the C.S.T.O. states.Another goal of the C.S.T.O. for Russia is strengthening its military presence in allied states. Two military groupings function within the confines of the C.S.T.O. -- Russian-Belarusian (about 200,000 troops) and Caucasian (practically Russian-Armenian). Moscow perceives it as a means of support of the leaders in their countries, and as a way to preserve its influence. It is very important for Moscow to increase its military engagement in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia focuses on maintaining the status quo in the post-Soviet space, which is endangered by the inclusion of such powers such as the United States and China.ConclusionRussian policy toward the post-Soviet space has now become much more realistic than it was a few years ago. Russia wants to build a strong organization, not endangered by desertions of states wanting to join N.A.T.O. However, its potential allies still remain weak states, which forces Russia to finance the modernization of their military forces. Even this group of core members may create trouble for Moscow.For instance, Kazakhstan has increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia\'s protests. The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq. Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant. Parts of the C.S.T.O. do not fully cooperate with Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense\'s budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.",1]
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- To strengthen the Russian Military Engagement (for RF)

The Priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation

SCO includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Organization (SCO) was initiated in 1996 as the Shanghai Five.

To become a mechanism for consultations on trade, water and border security.

To counter the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism.

To create confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solve the border disputes.

To work for conflict prevention.

To reduce the military forces in the border areas, with the important exception of troops that were combating ‘separatism and extremism’ that had increased after the terrorist attacks in the USA.

THE REASONS OF THE FAILURE OF THE CSTO AND THE SCO

1. LACK OF COOPERATION

Kazakhstan opposed a Russian initiative -- presumably supported by others -- to create a joint standing conventional military force for CentralAsia within the CSTO's framework.
Kazakhstan has also increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia's protests.
The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq.
Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.
2. Lack of Confidence

3. OPPOSITE VIEWS ON FINANCING THE CSTO

certain countries resisted proposals on financing the CSTO. Onedefeated proposal was to collect long-overdue contributions from Central Asian member countries to the CSTO's budget from the years 1996-2003. Another, more topical measure that was defeated was to require member countries to co-finance the development of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in Central Asia. The only financial issues that appeared to be resolved would increase salaries of CSTO secretariat personnel by 20% --

4. DECREASE IN RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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5. BIPOLARITY WITHIN THE CSTO
The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia's side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.
6. Overlaping national security Interests

The focus of individual national strategies on security often clashes with the other states’ perception of national security.

7. Preference of Bilateral Security Arrangement

This is due to the lack of trust between the Central Asian states. The Central Asian states also fear possible Chinese or Russian intervention and rightly so for these two large economic and military powers could dominate the region. Besides, there is a fear that cooperation would further weaken national identity to the benefit of a regional identity, or another national identity.

8. Interest in Crises Management Rather Than Long-Term Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is defined as measures taken before a conflict has emerged. Crises management refers to measures that have been taken after a conflict has developed into
a crisis. Governments focused on crisis management rather than long-term oriented conflict prevention strategies since there is no political willingness and confidence.

Incapabilities of SCO and CSTO of covering the security needs of the central asian republics – The prevailing security problems of the CAR

-The fight against Afghanistan-based terror did not result in success. At the moment Afghanistan can not back militant Islamist movements since international interventions in this country does not allow to do so. However, assoon as this severe foreign intervention ends, Afghanistan will appear as a state that supports radical Islamic movements in Central Asia.

-One of the largest, and certainly the most militant of the region’s Islamist groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formed following clashes between Islamist supporters and state officials in Uzbekistan in 1992[1]. Many of those who escaped the subsequent suppression and persecution fled to Afghanistan and formed the IMU, which combines Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries who seek to create an Islamic state in Uzbekistan through terrorism. Despite being severely persecuted in Uzbekistan, the IMU has maintained attacks through the border regions from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and its activity increased dramatically at the end of the 1990s, following the implementation of strict ideological controls, particularly in Uzbekistan.

-drug and people trafficking is still a big problem for the CAR. The resumption of Afghan heroin production is a problem for all states in the region, particularly those with porous borders.

-Authoritarianism devam etmektedir, the process of democratization could not be completed.

- neither SCO nor CSTO could solve ethnic disputes in the region. Tajiks would like to take revenge of their exclusion from the territory of today’s two main cultural centers of Central Asia, Samarkand and Bukhara now included in Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbeks lay claim to all of the Farghana Valley which includes Kirghizstan’s Osh region and part of Tajikistan’s Khojent region (former Leninabad). Uzbeks also claim parts of southern Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan.

Water controversy is still an important security matter that should be mentioned in Central Asia. The region's two main river systems, the Syr-Darya and the Amu-Darya, each pass through several international borders on their way to the Aral Sea. Sharp differences in interests exist between upstream and downstream users in the preference for an 'irrigation regime' as opposed to an 'energy regime'. Downstream users prefer to store water in the hydroelectric reservoirs to save it for irrigation use during the dry summer months, while upstream users prefer to generate hydroelectric power during the winter months for heating. Central Asia is an arid region and many of the countries rely heavily on agriculture as a source of foreign exchange and generator of employment.

CSTO-ENLARGEMENT
1. The meetings executed until now approved a framework plan on CSTO enlargement in two stages –through 2010 and beyond -- first to upgrade the Collective RapidDeployment Forces in Central Asia and to create an inter-state commission forhandling deliveries and servicing of military equipment at preferential prices.These measures have been on the agenda for several years but hardly showed anyresults.
2. So far, the CSTO has only held joint ground-force and combined exercises in its Central Asian region, but the Russian military now plans tohold joint ground-force exercises in the organization's "western region" and"southern region" -- that is, in Belarus and in Armenia.

THE SCO – ENLARGEMENT
1. It has been among the plans to broaden the SCO’s focus to a more institution­alized security organization due to the increased threat in the region from non-state actors, such as the IMU.

2. China has been look­ing to expand its influence in this region. However, it is important to note that China has not indicated a desire to offer security guarantees or provide a military presence in Central Asia. At present, China’s interests are more regionally or culturally defined, as opposed to strategic. China still perceives Central Asia as within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, if Russia’s influence within Central Asia continues to weaken, China may assume a more active role in advancing its energy and economic interests.

3. There have been suggestions from several Western states that the international community should pressure the SCO to expand its membership to include EU
and US representatives. However, it would be useless for the US and the EU, as
the SCO poses no security threat to the USA or the EU. The inclusion of
extra-regional actors will only create tension inside the organisation and it would
be in China’s and Russia’s interests to block the development of the conflict
prevention and conflict management mechanisms in fear of a, primarily, US
hijacking of the organisation. The same might be true about the inclusion of
India, Pakistan and Iran.

Conclusion

The security and economic challenges facing the Central Asian states should reinforce cooperation. The costs of failure are high; the rewards of success are great. If the states succeed in establishing a new level of cooperation they will reinforce their own sovereignty. (Paradoxically, perhaps, greater cooperation will enhance national independence and preserve autonomy. But if inter-state cooperation continues to prove elusive, the problems relating to border disputes, trade and payments, common infrastructure arrangements, trans-border natural resources, intra-regional migration, terrorism, and trafficking in people, drugs and weapons, will increasingly circumscribe the autonomy of the states. The Central Asian states are faced with a choice.) In the short run it may be easier to withdraw into self-protection and self-reliance than to cooperate with neighbours, but in the long run only greater cooperation will solve Central Asia's emerging regional problems.