KONA, Gamze Güngörmüş (2006). “Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Collective Security Treaty Organization / Capabilities in Dealing with the Central Asian Security Issues and Perspectives of Enlargement”, the Paper presented at the international conference on ‘Central Asian Security, Regional Organizations and the Role of Turkey’, organized by Bogazici University-Tusiad Foreign Policy Forum in association with the NATO-OTAN Public Policy Division. 09-10 May 2006, İstanbul.
Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona
SCO and CSTO Capabilities in Dealing with the Security of Central Asia, The Enlargement Perspectives and the Role of Turkey
Abstract
The purpose of this paper will be to discuss and analyze SCO – CSTO capabilities in dealing with the Central Asian security issues and perspectives of enlargement. Following the official disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of newly independent states in Central Asia, the security situation in the region was thrown into turmoil and uncertainty. With the Russian state increasingly concerned with it’s internal woes, from Chechnya as well as severe economic problems in the transition from communism to capitalism; Central Asia’s security scenario was filled with potential problems such as religious extremism of the Islamic variety, ultra-nationalist impulses, border conflicts, sensitive water and environmental concerns, terrorism, the drug trade, safeguarding the oil and gas resources of the region, the lack of democratization and human rights. In dealing with those security issues; while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the internal actors, RF, Turkey and Iran as the regional actors and the U.S. as the international actor have been attempting to have a role in security arrangement of the region; EU, Nato, OSCE as the international organizations and CSTO, SCO as regional organizations seemed to be very willing to play a role in designing security environment of the Central Asian region. However, following the U.S.’ profound involvement in Central Asian states’ internal affairs under the cover of “fight against terrorism”, these states prefered to set up multi-lateral security cooperations with the RF. In this process, CSTO and SCO have appeared as the most reliable and detailed security organizations for the Central Asian states. Both of these organizations have their own priorities in the field of security. While the SCO is aimed at creating confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solving the border disputes, preventing conflict and reducing the military forces in the border areas, the CSTO is aimed at consolidating the Russian influence in the territory of the former U.S.S.R., fighting terrorism, regaining global power-projection capabilities, cooperation in air defense, manufacturing of weapons, preparation of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities. Unfortunately, it should be noted that until now very few of these ideals were achieved but others remained as sole ideals. So, I will also put forward the reasons of the the failure of the CSTO and the SCO such as lack of cooperation, opposite views on financing the CSTO, decrease in Russian military expenditure,
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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bipolarity within the CSTO, preference of bilateral security arrangement. And the last part of the paper will focus on the perspectives of enlargement of the CSTO and the SCO.
Introduction
First of all, it sounds reasonable to start with answering the question whether the SCO and the CSTO were established to cover the foreign policy and security needs of the central asian republics or to cover the needs of the foreign and security needs of their own. So, in order to determine that those two organizations were established to serve their own needs or central asian republics’ needs, I will make a comparison between the foreign policy/security priorities of the SCO and CSTO and the foreign policy/security priorities leading powers of those two organizations RF and China in regard to the central asian region through explaining each one of the priorities. By doing so, I will also try to prove the fact that the main aim of these two organizations is designed by the main aim of the RF and China, which is based upon enlarging their sphere influence in the CAR, dominating the energy resources in the region and deepening bi-lateral cooperation against the U.S. In the second part, I will mention to what extend those two organizations have been capable or not of solving the security problems of the central asian republics. And in the last part I will present the perspective of enlargement of the SCO and CSTO.
Foreign policy priorities of china in central asia ;
China has been determined to develop bilateral and multilateral relations with the CAR, based upon confidence.
Since china is worried about the U.S. probable attempt to block energy transportation, she tries to reinforce its influence in central asia. Parallel to this assumption china held some oil platforms in kazakistan and turkmenistan.
Chine is deeply interested in the region’s welfare and stability. She believes that as long as the region continues to be stable, both the separatist powers in eastern turkistan would be blocked, and the energy security would be maintained.
China assumes that the multi-faceted relationship to be developed with the central asian republics would both balance the russian influence in the region, and would limit the U.S. power in the same region.
The central asian market is also willing to import relatively high quality and cheap chineese goods. China believes that the effects of those attempts would result in the break up of russian influence in the central asian region an in the end Russian withdrawal.
After september 11, some poitical interests of china appeared besides its security and economic interests.
For example :
The manas american base, established in kırgızistan by the u.s. to back the bagram base in afghanistan, should be regarded as a precaution taken against the enlarging chineese threat.
the planes taking off manas base arrive in eastern turkistan in 10-20 minutes.
All those U.S. attempts in kırgızistan cause a direct threat toward eastern turkistan and indirect threat toward china.
The coup d’etat emerged in kırgızistan intensified the feelingof containment.
And china started to give logistic and economic support to china
China for the first time executed military exercise outside its borders in china.
Center for struggle against terrorism of the SCO was established in kırgızistan,and china financed this center.
RF
It is a well known fact that under yeltsin administration Russia had various foreign, security and military interersts in the central asian region, however, under putin administration the Russian increasing interest in Central asia has been approved up to now by three concrete documents :
1. The document, “Russia Federation’s National Security Doctrine”, pointed out the country’s determined and absolute will to safeguard national security. In short, the upshot of this document is that Russia wishes to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the West while keeping its hold on the CIS by guaranteeing frontiers, disallowing break up and securing itself.
2. “Russian Federation’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine” document, approved on April 21, 2000 just after National Security Doctrine was accepted, is focused on Russia’s economic profits and status in the other countries, especially the former soviet republics.
3. In the New Military Doctrine, Russia applies a policy that makes itself the only nuclear power in the CIS. According to this, the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Belarus are turned over to Russia. In spite of decrease in NATO’s nuclear power, Russia still keeps its many weapons.
In the CIS Summit of 2000, it was proved that RF would enlarge its sphere of influence on the former Soviet territory.
PRIORITIES OF THE C.S.T.O.
According to the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the priorities of the C.S.T.O. include:
- manufacturing of weapons,
- To train the military personnel
- To increase peacekeeping activities.
- To replace the air defense system of the C.I.S. with the integrated system of the C.S.T.O.
- To counter Afghanistan threat
which has not ceased to be a source of Islamic fundamentalism, and which remains the main producer of narcotics in the region, the eradication of which has become one of the main priorities of the C.S.T.O.
- To cooperate against terrorism
Another important field of cooperation is the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that this fight is being used as an excuse for repression against domestic political adversaries. Nonetheless, counter-terrorism is one of the highest priorities for the C.S.T.O. states.Another goal of the C.S.T.O. for Russia is strengthening its military presence in allied states. Two military groupings function within the confines of the C.S.T.O. -- Russian-Belarusian (about 200,000 troops) and Caucasian (practically Russian-Armenian). Moscow perceives it as a means of support of the leaders in their countries, and as a way to preserve its influence. It is very important for Moscow to increase its military engagement in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia focuses on maintaining the status quo in the post-Soviet space, which is endangered by the inclusion of such powers such as the United States and China.ConclusionRussian policy toward the post-Soviet space has now become much more realistic than it was a few years ago. Russia wants to build a strong organization, not endangered by desertions of states wanting to join N.A.T.O. However, its potential allies still remain weak states, which forces Russia to finance the modernization of their military forces. Even this group of core members may create trouble for Moscow.For instance, Kazakhstan has increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia\'s protests. The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq. Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant. Parts of the C.S.T.O. do not fully cooperate with Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense\'s budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.",1]
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- To strengthen the Russian Military Engagement (for RF)
The Priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation
SCO includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Organization (SCO) was initiated in 1996 as the Shanghai Five.
To become a mechanism for consultations on trade, water and border security.
To counter the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism.
To create confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solve the border disputes.
To work for conflict prevention.
To reduce the military forces in the border areas, with the important exception of troops that were combating ‘separatism and extremism’ that had increased after the terrorist attacks in the USA.
THE REASONS OF THE FAILURE OF THE CSTO AND THE SCO
1. LACK OF COOPERATION
Kazakhstan opposed a Russian initiative -- presumably supported by others -- to create a joint standing conventional military force for CentralAsia within the CSTO's framework.
Kazakhstan has also increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia's protests.
The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq.
Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.
2. Lack of Confidence
3. OPPOSITE VIEWS ON FINANCING THE CSTO
certain countries resisted proposals on financing the CSTO. Onedefeated proposal was to collect long-overdue contributions from Central Asian member countries to the CSTO's budget from the years 1996-2003. Another, more topical measure that was defeated was to require member countries to co-finance the development of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in Central Asia. The only financial issues that appeared to be resolved would increase salaries of CSTO secretariat personnel by 20% --
4. DECREASE IN RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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5. BIPOLARITY WITHIN THE CSTO
The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia's side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.
6. Overlaping national security Interests
The focus of individual national strategies on security often clashes with the other states’ perception of national security.
7. Preference of Bilateral Security Arrangement
This is due to the lack of trust between the Central Asian states. The Central Asian states also fear possible Chinese or Russian intervention and rightly so for these two large economic and military powers could dominate the region. Besides, there is a fear that cooperation would further weaken national identity to the benefit of a regional identity, or another national identity.
8. Interest in Crises Management Rather Than Long-Term Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention is defined as measures taken before a conflict has emerged. Crises management refers to measures that have been taken after a conflict has developed into
a crisis. Governments focused on crisis management rather than long-term oriented conflict prevention strategies since there is no political willingness and confidence.
Incapabilities of SCO and CSTO of covering the security needs of the central asian republics – The prevailing security problems of the CAR
-The fight against Afghanistan-based terror did not result in success. At the moment Afghanistan can not back militant Islamist movements since international interventions in this country does not allow to do so. However, assoon as this severe foreign intervention ends, Afghanistan will appear as a state that supports radical Islamic movements in Central Asia.
-One of the largest, and certainly the most militant of the region’s Islamist groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formed following clashes between Islamist supporters and state officials in Uzbekistan in 1992[1]. Many of those who escaped the subsequent suppression and persecution fled to Afghanistan and formed the IMU, which combines Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries who seek to create an Islamic state in Uzbekistan through terrorism. Despite being severely persecuted in Uzbekistan, the IMU has maintained attacks through the border regions from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and its activity increased dramatically at the end of the 1990s, following the implementation of strict ideological controls, particularly in Uzbekistan.
-drug and people trafficking is still a big problem for the CAR. The resumption of Afghan heroin production is a problem for all states in the region, particularly those with porous borders.
-Authoritarianism devam etmektedir, the process of democratization could not be completed.
- neither SCO nor CSTO could solve ethnic disputes in the region. Tajiks would like to take revenge of their exclusion from the territory of today’s two main cultural centers of Central Asia, Samarkand and Bukhara now included in Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbeks lay claim to all of the Farghana Valley which includes Kirghizstan’s Osh region and part of Tajikistan’s Khojent region (former Leninabad). Uzbeks also claim parts of southern Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan.
Water controversy is still an important security matter that should be mentioned in Central Asia. The region's two main river systems, the Syr-Darya and the Amu-Darya, each pass through several international borders on their way to the Aral Sea. Sharp differences in interests exist between upstream and downstream users in the preference for an 'irrigation regime' as opposed to an 'energy regime'. Downstream users prefer to store water in the hydroelectric reservoirs to save it for irrigation use during the dry summer months, while upstream users prefer to generate hydroelectric power during the winter months for heating. Central Asia is an arid region and many of the countries rely heavily on agriculture as a source of foreign exchange and generator of employment.
CSTO-ENLARGEMENT
1. The meetings executed until now approved a framework plan on CSTO enlargement in two stages –through 2010 and beyond -- first to upgrade the Collective RapidDeployment Forces in Central Asia and to create an inter-state commission forhandling deliveries and servicing of military equipment at preferential prices.These measures have been on the agenda for several years but hardly showed anyresults.
2. So far, the CSTO has only held joint ground-force and combined exercises in its Central Asian region, but the Russian military now plans tohold joint ground-force exercises in the organization's "western region" and"southern region" -- that is, in Belarus and in Armenia.
THE SCO – ENLARGEMENT
1. It has been among the plans to broaden the SCO’s focus to a more institutionalized security organization due to the increased threat in the region from non-state actors, such as the IMU.
2. China has been looking to expand its influence in this region. However, it is important to note that China has not indicated a desire to offer security guarantees or provide a military presence in Central Asia. At present, China’s interests are more regionally or culturally defined, as opposed to strategic. China still perceives Central Asia as within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, if Russia’s influence within Central Asia continues to weaken, China may assume a more active role in advancing its energy and economic interests.
3. There have been suggestions from several Western states that the international community should pressure the SCO to expand its membership to include EU
and US representatives. However, it would be useless for the US and the EU, as
the SCO poses no security threat to the USA or the EU. The inclusion of
extra-regional actors will only create tension inside the organisation and it would
be in China’s and Russia’s interests to block the development of the conflict
prevention and conflict management mechanisms in fear of a, primarily, US
hijacking of the organisation. The same might be true about the inclusion of
India, Pakistan and Iran.
Conclusion
The security and economic challenges facing the Central Asian states should reinforce cooperation. The costs of failure are high; the rewards of success are great. If the states succeed in establishing a new level of cooperation they will reinforce their own sovereignty. (Paradoxically, perhaps, greater cooperation will enhance national independence and preserve autonomy. But if inter-state cooperation continues to prove elusive, the problems relating to border disputes, trade and payments, common infrastructure arrangements, trans-border natural resources, intra-regional migration, terrorism, and trafficking in people, drugs and weapons, will increasingly circumscribe the autonomy of the states. The Central Asian states are faced with a choice.) In the short run it may be easier to withdraw into self-protection and self-reliance than to cooperate with neighbours, but in the long run only greater cooperation will solve Central Asia's emerging regional problems.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper will be to discuss and analyze SCO – CSTO capabilities in dealing with the Central Asian security issues and perspectives of enlargement. Following the official disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of newly independent states in Central Asia, the security situation in the region was thrown into turmoil and uncertainty. With the Russian state increasingly concerned with it’s internal woes, from Chechnya as well as severe economic problems in the transition from communism to capitalism; Central Asia’s security scenario was filled with potential problems such as religious extremism of the Islamic variety, ultra-nationalist impulses, border conflicts, sensitive water and environmental concerns, terrorism, the drug trade, safeguarding the oil and gas resources of the region, the lack of democratization and human rights. In dealing with those security issues; while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the internal actors, RF, Turkey and Iran as the regional actors and the U.S. as the international actor have been attempting to have a role in security arrangement of the region; EU, Nato, OSCE as the international organizations and CSTO, SCO as regional organizations seemed to be very willing to play a role in designing security environment of the Central Asian region. However, following the U.S.’ profound involvement in Central Asian states’ internal affairs under the cover of “fight against terrorism”, these states prefered to set up multi-lateral security cooperations with the RF. In this process, CSTO and SCO have appeared as the most reliable and detailed security organizations for the Central Asian states. Both of these organizations have their own priorities in the field of security. While the SCO is aimed at creating confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solving the border disputes, preventing conflict and reducing the military forces in the border areas, the CSTO is aimed at consolidating the Russian influence in the territory of the former U.S.S.R., fighting terrorism, regaining global power-projection capabilities, cooperation in air defense, manufacturing of weapons, preparation of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities. Unfortunately, it should be noted that until now very few of these ideals were achieved but others remained as sole ideals. So, I will also put forward the reasons of the the failure of the CSTO and the SCO such as lack of cooperation, opposite views on financing the CSTO, decrease in Russian military expenditure,
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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bipolarity within the CSTO, preference of bilateral security arrangement. And the last part of the paper will focus on the perspectives of enlargement of the CSTO and the SCO.
Introduction
First of all, it sounds reasonable to start with answering the question whether the SCO and the CSTO were established to cover the foreign policy and security needs of the central asian republics or to cover the needs of the foreign and security needs of their own. So, in order to determine that those two organizations were established to serve their own needs or central asian republics’ needs, I will make a comparison between the foreign policy/security priorities of the SCO and CSTO and the foreign policy/security priorities leading powers of those two organizations RF and China in regard to the central asian region through explaining each one of the priorities. By doing so, I will also try to prove the fact that the main aim of these two organizations is designed by the main aim of the RF and China, which is based upon enlarging their sphere influence in the CAR, dominating the energy resources in the region and deepening bi-lateral cooperation against the U.S. In the second part, I will mention to what extend those two organizations have been capable or not of solving the security problems of the central asian republics. And in the last part I will present the perspective of enlargement of the SCO and CSTO.
Foreign policy priorities of china in central asia ;
China has been determined to develop bilateral and multilateral relations with the CAR, based upon confidence.
Since china is worried about the U.S. probable attempt to block energy transportation, she tries to reinforce its influence in central asia. Parallel to this assumption china held some oil platforms in kazakistan and turkmenistan.
Chine is deeply interested in the region’s welfare and stability. She believes that as long as the region continues to be stable, both the separatist powers in eastern turkistan would be blocked, and the energy security would be maintained.
China assumes that the multi-faceted relationship to be developed with the central asian republics would both balance the russian influence in the region, and would limit the U.S. power in the same region.
The central asian market is also willing to import relatively high quality and cheap chineese goods. China believes that the effects of those attempts would result in the break up of russian influence in the central asian region an in the end Russian withdrawal.
After september 11, some poitical interests of china appeared besides its security and economic interests.
For example :
The manas american base, established in kırgızistan by the u.s. to back the bagram base in afghanistan, should be regarded as a precaution taken against the enlarging chineese threat.
the planes taking off manas base arrive in eastern turkistan in 10-20 minutes.
All those U.S. attempts in kırgızistan cause a direct threat toward eastern turkistan and indirect threat toward china.
The coup d’etat emerged in kırgızistan intensified the feelingof containment.
And china started to give logistic and economic support to china
China for the first time executed military exercise outside its borders in china.
Center for struggle against terrorism of the SCO was established in kırgızistan,and china financed this center.
RF
It is a well known fact that under yeltsin administration Russia had various foreign, security and military interersts in the central asian region, however, under putin administration the Russian increasing interest in Central asia has been approved up to now by three concrete documents :
1. The document, “Russia Federation’s National Security Doctrine”, pointed out the country’s determined and absolute will to safeguard national security. In short, the upshot of this document is that Russia wishes to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the West while keeping its hold on the CIS by guaranteeing frontiers, disallowing break up and securing itself.
2. “Russian Federation’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine” document, approved on April 21, 2000 just after National Security Doctrine was accepted, is focused on Russia’s economic profits and status in the other countries, especially the former soviet republics.
3. In the New Military Doctrine, Russia applies a policy that makes itself the only nuclear power in the CIS. According to this, the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Belarus are turned over to Russia. In spite of decrease in NATO’s nuclear power, Russia still keeps its many weapons.
In the CIS Summit of 2000, it was proved that RF would enlarge its sphere of influence on the former Soviet territory.
PRIORITIES OF THE C.S.T.O.
According to the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the priorities of the C.S.T.O. include:
- manufacturing of weapons,
- To train the military personnel
- To increase peacekeeping activities.
- To replace the air defense system of the C.I.S. with the integrated system of the C.S.T.O.
- To counter Afghanistan threat
which has not ceased to be a source of Islamic fundamentalism, and which remains the main producer of narcotics in the region, the eradication of which has become one of the main priorities of the C.S.T.O.
- To cooperate against terrorism
Another important field of cooperation is the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that this fight is being used as an excuse for repression against domestic political adversaries. Nonetheless, counter-terrorism is one of the highest priorities for the C.S.T.O. states.Another goal of the C.S.T.O. for Russia is strengthening its military presence in allied states. Two military groupings function within the confines of the C.S.T.O. -- Russian-Belarusian (about 200,000 troops) and Caucasian (practically Russian-Armenian). Moscow perceives it as a means of support of the leaders in their countries, and as a way to preserve its influence. It is very important for Moscow to increase its military engagement in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia focuses on maintaining the status quo in the post-Soviet space, which is endangered by the inclusion of such powers such as the United States and China.ConclusionRussian policy toward the post-Soviet space has now become much more realistic than it was a few years ago. Russia wants to build a strong organization, not endangered by desertions of states wanting to join N.A.T.O. However, its potential allies still remain weak states, which forces Russia to finance the modernization of their military forces. Even this group of core members may create trouble for Moscow.For instance, Kazakhstan has increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia\'s protests. The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq. Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant. Parts of the C.S.T.O. do not fully cooperate with Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense\'s budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.",1]
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- To strengthen the Russian Military Engagement (for RF)
The Priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation
SCO includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Organization (SCO) was initiated in 1996 as the Shanghai Five.
To become a mechanism for consultations on trade, water and border security.
To counter the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism.
To create confidence-building measures in the border areas and in the long run solve the border disputes.
To work for conflict prevention.
To reduce the military forces in the border areas, with the important exception of troops that were combating ‘separatism and extremism’ that had increased after the terrorist attacks in the USA.
THE REASONS OF THE FAILURE OF THE CSTO AND THE SCO
1. LACK OF COOPERATION
Kazakhstan opposed a Russian initiative -- presumably supported by others -- to create a joint standing conventional military force for CentralAsia within the CSTO's framework.
Kazakhstan has also increased its activities in the Caspian Sea, despite Russia's protests.
The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the stabilization of Iraq.
Kyrgyzstan enabled American flights to Afghanistan over its territory, and allowed the U.S. to setup an airbase at Kant.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which cover 30 percent of the air space of the C.S.T.O., did not participate in an active phase of air defense exercises in September 2005.
2. Lack of Confidence
3. OPPOSITE VIEWS ON FINANCING THE CSTO
certain countries resisted proposals on financing the CSTO. Onedefeated proposal was to collect long-overdue contributions from Central Asian member countries to the CSTO's budget from the years 1996-2003. Another, more topical measure that was defeated was to require member countries to co-finance the development of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in Central Asia. The only financial issues that appeared to be resolved would increase salaries of CSTO secretariat personnel by 20% --
4. DECREASE IN RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Russian military expenditure reflects also a shift in its priorities in the C.I.S. In the year 2003, the part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's budget called "collective security and peacekeeping operations" was 1.4 billion rubles, and in 2004 it decreased sharply to 63 million rubles, and in 2005 to 61 million rubles. At the same time, the expenditure on Russian bases in C.S.T.O. members has increased.
Russia is trying to find an answer to what it perceives as an intervention by outside Western forces in its sphere of influence. The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is still a battlefield between Russia and the West. Although the U.S.-E.U. combine enjoyed an important victory with Viktor Yushchenko\'s presidential win in December 2004, Russia\'s influence is far from suppressed, and the pro-Western camp appears internally divided after Yulia Timoshenko left Yushchenko\'s government. Nevertheless, this bloc has an interest in preventing Russian dominance.The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia\'s side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.Editor’s Note: Marcin Kaczmarski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University. His area of study is Russian-American relations after the Cold War, in addition to Russian foreign policy and international security. His analyses have appeared in major publications such as Rzeczpospolita.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp011106.shtmlThank you,EurasiaNethttp://www.eurasianet.org",0]
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5. BIPOLARITY WITHIN THE CSTO
The C.I.S. structure has become a bipolar one. One bloc, more pro-Western at the moment, consists of Georgia, Moldova (at least in part) and Ukraine. The other bloc consists of the C.S.T.O. states which are more firmly on Russia's side. Also part of this bloc is Uzbekistan, which has done a geopolitical turnover after the Andijan uprising.
6. Overlaping national security Interests
The focus of individual national strategies on security often clashes with the other states’ perception of national security.
7. Preference of Bilateral Security Arrangement
This is due to the lack of trust between the Central Asian states. The Central Asian states also fear possible Chinese or Russian intervention and rightly so for these two large economic and military powers could dominate the region. Besides, there is a fear that cooperation would further weaken national identity to the benefit of a regional identity, or another national identity.
8. Interest in Crises Management Rather Than Long-Term Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention is defined as measures taken before a conflict has emerged. Crises management refers to measures that have been taken after a conflict has developed into
a crisis. Governments focused on crisis management rather than long-term oriented conflict prevention strategies since there is no political willingness and confidence.
Incapabilities of SCO and CSTO of covering the security needs of the central asian republics – The prevailing security problems of the CAR
-The fight against Afghanistan-based terror did not result in success. At the moment Afghanistan can not back militant Islamist movements since international interventions in this country does not allow to do so. However, assoon as this severe foreign intervention ends, Afghanistan will appear as a state that supports radical Islamic movements in Central Asia.
-One of the largest, and certainly the most militant of the region’s Islamist groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formed following clashes between Islamist supporters and state officials in Uzbekistan in 1992[1]. Many of those who escaped the subsequent suppression and persecution fled to Afghanistan and formed the IMU, which combines Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries who seek to create an Islamic state in Uzbekistan through terrorism. Despite being severely persecuted in Uzbekistan, the IMU has maintained attacks through the border regions from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and its activity increased dramatically at the end of the 1990s, following the implementation of strict ideological controls, particularly in Uzbekistan.
-drug and people trafficking is still a big problem for the CAR. The resumption of Afghan heroin production is a problem for all states in the region, particularly those with porous borders.
-Authoritarianism devam etmektedir, the process of democratization could not be completed.
- neither SCO nor CSTO could solve ethnic disputes in the region. Tajiks would like to take revenge of their exclusion from the territory of today’s two main cultural centers of Central Asia, Samarkand and Bukhara now included in Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbeks lay claim to all of the Farghana Valley which includes Kirghizstan’s Osh region and part of Tajikistan’s Khojent region (former Leninabad). Uzbeks also claim parts of southern Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan.
Water controversy is still an important security matter that should be mentioned in Central Asia. The region's two main river systems, the Syr-Darya and the Amu-Darya, each pass through several international borders on their way to the Aral Sea. Sharp differences in interests exist between upstream and downstream users in the preference for an 'irrigation regime' as opposed to an 'energy regime'. Downstream users prefer to store water in the hydroelectric reservoirs to save it for irrigation use during the dry summer months, while upstream users prefer to generate hydroelectric power during the winter months for heating. Central Asia is an arid region and many of the countries rely heavily on agriculture as a source of foreign exchange and generator of employment.
CSTO-ENLARGEMENT
1. The meetings executed until now approved a framework plan on CSTO enlargement in two stages –through 2010 and beyond -- first to upgrade the Collective RapidDeployment Forces in Central Asia and to create an inter-state commission forhandling deliveries and servicing of military equipment at preferential prices.These measures have been on the agenda for several years but hardly showed anyresults.
2. So far, the CSTO has only held joint ground-force and combined exercises in its Central Asian region, but the Russian military now plans tohold joint ground-force exercises in the organization's "western region" and"southern region" -- that is, in Belarus and in Armenia.
THE SCO – ENLARGEMENT
1. It has been among the plans to broaden the SCO’s focus to a more institutionalized security organization due to the increased threat in the region from non-state actors, such as the IMU.
2. China has been looking to expand its influence in this region. However, it is important to note that China has not indicated a desire to offer security guarantees or provide a military presence in Central Asia. At present, China’s interests are more regionally or culturally defined, as opposed to strategic. China still perceives Central Asia as within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, if Russia’s influence within Central Asia continues to weaken, China may assume a more active role in advancing its energy and economic interests.
3. There have been suggestions from several Western states that the international community should pressure the SCO to expand its membership to include EU
and US representatives. However, it would be useless for the US and the EU, as
the SCO poses no security threat to the USA or the EU. The inclusion of
extra-regional actors will only create tension inside the organisation and it would
be in China’s and Russia’s interests to block the development of the conflict
prevention and conflict management mechanisms in fear of a, primarily, US
hijacking of the organisation. The same might be true about the inclusion of
India, Pakistan and Iran.
Conclusion
The security and economic challenges facing the Central Asian states should reinforce cooperation. The costs of failure are high; the rewards of success are great. If the states succeed in establishing a new level of cooperation they will reinforce their own sovereignty. (Paradoxically, perhaps, greater cooperation will enhance national independence and preserve autonomy. But if inter-state cooperation continues to prove elusive, the problems relating to border disputes, trade and payments, common infrastructure arrangements, trans-border natural resources, intra-regional migration, terrorism, and trafficking in people, drugs and weapons, will increasingly circumscribe the autonomy of the states. The Central Asian states are faced with a choice.) In the short run it may be easier to withdraw into self-protection and self-reliance than to cooperate with neighbours, but in the long run only greater cooperation will solve Central Asia's emerging regional problems.
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