1. Güngörmüş Kona, Gamze, “The External and Internal Factors Which Strengthen Radical Islam in Central Asia”, The Eurasia Critic-Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics, UK, 22-26 (August 2008).
2. Güngörmüş Kona, Gamze, “Reasons Behind Turkish New Interest in Central Asia”, The Eurasia Critic-Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics, UK, 50-54 (June 2008).
1. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS WHİCH STRENGTHEN RADICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Abstract
Religion has an independent status having the mission of reinforcing both the individuals and societies. Particularly, Islam which has a more direct relation with the social structure, compared to Christianity, has the functions of designing and guiding the structure of the society, safeguarding the individuals and transfering the ideological and cultural values to the society (Mardin, 1993, p. 91) So, Islam religion, having the mentioned functions, is automatically integrated in the profan matters. As for the stand of Islam in the Central Asian societies after the demise of the Soviet Union, we might say that Islam, the religion of the majority of the Central Asian people, has been trying to compansate for its negative past experience. In addition to this, with the demise of Soviet institutions and ideology and the persistence of economic crisis, Islam, even its fundamentalist variant, could well become a powerful political force in Central Asia, as disillusioned people cast about for a sense of direction (Menon and Barkey, 1993, p.72) The aim of this article is to determine the internal and external factors which pave the way for the development and reinforcement of radical Islam, which has become a real threat in Central Asia since 1990s.
Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona
The Internal and External Factors Which Strengthen Radical Islam In Central Asia
Introduction
Religion has an independent status having the mission of reinforcing both the individuals and societies. Particularly, Islam which has a more direct relation with the social structure, compared to Christianity, has the functions of designing and guiding the structure of the society, safeguarding the individuals and transfering the ideological and cultural values to the society. (Mardin, 1993, p.91) So, Islam religion, having the mentioned functions, is automatically integrated in the profan matters. As for the stand of Islam in the Central Asian societies after the demise of the Soviet Union, we might say that Islam, the religion of the majority of the Central Asian people, has been trying to compansate for its negative past experience. In addition to this, with the demise of Soviet institutions and ideology and the persistence of economic crisis, Islam, even its fundamentalist variant, could well become a powerful political force in Central Asia, as disillusioned people cast about for a sense of direction. (Menon and Barkey, 1993, p.72) In this article, the internal and external factors which pave the way for the development and reinforcement of radical Islam, which has become a real threat in Central Asia since 1990s will be determined and explained.
The Internal Factors :
Economic Problems in the Region :
Central Asia’s states are simultaneously suffering from three separate - though related - painful developments : the collapse of the command economy, with its highly interdependent system of production, trade and payments; the sudden independence from Russia, the giant core of the system; and the continued dependence on Russia, which itself is gripped by economic and political crisis. (Islam, 1994, p.157) The mentioned three negative factors, which are regarded by Shafiqul Islam as the factors which mainly cause economic deficiencies in these republics also lead other negative results in the economic field. These may include: High inflation rate; declining living standards; shortcomings in liberal market economy structures and norms; lack of skilled staff in administration of economy; insufficient man capital necessary for economic development; problematic money and banking system; slow privatization; massive monopolization of the economy; lack of capital; absence of consistent economic aid from industrialized countries since the indusrialised countries refrain from investing in these republics assuming that they are located in politically and economically unstable and risky region. (Kona, 1999, p.89); insufficient transport lines; obstacles in importation; limited foreign exchange regulations etc. The prevailing problems in the economic field directly reflect themselves on domestic and foreign policy and social life, and makes Islam a kind of spiritual shelter for the ones who suffer from the economic problems.
The Strong Will of Intervention of the Central Asian Leaders:
Authoritarian way of behaviour of the Central Asian leaders represents contradiction with the Western idea of democracy. While the leaders emphasize the importance of democracy for their new republics they continue authoritarian type of leadership inherited from Soviet Union. More or less, all the Central Asian republics seem to be administered similar to the previous totalitarian communist regime. (Gumpel, 1994, p.24)
the leaders of the Central Asian republics have given importance to authoritarian way of leadership. By doing so, they both try to foster their power and extend duration of their power. following the dismantlement of the Soviet Union both nationalist interests and religious upheavals increased. It is evident that these tendencies are functional in two ways: On the one hand they present a kind of safeguard against any state who would threathen their national unity and on the other hand they create a kind of security umbrella against any social discontent or political diversity which would give harm to their national unity and political development. So, the political leaders of the Central Asian republics use authoritarianism to hold the society together against external powers and probable internal conflict. By doing so, they keep the society under their control and they foster their leadership. Besides, it is not surprising that the Central Asian leaders willingly follow the authoritarian way of leadership in the former Soviet Union since both are intended to remove conflicts in the society and remain in power for long years through adopting authoritarianism. This severe pressure applied upon society, economy and politics reinforces the refusal of the generally accepted ideology and intensifies the will of filling the gap by the Islamist ideology which is rather different in terms of quality
Ethnic Disputes in the Region:
Moscow has designed the borders of the Central Asian republics arbitrarily and artificially and this made the present republics ethnically heterogenous. The borders of the republics have been changed about 90 times since 1921. While these changes secured Soviet Union’s unity, they made the republics ethnically fractious. Besides, Central Asian region has been in chaos in terms of ethnic disputes due to the lesser degree of urbanization, priority of Islam above ethnic consciousness, strong role of clan identity, lack of political mobilization, prevailing nomad traditions, lack of national heroes and histories and the authoritarian rulers who try to suppress nationalists for the well being of their leadersip. (Kubicek, 1996, p.94) So, on the one hand the mentioned ethnic dispute facilitates the peoples of Central Asia to direct their attention toward the Islamic motives and on the other hand helps the Islamist groups benefit from this chaotic environment for their own profit.
Islam As a Mediator to Have a Social Identity:
In general, religion has been regarded as a mediator for the people want to have a social identity. The peoples of the Central Asia, who had lived with collective social identities for 70 years and who had left aside their Kazak, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Uzbek identities, have begun to feel the necessity and power of religion after the break up of the Soviet Union. Following their independence, Islam has started to be regarded as a value which fosters to have unique Kazak, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Uzbek identities in independent Kazakhistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Those peoples, who want to emphasize their own identities, would like to overvalue Islam through interpreting it as a distinguishing factor.
Islam As the Most Important Social Value in Traditional Societies:
As in all traditional societies in which cultural, religious and social symbols are appreciated more than material symbols, the status of religion is prestigious for the Central Asian states which reflect the features of traditional structure. Strong tendency toward the religious symbols and rituals in these societies has been regarded as a kind of resistance against the probability of loosing the traditions.
Islam As a Distinguishing FactorRegarding the Slavic Population:
Islam should also be regarded as a distinguishing factor in getting the Central Asian Muslim population to feel different from the majority of Slavic population in the Commonwealth of Independent States. People instinctively felt it was Islam which is not just a set of religious beliefs but a way of life and civilization - that made them different from the Russians, whose rule they had never accepted as legitimate. (Mirsky, 1992, p.334)
The External Factors:
Islam As a Constraining Symbol Against the Extended Russian Role:
Furthermore, Islam has been regarded as a constraining symbol against the probable extended role of the Russian Federation by the Central Asain people. Today Islam may emerge as a barrier against extended Russian role in Central Asia in as much as Islam is becoming a defining item of the political agenda. (Peker, 1996, p.81)
Islam As an Overemphasized Social Value Against the Former Russian Policies:
The revival of Islam may also be based on the policies of the former Soviet Union related to any religion except Orthodoxy. During the Soviet period Islam has been completely eliminated from the public life: mosques, medreses and other religious establishments had disappeared dramatically. Entire religious life in the Soviet Union was kept under strict control of the government, while any slightest manifestation of the national and religious consciousness among the non-Russian people was considered as flagrant nationalism and fundamentalism...In the minds of the ordinary Russians Islam had been associated with backwardness, fundamentalism and even terrorism. But, in spite the all, Islam is considered by its followers as a part of national culture and as a way of life. This gives Islam special status, compared to other religions. (Kadir, 1996, pp.48-49) The Soviet leaders regarded the Muslims as reactionaries who opposed progress at least in the Soviet Union. (D’Encausse, 1992, p.17-51) So, according to the explanations, it may be argued that the Muslim peoples, who were isolated from the society and scorned during the Soviet period, want to perform their Islamic belief and emphasize Islam religion in society after the break up of the Soviet Union.
The Russian Modernization Realised in Central Asia:
The attempts to modernize the politics and society made during the Russian rule could not penetrate into the basic social structures and institutions. So, this development accelerated and facilitated Islam’s integration with these structures and institutions, which could succeed to keep traditionalism.
Ideological Gap Following Communism:
Unfortunately, the inability of administrations, which were not able to build up a new ideology following the disappear of communist ideology after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, resulted in the emergence of some radical structures and the adoption of some religious projects by the Central Asian peoples.
Power Rivalry in the Region:
As the result of the decrease in Russian presence in the region, both the international such as U.S., Japan, China and regional states such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India; seeking for geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages; started to take their place in this new great game. They all have come with their own priorities and they all want to re-orientate the Central Asian republics according to their own preferences. So, these new Central Asian states, which are economically weak, politically immature and unstable and ethnicly rather mixed, are subject to be directed or absorbed by the mentioned international or regional powers. (Brzezinski, 1998, pp. 40-53) These re-orientation attempts by the international and regional powers also prevent the Turkic republics in the region from developing their internal and foreign policy principles by themselves. On the one hand, this annoys the nationalist and Islamist circles and causes social discontent and on the other hand, makes these republics dependent on external powers.
Conclusion
In order to safeguard political regimes in Central Asia before radical Islam, all the republics in the region should reach almost the same development level, socio-economic problems should be solved, the ruling party should remove oppression over the oppostion parties, cooperation among the regional states should be established, democratic norms and rules should be legitimate in society and politics, the ruling party should solve the prevailing problems not through authoritarian way but tolerence. The most important in all these efforts intended to eliminate radical Islamist movements in Central Asian republics is the reinforcement of political culture, determination of judicial norms, development of dialogue in society and establishment of democracy.
References
Brzezinski, Zbigniev (1998). Büyük Satranç Tahtası. (Çev. Ertuğrul Dikbaş ve Ergun Kocabıyık). Istanbul: Sabah Yy.
D’Encausse, Helene Carrere (1992). Sovyetler’de Müslümanlar. (Çev. Adnan Tekşen). Alternatif Üniversite Yy.
Gumpel, Werner (1994). “Economic and Political Developments in the Central Asian Turkish Republics”. Eurasian Studies (Ankara), no.2.
Islam, Shafiqul (1994). “Capitalism on the Silk Route”. Current History, no.582.
Kadir, Zülfiye (1996). “Muslim Political Movements in Russia”. Eurasian Studies (Ankara), no.2.
Kona, Gamze, 1999. “Central Asia: A New Economic Potential”. İşletme ve Finans (Ankara), no.155.
Kubicek, Paul 1996. Managing Inter-Ethnic Relations in Central Asia: Theory and Practice. Eurasian Studies (Ankara), no.3.
Mardin, Şerif (1993). Din ve Ideoloji. Altıncı Basım, Istanbul: Iletişim Yy.
Menon, Rajan ve Henri J. Barkey (1993). “The transformation of Central Asia: implications for regional and international security”. Survival Winter 1992-93.
Mirsky, George I. (1992). “Central Asia’s Emergence”. Current History, no.567.
Peker, Günden (1996). “ISLAM: myth or reality in Central Asia”. Eurasian Studies (Ankara), no.3.
2. THE REASONS BEHIND TURKISH NEW INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA
Abstract
It is obvious that the changes in international political system led the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. The demise of the Soviet Union prepared the end of the Cold War; the end of the Cold War paved the way for the questioning of the functions and the status of the most important security institution Nato and also the functions and the status of some strategic Nato members; the role of Turkey, one of the most important Nato ally, started to be regarded as not important as in the Cold War period. In fact, Turkey’s decreasing power before the west led Turkey to overview her foreign policy strategy and this resulted in the transformation from western-orientated to region-orientated foreign policy. With in this region-orientated foreign policy, the relations which were frozen for 70 years with the Central Asian peoples have been revived after 1991. Besides, dismantlement of the Soviet Union also led the revival of the relations with the Central Asian Turks. Oil and gas attractivity of the region might also be regarded as one of the determinants of Turkish orientation toward the region. Last but not the least, political and socio-cultural reasons have also had a role in the mentioned Turkish orientation toward the Central asian region. In this article, we will discuss the reasons which led Turkish decision-makers to concentrate on the Central Asian region and Central asian Republics in all dimensions.
Key Words : Turkey, Central Asia, orientation, preference, reasons
The Reasons of Turkish Interest in Central Asia
It is obvious that the changes in international political system led the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. The demise of the Soviet Union prepared the end of the Cold War; the end of the Cold War paved the way for the questioning of the functions and the status of the most important security institution Nato and also the functions and the status of some strategic Nato members; the role of Turkey, one of the most important Nato ally, started to be regarded as not important as in the Cold War period. In fact, Turkey’s decreasing power before the west led Turkey to overview her foreign policy strategy and this resulted in the transformation from the western-orientated to the region-orientated foreign policy. With in this region-orientated foreign policy, the relations which were frozen for 70 years with the Central Asian peoples have been revived after 1991. Besides, dismantlement of the Soviet Union also led the revival of the relations with the Central Asian Turks. Oil and gas attractivity of the region might also be regarded as one of the determinants of Turkish orientation toward the region. Last but not the least, political and socio-cultural reasons have also had a role in the mentioned Turkish orientation toward the Central asian region.
In the article, we will explain the reasons which are closely related with Turkish orientation toward Central Asia: The Demise of the Soviet Union, Changes emerged in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, Economic reasons, Political reasons and Socio-cultural reasons and by doing so we will also explain the reasons why the Central Asian region and the Central Asian republics can not be disregarded by Turkish decision-makers and Turkish bureaucratic elite.
1. The Demise of the Soviet Union and the Emergence of the Independent Republics in Central Asia
Along with the emergence of the newly independent Soviet Muslim periphery, the region, has started to be included in Turkish foreign policy agenda, too. Turkey was one of the first countries who recognised the independence of the Central Asian republics. Besides recognition Turkey has declared her willingness to give spiritual and material support to the newly-independent Central Asian republics. The attempts of Turkey was treated with pleasure by the mentioned republics. It will not be wrong to argue that the interest of the Central Asian Muslim republics depended completely on a different reason at the very begining of independence. Bilge explains the reason of Central Asian Muslim republics’ attitude toward Turkey such that; “These republics have not been willing to disintegrate from the Soviet Union, in a way they were isolated. The support given to them were cancelled. Under these circumstances Muslim Turkish republics felt closer to Turkey. Turkey was isolated from the European Union and left alone in the same period. So, the rapproachement between the Central Asian Muslim republics and Turkey has become quite natural”. (Bilge, 1995, p.96)
We should make it clear that in the begining of the relations period not only the newly independent Central Asian republics but also Turkey tried to develop intimate relations with these republics taking her multi-dimentional advantages into consideration such as compensating her isolation from the EU, enlarging its sphere of economic, cultural and political influence in the Central Asian region, developing cultural and social relations with these republics and safeguarding herself in this newly-emerged volatile region. According to Bal, “There are two reasons for Turkey’s interest in Central Asia and Caucasus (particularly in Azerbaijan). The first and most important one includes cultural issues such as ethnicity, religion, history and language. It answers the question, whether Turkey would be so interested in this part of the world if these republics were not Muslim in religion and Turkic in origin. The second reason includes security issues and Turkey’s international relations in general”. (Bal, 1998, p.59). To sum up, the demise of the Soviet Union and the positive stand of the Central Asian republics’ stand toward Turkey had been two important occasions which helped Turkey develop relations with the Turkish origin republics in the Central Asian region.
2. Changes Ocuured in Turkish Foreign Policy
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, Turkey started to change her foreign policy strategy though she has kept basic foreign policy principles/objectives she adopted since the establishment of Turkish Republic. (see Hale, 1993, pp.231-248; Kirişçi, 1995, pp.1-21; Taşhan, 1993, pp.1-19; Sander, 1998, pp.69-94 and pp.147-159; Sander, pp.31-45, 1993; Çam, 1978, pp.77-96; Kirişçi, 1993, pp.1-36; Yavuzalp, 1998, pp.219-243) During the Cold War period Turkey has presented relatively passive foreign policy. This passive foreign policy behaviour was significant after Nato membership. Turkey tried to identify its own benefits with Nato in order to integrate itself with the West. For Turkey, West was regarded as a guard against the USSR. However, this close relationship with the West had prevented Turkey from developing its foreign policy preferences. Due to this fact, Turkey was left unable to choose and perform its own foreign policy patterns. Turkey only behaved according to the Western policy determinants. However, this passive foreign policy behaviour has changed into the active one after 1991. Turkey has started to affect the course of international political developments with her own initiatives. These cases symbolize the transformation in Turkish foreign policy behaviour: The Gulf Crisis, The Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenian - Azeri Conflict, Involvement in Somalia. In addition to that, at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Turkey faced unexpected and sudden developments from the Balkans to Central Asia and realized that it might create new alternatives while benefiting from the new economic and social developments in the neighbouring countries. So, Turkey, in addition to its bilateral relations with the West and America, stared to set up multi-lateral relations with the countries in the region. Furthermore, Turkey transformed the content of its relations. The content of the relations based upon military and political aspects with the West and America during the Cold War period was added to social, cultural and economic relations with the neighbouring countries after 1990s.
3. Economic Reasons
While disintegration of the Soviet Union and changes in Turkish foreign policy constitute the first two important reasons which lead Turkish decision-makers to show interest in the Central Asian region, economic reasons might be regarded as another important factor which has motivated Turkish decision-makers to become interested in the region. The economic reasons can be as follows: First of all, Central Asian region is quite rich in terms of natural gas and oil reserves. Proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin are currently estimated at 15 to 31 billion barrels, about 2.7 percent of total world proven reserves. Individual country reserves in billion barrels are estimated at 3.6 to 6.3 for Azerbaijan, 10 to 22 for Kazakhstan, 1 to 1.5 in Turkmenistan and less than 1 in Uzbekistan. Such figures, while not comparable with Saudi Arabia’s holdings, are significantly greater than those of either Iran or Iraq. Future exploration may show that the region holds more substantial oil reserves, potentially as high as 60 to 140 billion barrels. Proven natural gas reserves of 230 to 360 trillion cubic feet represent about 7 percent of total world proven gas reserves. (Olcott, 1999, pp.307-308 ; Sinnott, 1997, p.22) Contrary to the mentioned rich oil and gas reserves, very limited natural gas and oil reserves in Turkey and gradual increase in natural gas and oil importation abroad has been an important factor in directing Turkish decision-makers attention toward Central Asia and Central Asian states. “In 1994, Turkey needed to import 22 million tons of oil. According to BOTAŞ estimates, by 2010 Turkey will have to import 40 million tons. At present, much of Turkey’s oil is transported from Russia. Iran is another important supplier. In 1995 Tehran exported 4.5 million tons of oil to Turkey... As in the case of oil, Turkey is not a major gas producer either. Turkey currently imports 6 billion cubic metres of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Algeria and Turkish consumption will increase gradually”. (Winrow, 1997, p.117) Currently, 7 natural gas pipeline and 2 oil pipeline projects with some Middle East and Central Aisan states and Russia are at the top of economic agenda. (See Özyaprak, 2007) It can be said that among these oil and gas pipeline projects Turkish policy-makers are principally interested in transporting Central Asian natural gas and oil to European makets via Turkey. According to Miles: “The countries whose transit routes are eventually chosen will benefit not only from heavy capital inflows in terms of investment and transit fees, but more importantly, will gain considerable influence throughout the region”. (Miles, 1999, p.325) Depending on this quite realist explanation it can be said that Turkish decision-makers expect that this kind of development will bring both economic and political benefits to Turkey.
Secondly, gradual developments in private sector particularly after 1990s has necessitated entrepreneur to find out potential export markets for their goods. Parallel to this development, the newly-independent Central Asian states have begun to be regarded as a newly-invented export market by economic circles in Turkey. (Kuru, 1999, p.149)
Thirdly, employment problems, which have become much more obvious after 1990s, have been onother economic factor which has led both the private sector and state to direct their interest into the region. It should be taken into account that the states such as Germany and Arab states have lost their attraction interms of employment advantages for Turkey compared to last years. (Kuru, 1999, p.149)
So, depending on the explanations above it can be said that in addition to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in Turkish foreign policy strategy; economic reasons also play an important role in directing Turkish officials interest toward the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics.
4. Political Reasons
Besides economic reasons, political reasons are also important in directing the interest of Turkish decision-makers into the Central Asian region. The political reasons can be summarized as follows. First of all, following the emergence of independent Central Asian republics Turkish decision-makers have begun to regard the Central Asian region as an important region which would possibly compensate Turkey’s downgrading role in international political system after the end of the Cold War. Thoughts of some foreign political analysts seem to support this assumption. For example, according to Kazemi and Ajdari, links with the republics will help maintain Turkey’s strategic importance in the post Cold War era. (Kazemi and Ajdari, 1998, p.58) So, partly motivated by this mentioned external consensus, and partly by taking internal requirements into consideration Turkish decision-makers have begun to support the idea that Turkey would regain its prestige, largely obtained by the defence role given by the U.S. against the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, through presenting herself as a model for the Central Asian republics. They even believe that Turkey might obtain more international prestige through functioning as a bridge between the West and the Central Asian republics in the new world order. For this reason, Central Asian region is regarded as a region in which Turkey has to be active.
Secondly, the delay in Turkey’s full membership application for the EU reinforced Turkish decision-makers to find new alternatives. Developments in Central Asian republics, which have some common historical, cultural and religious features with Turkish republic, seem to be a new alternative though probable economic and political advantages to be obtained from this region are never regarded as an alternative to economic and political advantages to be obtained from the EU. It can be said that Central Asian region and Central Asian republics are regarded as the motivating factors which might compansate Turkey’s isolation, emerged after the end of the Cold War.
Thirdly, as mentioned before Turkey had played the same role during the Cold War years: Nato’s southern flank responsibility. However, along with the end of the Cold War period, Turkey’s role designed by the West and some European states against the Soviet Union, which helped Turkey obtain economic and military advantages, has diminished. Despite this negative development in terms of Turkey, the West, principally the U.S. are still interested in the developments emerged in former Soviet geopolitical area following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. First of all, they forcefully support the independent states’ transition to democracy and market economy. Secondly, they closely follow the probable attempts of the Russian Federation in regard to reestablishing its rule on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Thirdly, they declare obviously their intention related with exportation of oil and gas in these states to world markets. Turkey has also almost the same concern in regard to these new republics, particularly Central Asian republics. Firstly, Turkey very often explains her readiness for the political and economic support in regard to the continuity of independence of these states since she believes that in case of the establishment of the probable Russian rule over these independent republics Turkey would face the same Russian threat as in the Cold War period. Secondly, Turkey is in favour of diminishing Russian role over transportation of Central Asian oil and gas transportation routes since she expects to benefit from transportation fee when oil or gas is transported via Turkey. Thirdly, Turkey regards the republics in Central Asia as a mean to gain economic and political power in her own region. Depending on these common interests related with the independent republics and Russian Federation Turkey might have dual role through intensifying relations with the Central Asian republics against the Russian Federation. So, it can be said that the interest in having this dual role might be another motivating factor in regard to developing multi-lateral relations with Central Asian republics.
Fourthly, it can be said that through developing relations with the Central Asian republics Turkish decision-makers expect to increase Turkey’s political influence in its own region and in the neighbourly regions such as Middle East and Balkans. In a way they believe that close relations with the republics in Central Asia, which are Turkic origin and which belong to the same religion, will help Turkey be influential politically. For this reason, they regard Turkey’s relations with independent Central Asian republics quite important. So, it can be argued that this assumption has played a role in directing Turkey’s interest toward the region and the states in the region.
Finally, in addition to the mentioned factors, it can be assumed that some Turkish politicians, whose political discourse is largely based on Turkism and nationalism, and some Turkish political parties which have adopted those two notions as a kind of symbol have been influential in reinforcing the interest of different groups and Turkish people toward Central Asia and newly-independent Central Asian states. Besides the mentioned type of politicians and political parties, some Turkish media organizations have also given full support to these politicians and political parties. So, it can be said that both some Turkish politicians, some political parties and some newspapers and tv channels have all helped show interest in Central Asian region and intensify relations with the republics in Central Asia.
5. Socio-cultural Reasons
In addition to four groups of reasons which have had impact on developing close and multi-lateral relations with the Central Asian republics, some common features between these republics and Turkey such as religion, ethnic origin, language and culture might also be regarded as motivating factors related with developing close relations with the Central Asian republics. It can be said that to develop relations and realise some political and economic goals between the peoples who belong to the same ethnic origin, who speak different dialects of Turkish, who are Muslim and who had shared the same historical past is regarded as more practical and realistic. So, it can be assumed that the mentioned common features between Central Asian republics and Turkey might be interpreted as an important factor which lead Turkish decision-makers to direct their interest toward the Central Asian region.
Conclusion
In the article, we have tried to present the reasons which directed Turkish officials to begin to show interest in the Central Asian region, and which directed Turkish foreign policy to focus on this region and the republics in Central Asia. It should be kept in mind that Turkey will never give up developing relations with the republics in Central Asia not only due to the reasons of geographic proximity of Central Asia and common socio-cultural features between Turkish and Central Asian societies but also due to the economic and political expectations of Turkish decision-makers related with the Central Asian region.
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