Turkish Foreign Policy and Central Asia

Dr. Güngörmüş Kona, Gamze, “Central Asia and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Turkish Rewiev of Eurasian Studies, pp. 79-136, Annual 2005-5, İstanbul.

Dr. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona

CENTRAL ASIA AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

The emergence of Turkish interest in the Central Asian region began with the geopolitical changes appeared in the former Soviet South geopolitical area following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. After the disintegration five states in Central Asia declared their independence and began to develop foreign relations with the states outside the region. Encouraged by the mentioned changes Turkish decision-makers began to show interest toward the region and this resulted in the orientation of Turkey toward the Central Asian states which was abandoned since Bolshevik Revolution and establishment of Turkish Republic.

It can be said that the U.S. back played an important role in reinforcing Turkish orientation toward the Central Asian region too. The U.S. did not hesitate to support Turkish state economically and politically in order to make her more influential in the Central Asian region. The U.S. presented soft Muslim Turkey as a laic, secular and democratic model to the Central Asian states in order to remove the possibility of Iran’s attempt to benefit from this heavily Muslim populated region for political pragmatism. Such encouragement of the U.S. resulted in the reinforcement of Turkish interest and policies toward the Central Asian region.

The radical change in Turkish foreign policy preference after 1990s had also a share in the increase of Turkish interest toward the region. Along with the changes which emerged in international system Turkey had to make rearrangements not in its foreign policy principles but in foreign policy preferences. Among the reasons which forced Turkey to rearrange its foreign policy preferences; the assumption that Turkey’s function and importance in the Nato began to downgrade, newly-emerged volatility and fluidity in the former Soviet geopolitical area, removal of the Soviet threat and the delay in the EU full membership process consisted the primary importance. These changes prepared a suitable milieu for Turkey to adopt multi-lateral foreign policy preference different from bi-lateral foreign policy preference strictly followed by Turkish decision-makers under the conditions of the Cold War period. Along with the adoption of multi-lateral foreign policy preference, Central Asian states, with which Turkey has some cultural, ethnic, religious and historical ties, began to be regarded as an alternative which might present Turkey some economic and political advantages.

However despite sincere attempts, due to some external and internal reasons, Turkish decision-makers could not cover their expectations in regard to the Central Asian states. In this article; on the one hand we will discuss the development of cooperation strategy model as an alternative to maximize Turkey’s foreign policy advantages in the Central Asian region and foreign policy goal/s that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian Region, and on the other hand foreign policy goal/s and interests of the U.S., Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan and Russian Federation in relation with the mentioned region, since we believe that foreign policy goals of those states indirectly affect the political stand and foreign policy goals of Turkish governments in Central Asia.

1. Foreign Policy Strategies Adopted By the States in International Relations and the Probability of Application of those Foreign Policy Strategies by Turkey in Central Asian region.

Under this title we will explain the necessity of adopting specific foreign policy strategy in order to maximize Turkey’s economic, political and social advantages in the Central Asian region. By doing so, we will make it clear that if Turkish decision-makers do not adopt and develop specific foreign policy strategy for the mentioned region Turkey will become completely isolated from the ongoing power rivalry and will not be able to benefit from the potential advantages in the region.

It is known that there have been four types of foreign policy strategy adopted by the states in order to realize their foreign policy goals. These are neutrality, isolationism, non-alignment and cooperation. Through explaining these four foreign policy strategies (see Sönmezoğlu, 1989, pp. 149-194) briefly we will prove the fact that cooperation strategy is the most suitable strategy type that should be adopted but other three strategy types are not proper for realizing Turkey’s goals in the Central Asian region.

Neutrality and probability of application of this type of foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region

Neutrality bears juridical feature and is different from non-alignment (neutralism) which bears political feature. Any state which excludes itself from any war de facto and de jure occurred between two or more states and which wants to be regarded so is accepted as neutral in international relations. Neutrality should be regarded as a foreign policy strategy chosen by the states’ free will. The states who prefer this type of foreign policy strategy can give up adopting the same strategy any time by their own will.

However, neutrality can be applied as a concept which refers to the period outside war. Any state might give up the right of war, except for the necessity of self-defense, and also the right
of entering any military alliance in return its political independence and territorial unity is taken under guarantee by other states. Upon this kind of declaration the state is included in permanent neutrality. So as to emphasize the difference between neutrality and permanent neutrality, it should be pointed out that while neutrality is a type of foreign policy strategy which is preferred by states’ own will and which can be given up so, permanent neutrality is an agreement between the state who demanded this permanent neutrality status and the states who accepted this status. So, any demand of change in this status necessitates the approval of the states who had accepted this status before. The foreign policy status adopted by Turkish decision-makers in the World War II was neutrality. Despite several requests of Britain, France and the Soviet Union in regard to Turkey’s inclusion in the World War II, Turkey refused these requests and remained neutral until the very end of war. However, on February 23, 1945 Turkey gave up being neutral in order to participate in San Francisco Conference and be a member of United Nations, and declared war against Germany.

As for the probability of application of the mentioned foreign policy strategy by Turkey in Central Asian region, it can be said that under current conditions, there is no necessity of adopting this type of foreign policy strategy by Turkish decision-makers since there is no war in which Turkey has to take part actually in the region. So, we should automatically eliminate application of this type of foreign policy strategy in Central Asia.
Isolationism and probability of application of this type of foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region

Isolationism is known to be a political and military strategy, and can be explained as the minimum participation in the problems related with international system, minimum preference in regard to develop diplomatic or economic relations with other states, and unwillingness in regard to conduct any military operation or to give any military privilege to any state. There have been several factors which stimulate the states to adopt this type of foreign policy strategy. For example, the demand related with preserving a determined social system or structure and improving this system or structure a way from external factors can be regarded as one of the factors which lead the states to adopt isolationist foreign policy strategy. Peoples Republic of China adopted this type of strategy until 1960s. In addition to this, economic and social self-sufficiency can be another factor which stimulates the states to adopt isolationism. So, U.S., former Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China can relatively follow this type of strategy easily. Furthermore, xenophobia and underestimation dominant in public opinion toward some other states can be motivating factors which lead the states to adopt isolationist foreign policy strategy. Lastly, geographic factors play an important role in following this type of foreign policy strategy. For example, a state largely covered by forests or high mountains is advantageous against any external penetration or invasion and so, she can prefer isolationist strategy partly depending on this reason.

However, while the application of isolationist strategy was more convenient during the period between the mid of 17th century and the mid of 20th century, during which ‘balance of power’ international system was hegemon in international relations; along with the polarization in international system after the World War II, the states began to feel the necessity of acting commonly and supporting each other deeply against the states in other pact, so, they had to give up following isolationist strategy gradually, in stead they began to behave cooperatively almost in every step of foreign policy.

As for the probability of application of the mentioned foreign policy strategy by Turkey in Central Asian region, it can be said that under today’s economic and political conditions, there is no chance for Turkish decision-makers to follow this type of strategy in the mentioned region. Furthermore, when we take the mentioned motivating factors which stimulate the states to adopt and follow isolationist foreign policy strategy into consideration we can argue that it seems impossible to apply this strategy in order to maximize our foreign policy goals in the Central Asian region.

Non-alignment and probability of application of this type of foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region

This foreign policy strategy, principally adopted by Asian, African and Latin American states, emerged following the World War II. The terms; such as ‘poor’, ‘less developed’, ‘periphery’, ‘south’, ‘third world’, ‘non-aligned’; used to define some states in Asia, Africa and Latin America can be regarded as synonyms of the term non-alignment. However, the mentioned terms are largely interrelated with the economic position of these states, the term non-alignment refers to political preference of the same states. Non-alignment means to remain outside the alliances and disputes between present pacts. Depending on this explanation, it can be said that any state who has the intention of following this type of foreign policy strategy has to accept the preconditions of this strategy and she will not participate in any multi-lateral military alliances or any bi-lateral military alliances with big powers, or will not accept the presence of any military bases on their own territory.

So, taking these determinants which shape non-alignment strategy into account, it can be said that it is highly impossible for Turkish decision-makers to follow this type of foreign policy strategy in realizing any foreign policy goal since integration with European political, economic and social institutions strictly consists one of the most important foreign policy goal in Turkish foreign policy since the World War II.

As for the probability of application of the mentioned foreign policy strategy by Turkey in Central Asian region, it can be said that depending on Turkey’s economic and political insufficiencies, application of this foreign policy strategy in the mentioned region is impossible. In other words, Turkey can only realize her aims in regard to the region not through isolating herself or remaining outside the alliances but through integrating herself with the pacts or economic, military or political alliances.

Cooperation and probability of application of this type of foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region

The history of setting up cooperation among states dates quite back since there have been several reasons which motivate the states to do so for long years. Firstly, one of the most important reasons which lead the states to follow cooperation foreign policy strategy is that they do have a common goal but they do not have enough capacity to reach this goal by themselves. Secondly, although the states have enough capacity to reach the determined goal they might prefer to adopt cooperation strategy in order to reduce the financial cost of the determined goal, or reach the goal in a shorter time, or gain support for their policies, or take other states under their influence. Third reason of the states to adopt cooperation strategy might be that the states might require to share the responsibility of their foreign policy attempts made to reach their goal with other states. Lastly, the states might follow cooperation strategy in order to increase their influence on other states through setting up cooperation. When we evaluate the mentioned reasons all together it can be said that there are several motivating factors which stimulate the states to adopt this kind of foreign policy strategy.

As for the validity of this strategy among Turkish decision-makers we can argue that cooperation strategy has been one of the most attractive foreign policy strategy compared to other three foreign policy strategies by Turkish decision-makers in the Ottoman state and Turkish republic. The aforementioned four reasons have all played role in adopting this kind of foreign policy strategy by Turkish decision-makers in the Ottoman state and Turkish republic. Furthermore, along with the changes in international political order after the World War II, Turkey has become much more interested in cooperation foreign policy strategy. Largely, due to the economic incapabilities and defense requirements Turkey preferred to cooperate with the U.S. and Western European states economically and politically.

As for the probability of application of the mentioned foreign policy strategy by Turkey in Central Asian region, it can be said that cooperation strategy seems to be the most suitable strategy to be adopted by Turkish decision-makers in order to reach the desired goal in the Central Asian region. First of all, Turkey has not enough economic and political capacity to materialize economic and political goals in this region. Secondly, it seems obvious that it is inevitable for Turkey to share the probable responsibility of her foreign policy attempts made for the region with some economically and politically powerful states such as U.S. and some Western European states since these attempts would probably face the opposition of the Russian Federation and some other states who would like to gain political and economic power in the Central Asian region. So, Turkey, in order to resist this probable opposition, has no other choice beyond cooperating with other states. Thirdly, if Turkey tries to realize her goals in the Central Asian region by herself she will not be able to become as influential as she wants on the Central Asian states, but through setting up cooperation with the state/s who has/have the power of shaping international political and economic system she can influence the Central Asian states more profoundly and direct her foreign policy attempts according to her own desire. When we evaluate the mentioned reasons all together it can be said that there are several motivating factors which stimulate Turkey to adopt this kind of foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region.

We have tried to explain four types of foreign policy strategies adopted in different periods depending on the conditions of the time by the states, and we also explained the probability of application of these four types of foreign policy strategy by Turkey in Central Asian region. In the following part, we will present the driving factors which lead Turkey to follow cooperation foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region. We will group these driving forces in four titles: 1. Economic Driving Forces 2. Political Driving Forces 3. Socio-cultural Driving Forces 4. Geographic Driving Forces.

2. The Driving forces which necessitate Turkey to develop “cooperation strategy” model for the Central Asian region

a. Economic Driving Forces

Under this title we will present the economic reasons which prevent Turkey from behaving independently but force her to cooperate with other states in order to materialize economic goals in the Central Asian region. By doing so, we will also emphasize the necessity of developing cooperation strategy models in order to maximize economic expectations in regard to the Central Asian region.

a. Central Asian republics, which have been trying to establish the necessary norms and institutions of liberal economy, are strongly in need of foreign financial support since their independence. Taking economic expectations of these republics into consideration it can be said that they are obviously in favor of developing relations and setting up economic alliances with economically powerful states. When we take Turkey’s limited economic possibilities into account we should admit that Turkey is not capable of entering the region by herself and covering economic needs of Central Asian republics by her own available economic possibilities. At that point Stephen Blank’s words should be regarded as a well-established determination which explains Turkey’s economic position: “Turkey’s inflation rate, military modernization, and the socio-economic costs of the Kurdish insurgency all suggest a broad unfinished domestic agenda that constrains Turkey fiscally and economically from playing a leading or dominating role in the ex-Soviet republics”. (Blank, 1993)

So, under the mentioned circumstances it becomes more reasonable to enter the region not alone but through cooperating with the economically powerful states which have some political or economic expectations from the Central Asian republics.

b. When we analyze Turkey’s available economic potential it can be assumed that Turkey is not only incapable of covering the economic needs of Central Asian republics but also she has not enough economic power to realize necessary projects in the Central Asian region, which would bring her financial benefits. For example, currently it is hardly difficult to say that Turkey can take the financial responsibility of building oil or gas pipelines in her own territory which would carry Central Asian oil and gas to world markets.

So, in terms of her own economic and political benefits Turkey must adopt cooperation foreign policy strategy and cooperate with the states which support the idea that Turkey is geographically, politically the most convenient transit country who would bring Central Asian oil and gas to the use of world states, and also Turkey must cooperate with the states who are economically powerful and who can give financial support to her in building oil or gas pipelines for the Central Asian oil or gas.

b. Political Driving Forces

Under this title we will present the political reasons which prevent Turkey from behaving independently but force her to cooperate with other states in order to obtain political advantages in her own region as the result of cooperation with the Central Asian states. By doing so, we will also emphasize the necessity of developing cooperation strategy models in order to maximize our political expectations in regard to the Central Asian region.

a. Following disintegration of the Soviet Union several states have appeared to gain economic or political, or both, or some other advantages in the Central Asian region. Having different expectation, some regional powers such as Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India and some global powers such as U.S., Japan and China have emerged as the states who have actively been involved in this power rivalry in this region. While Israel and Saudi Arabia are largely interested in economic aspect of this power rivalry; Russian Federation, U.S., Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan are interested in both economic and political aspects of the same issue. For example, Russia is not in favor of loosing its control on Central Asian republics completely because she is aware of the fact that she will certainly have economic and political disadvantages when she let the Central Asian republics totally free; Iran has also some political and economic expectations from these republics. She argues that any economic or political alliance related with the Central Asian region, in which she is not included, can not be regarded as a well-established alliance and will dissolve easily. In order to reinforce this assumption Iran very often attempts to convince other regional or global powers that her geographic location and historical ties with the Central Asian republics will help the states which expect to obtain economic or political benefits from the Central Asian region. For China and Japan, it can be said that although these two states have not declared their state policies in regard to Central Asian republics officially they will not accept a single state’s full penetration into the region taking the importance of balance of power system into consideration. At that point we should also mention that not only these states expect to obtain some economic or political advantages from the Central Asian republics but also these republics hope to benefit from economic and political capabilities of the states who show interest in Central Asia.

Depending on the reasons mentioned above it can be said that it seems highly impossible that Turkey will enter the region by itself. So, when we take various advantages they present to the Central Asian states into account it can be argued that neither the Central Asian states, who regard economic and political capabilities of some regional or global powers as vital for their economic and political development, nor the regional or global powers, who take place in the power rivalry in the region in order to realize their economic and political expectations, would not permit Turkey to materialize her economic and political goals in regard to the region independently.

For this reason, regarding the probable obstacles to be put by some regional or global powers before Turkey, Turkey must adopt cooperation strategy and cooperate with the states which support the idea that Turkey is the most reliable state for any kind of cooperation based on Central Asian region, and also Turkey must cooperate with the states who are politically powerful and who can give political support to her in regard to her goals related with Central Asian republics.

b. Under today’s circumstances it seems obvious that Russia would resist any intimate political, economic and social attempts in the Central Asian region taking its political and economic interests in the same region into consideration. The mentioned highly probable resistance of Russia would increase gradually when Russia comes across with direct Turkish attempts in the region. When we remember tense relations between Turkey and Soviet Union and the stand of the Soviet Union toward Turkey in the Cold War period despite Turkish-American multi-lateral alliance, we can argue that Turkey would face direct Russian opposition and difficulties in realizing its political, economic and social goals in the region by itself.

So, in order to diffuse or decrease Russian resistance Turkey must cooperate with the state/s which are interested in Central Asian region and which Russia will be unable to oppose, and also Turkey must cooperate with the states which are rather uneasy about Russian attempts in Central Asia, and with the states which believe that Turkey’s historical ties with the Central Asian republics would be quite influential while they are realizing their goals in this region.

c. In addition to the presence of actively involved regional and global powers, and the stand of the Russian Federation, internal and external political problems in Turkey are also among handicaps which prevent Turkey from acting independently in Central Asia. It can be said that Turkey is regarded politically unstable and unreliable by the Central Asian republics due to the internal political problems such as Kurdish insurgency and the demand of various groups for more freedom of thought, and external political problems such as the issues with Greece about Cyprus, Aegean continental shelf, Aegean air space, militarization of Aegean islands, and EU membership. In addition to these mentioned internal and external problems, very often changes in Turkish government also causes unreliability and instability among Central Asian republics. When we take the fact into consideration that Central Asian republics need the cooperation partners which are politically strong and stable enough to give their social, economic and political transformation attempts, we can say that Turkey, with her present political status, is not convenient to cooperate with the Central Asian republics alone.

For this reason, regarding the present internal external political obstacles before Turkey, Turkey must adopt cooperation foreign policy strategy and cooperate with the states which the Central Asian republics would enjoy to cooperate with regarding probable positive advantages they might obtain along with this cooperation , and also Turkey must cooperate with the states who are politically powerful and who can give political support to her in regard to her goals related with Central Asian republics.

c. Socio-cultural Driving Forces

Under this title we will present the socio-cultural reasons which prevent Turkey from behaving independently but force her to cooperate with other states in order to materialize its goals in the Central Asian region. By doing so, we will also emphasize the necessity of developing cooperation strategy models in order to maximize its goals in regard to the Central Asian region.

Although Turkish decision-makers insist on common features which Turkish and Central Asian peoples share, in fact these common features diversify immensily. While Anatolian Turks (Turkish people in Turkey) acquired an Islamic-Imperial identity, Central Asian Turks developed differently bearing tribal and mongoloid features. Persian had been the language of the cultural centers of Bukhara and Samarkand, and Turkistani elites were generally equally at ease in Chagatay Turk and Persian. Along with Russian dominance cultural and historical difference grew more and after the Bolshevik revolution Central Asian peoples had to follow a different path culturally and the elites of Central Asia had been Russified. In today’s southern Central Asia, the cultural world bears imprint of centuries of Iranian influence. In northern Central Asia, shamanist rituals are still strong, and Islam is far weaker than in Turkey. Furthermore, the region’s local languages are more distant from Turkish. Lastly, almost half of the residents of the region are Slavs or Persians who are rather away from Turkish origin. (Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.198)

So, depending on the reasons mentioned above Turkey can not be regarded as the beloved sister or brother of the Central Asian republics. It is obvious that there have been several cultural and social factors which limit these republics to regard Turkey as culturally and socially closest ally of them. These factors also prevent Turkey from conducting its policies in Central Asia independently but necessitate her to adopt cooperation foreign policy strategy and cooperate with the state/s which leads the emergence of cultural and social sympathy among Central Asian peoples.

d. Geographic Driving Forces

Lastly geographic situation of Turkey restricts Turkish decision-makers to realize their political, economic and social goals in regard to the Central Asian region independently since there is no continuity between Central Asia and Turkey. In the newly-emerged geography Iran represents one of the most important routes for the Central Asian states. In terms of transportation to the Central Asian republics Turkey is obliged to use Caucasus region, in which Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict is prevailing. Since Turkey seems to side with Azerbaijan in this conflict it is highly possible that Armenia might emerge as a barrier before Turkey in the transportation of Turkish goods to the Central Asian republics. Depending on this explanation, it can be said that Turkey is unable to conduct its policies in Central Asian region independently and must cooperate with the state/s which can facilitate Turkey’s geographic handicap in regard to Central Asian region.

3. Foreign Policy Goal/s of Regional and Global Actors in Regard to the Central Asian Region

Above we presented the driving factors which lead Turkey to adopt cooperation strategy as a foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region. Below we will explain foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of some regional and global powers, and also foreign policy goals that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region. By doing so, we believe that this explanation will also help the readers recognize the share of these states in the emergence of possible advantages and disadvantages of each cooperation strategy model better. We will explain foreign policy goals and interests of the states such as the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan in order that Turkish officials can determine the most suitable foreign policy goals for Turkish government in regard to the Central Asian republics and Central Asian region. Although we do not include Russian Federation in cooperation strategies, we find it necessary to explain foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation since it is closely related with the developments in Central Asian republics. So, before explaining foreign policy goals that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region, firstly we will present foreign policy goals and interests of the U.S, Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation in regard to the Central Asian region.

At that point we find it necessary to mention the difference between foreign policy goal/s and foreign policy interests and that why we explain foreign policy goal/s and foreign policy interests of the U.S., Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan and Russian Federation in regard to the Central Asian region separately. Although the difference between foreign policy goal/s and interests of the states is quite slight, it can be said that there is still an important difference between these two terms. When we use the term “foreign policy goal/s of the states” we mean that it is formal and it is adopted and decided by the state’s administrative bodies as a state policy. However, when we use the term “foreign policy interests of the states” we mean that although the action plan was not determined by the state’s administrative bodies formally, the decision-makers in the same state show interest in any regional or international developments and they are ready to activate administrative bodies in order to determine necessary policies in regard to the mentioned regional or international developments.

So, through explaining foreign policy goal/s of the states and foreign policy interests of the states separately we will mention that foreign policy goal/s of the U.S., Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan and Russian Federation in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian states have been determined by the administrative bodies of these states as a state policy but foreign policy interests of the U.S., Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan and Russian Federation in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics have not been determined by the administrative bodies of these states as a state policy but decision-makers of these states find it necessary to determine necessary policies in regard to the mentioned region and mentioned republics and they are ready to motivate administrative bodies to take necessary steps.

a. Foreign Policy Goal/s and Interests of the U.S. in Regard to the Central Asian Region

Firstly we will explain foreign policy goals determined by the U.S. administration in regard to the Central Asian region and secondly the reasons of U.S. decision-makers to turn their interest to this region.

Foreign Policy Goals of the U.S. in the Central Asian Region

At the very beginning of millennium, U.S. foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region are as follows:

First of all, maintenance and continuity of stability in the Central Asian region. Benjamin A. Gilman, emphasizes the importance of maintenance and continuity of stability in the Central Asian region in his statement given in the hearing on ‘U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics’ before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific in that way: “If the region of Central Asia falls into instability, I believe it may well create a fracture in the heart of the Eurasian continent that could inevitably draw in the larger states, such as Russia and China, that surround the region”. (Gilman, 1998, p.55); secondly, to give full support for the states in the process of transition to democracy and liberal economy. Robert W. Gee explains this in that way: “The U.S. has strategic interests in supporting the independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the newly independent states of the Caspian region. We want to assist the development of these states into democratic members of the international community, enjoying unfettered access to world markets, without pressure or undue influence from regional powers”. (Gee, 1998, p.32); thirdly, to prevent any regional or international power’s sole hegemony in the Central Asian region. According to Balcı, “Eurasian policy of the U.S. can be put in that way; U.S. is aimed at preventing any state’s or states’ hegemony in this region. U.S. would never let the state or states, which she has no good relations with, be hegemon over the Central Asian republics. Washington’s basic goal is to control Eurasia outside”. (Balcı, 1998); fourthly, to decrease and even remove the influence of Iran in the Central Asian region, and in order to realize this to present Turkey strongly as a model to be imitated by the Central Asian republics; besides, to decrease Russian and Iranian impact on oil reserves in the Caspian region, and to provide the exportation of oil in this region to the world markets through the state or states which she trusts strategically such as Turkey. (İlhan, 1998) In addition to this, although U.S. is not aimed at excluding the importance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in terms of their available oil potential regarding her own oil needs, U.S. is intended to shift the focus of her own economic and strategic expectations from the unstable Middle East region into the Caspian region. (Balcı, 1998); moreover, to prevent the uprising of radical Islam in the Central Asian region. U.S. thinks that if an Islamic wave emerges in Central Asia this has the possibility of jumping to other countries, namely the American allies in the region. At that point America’s one of the most important targets as far as security is concerned is to contain Iran and to prevent it from exporting its regime to the region. (Shakoor, 1995, p.16 ; Aras and Çolak, 1996, pp.68-69); furthermore, to disband the nuclear weapons and prevent Russia from using these weapons in the region. U.S. is also against conducting any nuclear research and establishing power reactors in the mentioned region; in addition to this, to prevent the restoration of the former Soviet Union or consolidating CIS under the aegis of Russia; last, to do her utmost to prevent the emergence of civil wars and potential border conflicts in the Central Asian region.

With these nine points we have presented U.S. foreign policy goals adopted by all American presidents since 1991 for the Central Asian region. In the following part we are going to explain why the U.S. administration is closely interested in the mentioned region and what these interests are.

The Reasons of the U.S. Interest in the Central Asian Region

First of all, it can be said that up till now U.S. has been quite successful in benefiting from any political or economic transformations which caused instability in the states or regions and has succeeded to enlarge its political influence through playing the role of diplomatic mediator. This assumption proved to be so in Iran-Iraq War and first and second Iraq operations. As the result of her diplomatic intervention, she could either gain popularity or enlarge her sphere of influence. Parallel to this argument it can be said that both rather fragile political, economic and social status quo emerged following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and establishment of independent republics in the former Soviet geopolitical area, and gradual increase in Russian Federation’s economic, political and social power in this region motivate U.S administration to be active in the Central Asian region. Both the Central Asian republics, which are in need of U.S. political and economic support for their attempts aimed at transforming their political regime into democracy and their economic structure into liberal economy, and the Russian Federation which is economically and politically weak currently, have prepared an available platform for the U.S. involvement in the region. It can be argued that U.S. would be much more advantageous when she becomes actively involved in the mentioned region because for the first time in her diplomatic history U.S. has the chance of being active in the region without having had to interfere with any war directly or indirectly occurred in the region, without having had to give financial aid to any one of the states in the region, and without having had to prove or defend herself for her activities in the mentioned region before international institutions.

Secondly, it can be said that it has been customary for the U.S. to show its actual presence in any region or regions where the Russian presence is felt openly. This had been quite clear in the Cold War period during which the U.S. and Soviet Union had been in a kind of rivalry in order to enlarge their sphere of influence in the Middle East region. Without hesitation it can be said that the very similar rivalry has been prevailing in the Central Asian region after 1990s. While the Soviet Union does not want to lose her authority over the former Soviet but newly-independent republics, the U.S. wants to limit Soviet influence over the Central Asian republics as much as possible. So, it can be said that coincidence of the U.S. and Russia’s interests in the Central Asian region motivates U.S. decision-makers to be more interested in the region.

Thirdly, growing concern about its political and economic future in the Pacific and its decreasing influence in South Asia are factors that urge it to realign policy in some other regions. (Konarovsky, 1994, p.255) Depending on these reasons it can be said that U.S. is searching for the ways to compensate the mentioned concern about the Pacific region and decreasing influence in South Asia through being influential in the Central Asian region. When we take the clash of U.S. interests and Russian interests in the Central Asian region into consideration it can be argued that U.S. would never leave the floor to Russia regarding her political and economic interests in the region.

Fourthly, it is a well known fact that after disintegration of the Soviet Union U.S. has appeared as the only super power in the world. Along with having this status, U.S. has to be active in world politics. According to Zbigniev Brezezinsky “U.S. will be able to continue to have this superpower status as long as she holds the control of Asian region in the long term”. (Manisalı, 1998) So, it can be said that this obligation also motivates the U.S. to show interest in the Central Asian region and also be active in this region.

Fifthly, possible enlargement of the U.S. influence in the Central Asian region would possibly lead U.S. to be more advantageous before the EU in international power rivalry. Possible gradual increase in U.S. influence in the Central Asian region would certainly reinforce U.S. position before the enlargement policy of the EU through the Balkans. So, this can also be regarded as a factor which motivates U.S. to be interested in the region.

Sixthly, in the following days of U.S. active involvement in the Central Asian region, U.S. would be able to establish her military presence in this region through assuming the fragility of military defense of the region against any attempts of the Russian Federation or some other regional and international powers. U.S. had conducted the same policy in the Cold War period through assuming the Soviet threat in the Middle East region. Depending on this reason, U.S. had set up military basis and increased the number of these basis gradually in time in the Middle East. As for the Central Asian region, it can be said that possible U.S. military presence in this region would not only delimit possible Russian political attempts based on Near Abroad policy but also lead U.S. to be more influential not only politically and economically but militarily in the Central Asian region.

Foreign Policy Interests of the U.S. in the Central Asian Region

Taking the reasons explained above into consideration it can be said that the U.S. is both interested in the developments in the Central Asian region and in the region itself. Graham Fuller explains these interests in six basic areas, four of which are negative and two of which are positive. (Fuller, 1994, p.130) These are: Arranging the policies all over the former Soviet Union so as to avoid the reemergence of any kind of Russian radical or ideological expansionism that could return the world to global nuclear confrontation; avoiding and maintaining damage control over further civil war or breakup of nations that will spill over into neighboring states, keeping the world in a state of disorder or mayhem; avoiding nuclear proliferation; avoiding the development of radical anti-western forms of political Islam in the region; supporting the growth of human rights, democracy, free market economy and a clearer global environment; enabling the U.S. to play a role in the economic development of the region, especially its raw materials.

Above, we have explained foreign policy goals of the U.S. in the Central Asian region; the reasons which motivate the U.S. administration to show interest in the Central Asian region, and the areas which the U.S. is interested in. Below, we are going to explain foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of Israel in the Central Asian region.


b. Foreign Policy Goal/s and Interests of Israel in Regard to the Central Asian Region

Although we have determined several foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of the U.S. in regard to the Central Asian region, it would not be possible to present several items related with Israel’s foreign policy goals and interests in the region. However, to mention this fact should not be meant that Israel is not interested in the Central Asian republics and Central Asia at all, contrary to this, during the past several years Israel’s interest in developing relations with the Central Asian republics has gradually grown. However, despite the mentioned growth in Israel’s interest, still it seems impossible to assume that Israel has determined specific foreign policy goals related with region. We can only speak about some indirect interests of Israel. We want to emphasize the word ‘indirect’ since we deliberately used this word in defining the nature of Israeli interests in the Central Asian region. Because developments prove the fact that Israel does not expect to gain economic or political advantages directly from the Central Asian republics but she expects to gain some advantages in regard to the problems she has been facing for the long years through intensifying relations with these republics. At that point it can be argued that Israeli interests in the Central Asian region are largely designed according to the demands of the U.S. In other words, most probably Israel has been taking place in the power rivalry in the Central Asian region in order to upgrade its advantages, expecting to obtain from the U.S.

The Reasons of the Israel Interest in the Central Asian Region

First of all, it is quite obvious that the strategic role of Israel in the Middle East region has been changing slightly since the end of the Cold War period. Although Israel is still one of the most important allies of the U.S. in the Middle East against radical Islamic states, such as Iran, against the states which very often destroys the balance of power in the Middle East through violating the rights of other Middle Eastern states, such as Iraq and Libya, against the states which directly back terrorism or support terrorist groups, such as Syria and Iran; the mentioned roles have started to be shared with Turkey, a state which is actively backed by the U.S. in regard to its Middle East policies. This development directly affects Israel’s importance before the U.S. though its superior importance to Turkey in terms of effectiveness of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. congress. In addition to this, Israel’s responsibility given by the U.S. in the Middle East region against the Soviet Union during the Cold War period has relatively lost its validity following the disintegration of the Union. So, depending on these dual reasons it can be said that Israel has been trying to be as important as in the Cold War period before the U.S. through playing the role determined by the U.S. in the Central Asian region.

Secondly, since the establishment of Israel state, with all its administrative bodies and various governments Israel has been struggling with most of the Middle East Arab states, particularly with fundamentalist Middle East Arab states in order to preserve its independence. For this reason, Israel has been trying to find allies in the region or in international platforms to counterbalance Muslim states’ reaction in the region. It can be said that currently U.S. and Turkey are regarded as the most important countries in backing Israel’s independence against fundamentalist Arab Middle East states by Israel and that she is doing its best to prevent fundamentalist states from gaining political power in the region. However, the emergence of five Muslim independent Central Asian republics in the former Soviet geopolitical area after 1991 has caused concern in Israel though these Muslim republics did not lead any threat for Israel’s independence in the Middle East region. Despite this reality, when we refresh our memories with the fact that currently the Central Asian region, in which these newly-independent Central Asian Muslim republics are located, has been regarded as the geopolitical extension of Middle East region, the growing concern of Israeli decision-makers becomes more evident. So, depending on this evidence it can be argued that Israel wishes to counteract or to balance the penetration of the Muslim countries into the former Soviet Muslim East (Zviagelskaia, 1994, p.153), and willingly shows interest in the developments in the Central Asian region, and does not refrain from active involvement in Central Asia.

The third reason of Israeli interest in Central Asia might be to improve relations with Turkey. Through acting commonly in Central Asia with Turkey, Israel might be expecting to reinforce its relations with her in the Middle East region taking political support Turkey presents in regard to its Middle East policies into consideration.

Fourthly, through actually getting involved in Central Asia and through improving relations with the Central Asian republics, Israel hopes to gain neutrality and even support from the Central Asian Muslim republics in regard to Arab-Israeli dispute. (Saivetz, 1994, p.322)

Last, Israel is trying to improve relations with the Central Asian Muslim republics in order to benefit from the economic back of the U.S. which is aimed at countering Iran’s influence in Central Asia. (see Zviagelskaya, 1994, p.153)

Along with these five points we have tried to present the reasons that motivates Israel to show interest in the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics. In the following part taking the mentioned reasons into consideration we are going to explain the four areas in which Israel is interested in.

Foreign Policy Interests of Israel in the Central Asian Region

Protecting the rights and well-being of local Jewish communities living in different Central Asian republics; having a share in this newly-emerged vast economic market; preventing the Central Asian Muslim republics from setting up an anti-Israel block through intensifying relations with fundamentalist Middle East Arab countries; preventing the Central Asian republics from siding with the parties who support anti-Israel policies in Arab-Israeli dispute.

Above, we have explained the reasons which motivate the Israeli administration to show interest in the Central Asian region and the areas which Israel is interested in. Below, we are going to explain foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of Iran in the Central Asian region.

c. Foreign Policy Goal/s and Interests of Iran in Regard to the Central Asian Region

Under this title firstly we will explain foreign policy goals determined by the Iranian administration in regard to the Central Asian region and secondly the reasons of Iranian decision-makers to turn their interest to this region.

Foreign Policy Goals of Iran in the Central Asian Region

First of all, Iranian government refrains from conducting severe Islamist discourse and pro-Islamist policies in the Central Asian region. It seems that Iranian policy-makers have no intention such as exporting their Islamist regime into these republics. According to Winrow, “it is not in the interests of the Iranian governments to sponsor pan-Islam in the region. Encouraging the spread of pan-Islam as a transnational political force in the region would certainly increase instability, and would not serve Iranian national interests”. (Winrow, 1995, p.35) So, it can be argued that Iranian government adopts internationalism versus nationalism / national interest versus Islam / pragmatism versus ideology; secondly, Iran, in stead of attempting to export the Islamic Revolution to Central Asia or even its own political model which would have little effect on Central Asian peoples who belong to Sunni Islam, makes use of their joint Persian heritage and their joint economic interests (see, Ehteshami, 1994, p. 39) and adopts real politic approach; thirdly, Iranian policy-makers try to convince the Central Asian republics to accept the fact that economically they would totally be dependent on the Russian Federation, and geographically they would remain landlocked, as long as these republics do not attempt to cooperate with Iran. When we take the fact into consideration that “Iran’s seashore line covered not only all of the 1450-kilometer- (900-mile-) long Persian Gulf but also 480 kilometers (300 miles) of the Arabian Sea.” (Hiro, 1994, 297) and that “...for landlocked Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian bits of the old Soviet Union, the silk-road railway provides access to ports and distant markets that used to be beyond their reach” (Economist, 21-27 June 1997), Iranian government’s assumption would become more valid. So, it can be said that Iran government wants to play an effective role in connecting Central Asian republics with world markets. (Dikkaya, 1999, p.206) Fourthly, Iranian government also supports the idea that the states, which take place in the power rivalry in the Central Asian region after disintegration of the Soviet Union, have to cooperate with her in order to be able to diversify the alternatives which they intend to present to the Central Asian republics; fifthly, Iranian government firmly refrains from annoying the Russian Federation since she believes that any attempt, that would delimit Russian Near Abroad policy related with the Central Asian republics, would face Russian resistance and would directly form a serious obstacle before her policies planned to be materialized in the Central Asian region; last, since the Central Asian republics gained their independence, Iran has been following the policy of mediating regional conflict as in Afghan-Tajik dispute. By doing so, she thinks that she can easily integrate with these republics so as to materialize the determined policies in regard to the Central Asian region.

Within these six points we tried to present foreign policy goals of Iran in regard to the Central Asian region. In the following part we are going to present the areas in which Iranian government has been interested in the Central Asian region.

Foreign Policy Interests of Iran in the Central Asian Region

First of all, Iran is interested in the region regarding her security concern. It can be said that Iran regrets the dissolution of the Soviet Union due to its ethnic structure. Although Azeri people, who consist 20 to 30 percent of the Iranian population, are well assimilated into Iranian society, in the periods when Iran politically and economically vulnerable, the Azeri people largely backed by foreign assistance sought to gain autonomy. After Azerbaijan independent republic was established following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Iranian government has become much more concerned about Azeri population in Iran. Because she very often thinks that Iran, which has borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia, would subject to a direct threat as the result of a severe Azeri-Armenian war. That is, even a slight population movement from the northern border of Iran (Azerbaijan republic) to Iranian Azerbaijan or from Iranian Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan republic might reactivate ethnic chaos in Iran, which would possibly make Iran politically weak. In addition to this, Iran thinks that Azerbaijanis, who inhabit northwestern Iran, might attempt to integrate with the Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan republic in stead of living as a minority under the hegemony of Iranian government. (see, Odom and Dujarric, 1995, pp.234-235 and 241) For the reasons mentioned, Iran firmly supports the continuation of the regimes and political stability in the Caucasus. (Menashri, 1998, p.80) Furthermore, Iran is also concerned about Turkmen population in Iran, which is not well integrated with Iranian society. Iranian government bears the same doubts about Turkmens in Iran, as about Azeri people in Iran, as such that Turkmen population might cause threat for Iranian government through demanding to integrate with the Turkmens in Turkmenistan republic; secondly, Iran is interested in the region regarding the unevenness in her economic development. First of all, “Iran looks to the region as an important market for Iranian-made consumer goods”. (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994, p.199) Then, Central Asian oil and natural gas reserves, ready to be transported to world markets, attract Iranian government’s attention. Iranian decision-makers, through transporting Central Asian oil to world markets via their own country, expects to remove isolation prevailing since Iran Islamic revolution and be reintegrated into international community. In addition to this, by this exportation route, they want to restore Iran’s geo-economic function as a north-south, east-west transit route which links Europe, Middle East, CIS, East and South Asia; thirdly, Iran is interested in the region regarding her diminishing regional role. Iranian government, through setting up closer relationship with the Central Asian republics, considers to regain political and economic strength in its region and wants to be a regional power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Furthermore, Iran also intends to occupy a superior place in the Muslim world. By doing so, Iranian decision-makers believe that Iran will be able to counter U.S.; last, Iran is interested in the region regarding her historical ties with the Central Asian republics. For many centuries, Central Asia had been a part of the greater Khorasan. Some well-known philosophers and poets such as Farabi, Avicenna and Roudaki were born in the areas which are parts of Central Asia currently. (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994, pp. 198-199) So, it can be said that “Iran sees a special role for itself in helping these countries rediscover their spiritual and cultural roots after a long estrangement under Russian and Soviet rule”. (Herzig, 1995, p.60)

We have explained foreign policy goals that the Iranian administration has adopted in regard to the Central Asian region and the areas which Iran is interested in Central Asia. Below, we are going to explain foreign policy interests of both India and Pakistan in the Central Asian region.

d. Foreign Policy Interests of India and Pakistan in Regard to the Central Asian Region

Although these two states are not regarded as active regional actors who can influence the developments in the Central Asian region, they bear some expectations from the region and the republics in the region. These expectations lead these two states to be interested in some areas in this region and these republics. Under this title we will explain foreign policy interests of these two states under this title.

Foreign Policy Interests of India in the Central Asian Region

In international politics, traditional relationship between India and Central Asia was destroyed following the power rivalry for Central Asia emerged between Russia and Britain, and when the Central Asian peoples were assimilated into Soviet society under Soviet rule along with October Revolution. After the World War II, in the mid-fifties Indian-Soviet cooperation started. From then on, despite the Soviet rule political, economic and social relations between India and Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union developed. However, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Indian decision-makers did not consider India’s relationship with Soviet Central Asia as important as her strategic relationship with the Soviet Union due to three basic reasons. First of all, during the Cold War years India was able to follow non-aligned movement, a different way of development beyond socialism and capitalism, by the help of Soviet Union’s material assistance. In addition to this domestic assistance, Soviet Union also helped India be recognized as a global power and regional power in Southern Asia. Thirdly, as the result of this economic and political support, India found enough strength against her rival, China, with which she was struggling for regional hegemony, and Pakistan, with which she has some fundamental problems due to Pakistan’s Islamic-based state-building principles. (see, Fritsche, 1995, p.111)

However, along with the break up of the Soviet Union India lost both political and economic support given by the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. Parallel to this development, firstly, relatively slow economic growth, caused by economic crisis, led her regional rival, China, to move ahead in regional power rivalry, and secondly, India’s strength in international politics was reduced gradually. Furthermore, growing internal ethnic conflicts between different groups of peoples and religions started to affect domestic stability of India badly. (Fritsche, p.112)

So, regarding India’s current political and economic vulnerability into consideration, it can be said that India is expecting to be backed by international community, particularly by the neighboring states, or at least she wants the neighboring states not to cause any threat that would endanger her security. Depending on this assumption, it can be argued that India is deeply interested in the developments in the Central Asian region, and that the major reason that leads India to be interested in Central Asia is her security concern. In the following part we will explain the areas that India is interested in with regard to the Central Asian region.

First of all, as mentioned before Soviet Union was both a strategic and an important trade partner for India. Currently, “...though Russia is the principal successor state, it makes sense for India to establish ties with the other Soviet republics”. (Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.202); secondly, India is interested in setting up new security arrangements with the Central Asian republics in order to take her security under guarantee against Pakistan. Because Indian decision-makers assume that Pakistan might cause threat for the Indian government through using Islamic sentiments in Central Asia against her. For this reason, she wants these republics to be keep away from involving in any kind of relationship with Pakistan and develop friendly relations with them regarding her security concern; thirdly, Indian government is interested in the continuation of present political regimes in Central Asian republics. In other words, she considers that if a transfer of power into Islamic groups in Central Asia, this possibility might lead two major negative developments: a. Indian decision-makers assume that this kind of development might lead Islamic-based Pakistan to gain support from Central Asian republics against Indian government. b. Central Asian region might establish a hostile relationship particularly with Pakistan against India, which might eventually cause a fundamentalist Islamic threat against secular state ideology. (Fritsche, p.114); last, India is interested in the possibility of the emergence of an Islamic commonwealth, which might include Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, and Xinjiang. Although the establishment of this kind of commonwealth is rather remote, Indian government may take this possibility seriously. (Odom and Dujarric, pp. 201-202)

Foreign Policy Interests of Pakistan in the Central Asian Region

Contrary to India, Pakistan welcomed independence of Central Asian republics and considered herself more advantageous than India since she believes that “...Central Asia was originally part of West Asia and artificially separated by the machinations of foreign Great Powers”. (Gleason, 1997, p.149) Depending on this assessment, Pakistan has made attempts to get involved in Central Asian region and the republics in the region. “The prevailing opinion in Pakistani political circles is that the state sovereignty acquired by the CAR has created in West and South Asia a new balance of forces favorable to Pakistan. The development of diverse relations with these republics is seen by Islamabad as a means of fortifying its position in its confrontation with India”. (Naumkin, 1995, p.103)

In order to develop diverse relations with these republics, Pakistani decision-makers seem to adopt two different approaches, political and economic. Through political approach, some organizations and parties tend to emphasize Islamic sentiments and provide economic assistance for the Central Asian republics. Through economic approach, which seems more pragmatic for Pakistan than the first approach, Pakistani decision-makers consider the construction of a trans-Asian railway line from the CAR to Pakistan. (Naumkin, p.103) Although the mentioned approaches have not been materialized until now, they prove the fact that Pakistan shows interests in the region. Depending on Pakistani decision-makers’ assessments, it can be said that Pakistan government is interested in the following areas in regard to the region.

First of all, Pakistan government regards Central Asian independent republics as an immense economic market. She has been attempting to establish close relationship with these republics so as to reconstruct her fragile economy; secondly; She would like to bring Turkmenistan natural gas via Afghanistan into Pakistan territory. For this reason, Pakistan government backs Taliban movement and she requires to establish hegemony over Afghanistan by the help of Taliban. Pakistan government is aware of the fact that the only access to the Central Asian region is through Afghanistan. Any railway or road construction, or Turkmenistan natural gas transportation is only available through Afghanistan. Partly, depending on this reason and partly on political reasons, Pakistani government gives full support to Taliban movement. By doing so, Pakistani leaders intend to establish hegemony over Afghanistan, which would facilitate to realize their politics in regard to the Central Asian republics. At that point it should be mentioned that Soviet Union and U.S. have played an important role in the emergence of Taliban movement (madrassah students’ movement). Following the revolt of the Communist party, which caused internal conflict in Afghanistan, Soviet Union invaded this country in 1979. This political attempt of Moscow led the beginning of independence movement by 85 % of Afghan people living in the country side under the leadership of radical Islamist groups against Russia. So, Russia, which invaded this country to prevent the rise of radical Islam, has helped the emergence of a suitable political development which resulted in Afghan peoples unity under Islamists, and this development ended with the victory of one of the most radical Islamist movement which is known as Taliban. In addition to Soviet Union, U.S. has also had a share in this development. During the Cold War period U.S. conducted the policy of containment against Soviet Union through supporting the neighboring Muslim countries. U.S. provided modern weapons, including Stinger missiles, for the ones fighting for the sake of Islam. And these weapons were obtained by radical Islamist groups, too. Along with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, power rivalry between these groups caused the emergence of Taliban in political arena. Taliban, consisted by Pakistan backed madrassah students, first claimed that they would end the internal conflict and reunite Afghanistan, but now threatens today’s Russian Federation, successor states in Central Asia, Iran and India indirectly. (Balcı, 1998 ; see Ülger, 1998/99, pp.94-110); and thirdly, She wants to have a share in Central Asian trade through constructing railway via Afghanistan.

When we assess the limits that the ruling governments of the Central Asian republics have posed toward Pakistani government’s Central Asian politics until now, it can be said that the ruling regimes in Central Asian republics take any attempt which is based on severe political Islam and which is tended to be realized by Islamist circles rather seriously and the leaders of these republics fear the spread of Islam not only from Pakistan but also Afghanistan, Iran and Arab countries. When the attempts of Pakistan, which support radical Islamist Taliban and which seeks ways to develop relations with fundamentalist Afghanistan for the realization of its own economic plans related with the Central Asian republics, are taken into consideration, it can be assumed that Central Asian ruling regimes as long as they continue to include the prevailing political ideology, which is currently far from being absorbed by political Islam, will continue to pose limits on Pakistani attempts related with Central Asian republics and Pakistani government will not be able to become involved in the region fully, and she will not materialize her plans.

Above, we explained foreign policy interests of India and Pakistan. In the following part, we will explain foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation.

e. Foreign Policy Goal/s and Interests of Russian Federation in Regard to the Central Asian Region

We strongly believe that examining and understanding Russian foreign policy goals and foreign policy interests for the Central Asian region would be quite useful in two ways; first of all, in terms of our article we will be able to speculate both the possible inputs and outputs that cooperation strategy model would bring, and also in terms of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish officials will be able to determine Turkish foreign policy behavior in regard to both the Russian Federation and Central Asian republics. However, before explaining these two issues we will present the changes emerged in Russian policy related with Central Asia and with the republics in this region until current Central Asian policy of Russia was shaped.

Foreign Policy Goals of Russian Federation in the Central Asian Region

Russian officials, considering the criticism of the supporters of democratic group related with the Russian foreign policy direction and some other factors into consideration, felt the necessity of rearrangement of Russian foreign policy direction for the Central Asian region in 1993. Depending on the reasons above, they changed Russian foreign policy behavior regarding this region. However, the difficulty emerges when we attempt to explain specific Russian foreign policy goals for the mentioned region clearly. Because, it can be said that even after 1993-consensus, it is hardly possible to mention any clear-cut Russian foreign policy objectives for this region, in stead it can be said that the actual approaches to Central Asia have been in a state of chaos since 1993. So, before explaining foreign policy goals of the Russian Federation for the Central Asian region, we will explain different approaches toward the region, and the reasons of the emergence of these different approaches. At that point we find it quite reasonable to express the views of Dr. Irina Zviagelskaia on Russian officials’ different approaches toward the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics, and the reasons of the emergence of different approaches.

According to Zviagelskaia, “The intensive debate on Russian policy in the area testifies to the fact actual approaches to the countries in the region are still in a state of flux. Andrei Kozyrev stated in July 1995 that relations with the CIS countries were now at the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda, but the actual policy of the Russian Federation towards Central Asia, although it has considerably matured since 1991, is still in a state of flux. No-clear-cut objectives have been defined and, consequently, no set of adequate methods has been found for their realization. Russia’s political line, not being the product of a well-thought-out strategy, is often subordinated to immediate tasks and is merely a reaction to events. The subjective factors which also shape Russia’s political course with regard to Central Asia may be said to include the contradictions between the executive and legislative powers, the lack of coordination in their approaches to many problems, as well as in the work of the various rival departments, the personal ambitions of politicians and the military, and the tendency to make practically and question concerning Russia’s strategy a subject of acute internal political struggle. Moreover, the discussion of Russia’s real interests in the different regions of the post-Soviet space, including Central Asia, and of its main policy priorities, is often replaced by attempts by individual groupings, parties and leaders to use a given subject for their selfish ends: to attract attention, to obtain the support of certain forces in Russia itself or to strike a blow at the opponents. One can identify two opposite approaches to Central Asia. The first proceeds from the assumption that Central Asia is an economic, political and military burden to Russia. Being culturally alien to it, the region should, moreover, become a part of an ‘expanded Middle East’ rather than stay with Russia. The only optimal solution would be total withdrawal from Central Asia accompanied by the emigration of the Russians from the area. The second approach runs as follows. Russia must keep its control of the region by all possible means. The newly independent countries are doomed to foreign domination. If Russia leaves the region or even its presence is significantly weakened, the Central Asian countries will become involved in alliances hostile to Russia”. (Zviagelskaia, 1995, pp.3-4 and 35)

She also mentions that Russian political debate on Central Asia has its own features and summarizes these features in that way: “1. Not infrequently the debates are of a speculative or purely time-serving nature. The specific mechanism of decision-making in Russia is such that political parties with their different programs play a less important role than backstage lobbying and personal connections. 2. Almost any issue is used in the domestic political struggle by forces of different political orientations. Often they even use the same arguments to support diametrically opposed conclusions. 3. The emergence of the Russian national idea could not avoid having an impact on the approaches to the issue of all political forces engaged in the debate, including the democrats. 4. The positions of institutions and individuals are in flux.[1] For example, at the beginning of the 1990s the Foreign Ministry was perceived as a proponent of a pro-Western orientation at the expense of Central Asia and other southern republics. In 1995, according to the Foreign Ministry, relations with CIS countries are Russia’s top foreign policy priority. In fact only the positions of the communists and nationalists have shown much consistency”. (Zviagelskaia, p.36)


However, that mentioned state of flux in Russian foreign policy circles and among Russian decision-makers in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian states continued until the year 2000, the date in which Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation.

Putin, who won the Russian State President elections on 26th May 2000, made the Russian public opinion support him about creating “a powerful state” policy. By means of Putin’s leadership Russia’s interior and foreign policies started to change very rapidly. Outside while Russia has been making some moves in the name of being a local super power and an energy super power, inside federal structure has strengthened and there ruled a new administration comprehension in Kremlin. Apart from Yeltsin, without any doubt, Putin’s new administration comprehension bases on “one’s own” and “powerful management”. Putin started to work even before elections to avoid Kremlin from some forces. (see Oğan, 2003) As Putin supports free market economy and democratic values, on the other hand he aims to centralize state power inside the country and to make Russia go back to the old powerful days outside. (Peterson, 2001, pp.17-19) Lee Peterson expresses these in his article titled “Can President Putin and His Activities Be Accepted as the Return to Oldies in Russia?”; “Throughout the history whenever Russia faces an identity crisis, he turns his back to the West and looks for an alternative way to develop. The newest example for this kind of attitude is Russia’s communist preference while trying to adapt himself to industrial revolution. Today, Russia won’t return to communism while struggling information revolution. But, new term can be admitted as a new system which should shelter the same ornaments as the old domineering regime…” (Peterson, op.cit, pp. 16-17)

After Putin, in Russia’s official policy Eurasian elements which is concerned with multi-polar world, a foreign policy that gives precedence to near abroad and anti-American efforts mostly keep their existence. But according to this policy these messages are clearly emphasized that Russia follows a more pragmatic policy and an obvious conflict against USA is not required while cooperation with this country is a possibility. Putin determined his (principle) priority as to strengthen the state of Russia and to make it come true with strong state, strong economy and strong army. While it has been aimed to form a strong state for interior policy, foreign policy is conducted according to interior problems’ solutions. In order to keep Russia’s leadership in CIS Putin wants to improve CIS’s economic side, to form Eurasian Economic Association and to manipulate energy factor for putting pressure on this geographies countries. (Cafersoy, 2002, pp.84, 98-99)

If the new National Security Doctrine, which was revised when Yeltsin was President and Putin was Prime Minister and came into force after Yeltsin on January 10, 2000, is examined; it will be understood that it contains the usual subjects about a state and essentially aims to supply the national security and to form it, to strengthen the central state organization, to observe the national profits, to raise the military potential and to obtain a reliable economic development. The aim of the doctrine is to give Russia his old leading role in the region, Eurasia and the world back. To procure this, first of all country was divided into seven federal provinces. These provinces governors’ were chosen from reliable and loyal people whom somehow concerned with KGB and army. Provinces were obliged to the organization in the center and were authorized. It’s evaluated that the reason of this management manner, based on seven-region type, is to form an effectiveness inside the Federation. Since Putin came to power, RF has started to be effective in the CIS. The Central Asian Republics’ instinct to protect themselves and Russia’s will to continue his existence in the region occasioned CIS’s rise and USSR’s collapse but, during Yeltsin’s term CIS couldn’t supply an absolute effect. It could be clearly understood in the CIS summit organized in January 2000 that Russia began to enhance his influence on the CIS and today continues to widen his area and hold. (Kuloğlu, 2000, p.65) Inwardly RF’s new National Security Concept, Russia’s role in the international society, the definitions of Russia’s national profits and threats against these profits are expressed. “Russia Federation’s National Security” document pointed out the country’s determined and absolute will to form national security. The result of this very document is Russia’s wish while keeping relationship with West and improving it, keeping his hold on CIS; by guaranteeing the frontiers dismissing the break up danger and securing himself.

“Russia Federation’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine” document, approved on April 21, 2000 just after National Security Doctrine was accepted, is focused on Russia’s economic profits and status on the other countries, especially the ones from the old Soviet Union. (Kanpolat, 2001, p.167)

New Military Doctrine follows up with the interest ethnical/religious radicalism occasioned interior wars much more than big wars. New doctrine is not very different from the old text dated 1993. Perhaps the only important difference is, by the new doctrine, it is declared Russia can respond with nuclear weapons for not just in case of nuclear weapons or the other mass destruction weapons usage against himself; Russia can also answer back with nuclear weapons while facing conventional attacks for both himself and his allies. On the other side the new doctrine emphasizes there is a decrease in the outer areas against RF. The new Russian Military Doctrine is based on Strategic Nuclear Dissuasiveness and “first use”. Russia applies the policy that makes himself the only nuclear power in the CIS. According to this, the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Cossackia are turned over to Russia. In spite of decrease in NATO’s nuclear powers Russia still keeps his many weapons himself.

Upon Putin’s policies explained above, currently under Putin Russian government has adopted an official line for the mentioned region. According to this official line Russian foreign policy goals in the Central Asian region are as follows: First of all, Russian government is in favor of preserving the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Because Russian Federation regards the CIS as a kind of security umbrella for her national security and through this organization, Russian officials believe that Russian Federation can maintain authority over former Soviet states; secondly, Russian government is aimed at establishing and maintaining stability in Central Asian republics. Because, “the Russian defense doctrine views the territories of Central Asia as vital to the sphere of Russia’s interests, while their outer borders (which are at the same time the borders of the CIS) are strategic to the territorial definition of Russia”. (Kulchik, Fadin and Sergeev, 1996, p.46) Currently, Central Asian states function as buffer states between Russia and the external states; Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and large sections of the Chinese border. However, Russian government never favors the Western perception that the Central Asian republics can function as the buffer zone which can leave the Russian Federation landlocked; thirdly, Russian government has been trying to convince Central Asian republics that they will be in a difficult situation economically and socially without her help. For this reason, she tries to continue the established contacts and develop new relations with them; fourthly, Russian government is aimed at preventing the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian region. Because, Russian officials fear that any penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into Central Asia would threaten Russian populations in Central Asian republics and cause further unrest among Muslim population living in Russian Federation. (Lepingwell, 1994, p.75) Furthermore, Russian government is aimed at preventing national uprisings in Central Asian republics since she fears that these would possibly destabilize the Central Asian region; fifthly, Russian government opposes to any state’s attempt to establish hegemony and even increase influence over Central Asian republics since she regards the Central Asian region as a part of near abroad and sees this region as the natural geographic extention of post-Soviet territory. Rajan Menon in his article “After Empire: Russia and the Southern ‘Near Abroad’”, explains the content of the term “Near Abroad” in that way: “In Russian political discourse, the label of choice for the other 14 erstwhile Soviet republics became the Near Abroad (blizhnee zarubezh’e). The context of its use suggests that this curious term is also a loaded one. It implies that Russia has special interests in the other ex-Soviet republics based on the historical background of these states (they were part of the tsarist and Soviet empires), their proximity, and the presence in them of a multimillion Russian diaspora...In sum, Near Abroad emits a proprietoral aura”. (Menon, 1998, p.100) For this reason, Russian officials try to increase their influence in this region and on the states in the region; sixthly, in order to maintain stability in the Central Asian region, Russia is in favor of giving political, economic and military assistance to these states as much as possible; and last, Russian Federation is aimed at performing peacekeeping role in the Central Asian region because “Russians increasingly believe that post-Soviet Eurasian geopolitics have left little choice for them – either the Russian Federation will shape and stabilize its outer geopolitical space, or the events in the near abroad will determine Russia’s own development through waves of refugees, political upheaval, regional conflicts and instability”. (Shashenkov, 1994, p.49) Michael R. Lucas in his article “Russia and Peacekeeping in the former USSR”, published in Aussen Politik, no.2, 1995, explains the term peacekeeping in that way: “The term ‘peacekeeping’ has been correspondingly re-defined since the early days of the UN and its first peacekeeping operations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The term functions today as a terminological and conceptual catch-all for various types of intervening activity of international organizations in crisis situations throughout the world”. (Lucas, 1995, p.146) At that point we find it fairly reasonable to present the view of Andrei Kozyrev, expressed by himself in the interview realized by Igor Rotar for “Nezavisimaya gazeta”, Kozyrev argues that “It would be a mistake to ignore the role of the United Nations and the CSCE, but it would be another extreme to abandon this sphere completely to the hands of these organizations. This is a zone of Russian interests and this understood by all sides”. (Shashenkov, p.65)
Foreign Policy Interests of Russian Federation in the Central Asian Region[2]

Although the former Soviet states declared their independence in 1991 and Russia recognized these states as independent states it can not be said that Russian Federation gave up all her interests and even expectations in regard to them. Contrary to this, politically and economically, Moscow, faced with increasing power rivalry in some former Soviet regions, is concentrating on the post-Soviet republics located in these regions more day by day. Central Asia is one of these former Soviet regions, in which the regional power rivalry is felt profoundly. Due to specific political, economic and social reasons Russian Federation regards Central Asian region as a region of vital interest. In the following items we will explain the areas in which Moscow is interested related with the Central Asian region: First of all, Russian officials’ interest in Central Asia is related with national security matter. This has four major components: to get or maintain Russian military bases built during the Soviet period on the borders of Central Asia and the Trans-caucasus (as well as Moldavia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states), to prevent the spread of internal ethnic conflicts in Central Asian republics, to prevent the spread of Islamic extremism in these republics and Islamic penetration, and to control the influence of external states such as the U.S., Turkey and Iran on Central Asian republics; secondly, Russian officials are interested in the continuation of political and economic stability in the region. Since they believe that any interstate and internal conflict, and any severe economic crisis possibly emerge on Russia’s southern borders would affect the status quo of Russian Federation; thirdly, Russian officials are interested in the Russian speaking populations in Central Asian republics. Currently, in Kazakhstan Russian speaking population accounts for more than 40% of all population, in Kyrgyzstan 20%, in Turkmenistan 9% and in Uzbekistan 8% of the population. Since the Russian government does not have enough economic resources to house and employ this Russian speaking populations, Russian officials see the need to prevent any refugee emigration from these republics to Russian Federation. In addition to this, Russia is also interested in preserving economic, social political security of the Russian population living beyond its borders. (Bacık and Canbaş, 1999, p.325); fourthly, Russian officials are interested in nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian republic included in Soviet Union’s strategic weapons program. One of the two Soviet underground nuclear testing sites was in the republic, in the Semipalatinsk region. After disintegration Kazakhstan government announced that she would terminate the testing and the site would be converted to other uses. Furthermore, the government agreed, in Lisbon Protocol to Start I, to destroy the missiles and the bomber in seven years. It also acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (Cullen, 1994, pp.140-141) Although Kazakhstan government has obeyed her commitments until now, Russian officials regard the possibility of leakage of fissionable material, bomb components and scientific expertise as the potential problem for the security of Russian Federation; the fifth Russian interest in Central Asia is related with the prevention of the spread of terrorism, drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling. Since the Russian officials see the Central Asian republics as the cause of the increase in crime and drug use in Russia since the collapse, the Russian government has been trying to control the mentioned negative societal developments for maintaining her own security; the sixth Russian interest in Central Asia is related with the preservation of social, economic and political contacts established with these republics during the Russian rule. Russian government regards the continuation of these contacts as crucial both for the realization of Russia’s economic and political expectations and for breaking the influence of external powers which hope to gain benefit from the region. According to Stephen Blank, “Russia’s paramount goal in this relationship is the stability and security of the new Central Asian republics. It fears they could become the center for Islamic fundamentalism that threatens the Russian diaspora in Central Asia”. (Blank, 1994, p.267); seventhly, Russia is interested in exploitation and transportation of oil and gas resources in the Central Asian region. The increasing interest of Iran and Turkey in benefiting from the exportation of Central Asian oil and gas through their own territory to the world markets, and the increasing interest of the U.S. in selling expertise to exploit oil and gas deposits in the region lead the Russian officials to be the most influential on Central Asian oil and gas resources; last, Russia is interested in the future expectations of the Western states, particularly the U.S., in regard to the Central Asian region. Although Russian officials are aware of the fact that any kind of economic assistance, and any suggestion for the establishment of democracy in these republics would rehabilitate Central Asia’s economy and stabilize domestic policy, and that in turn these two developments would have positive effect on Russian security policy, Russian officials never favor any Western state’s attempt to establish complete authority over these republics. Because they believe that this kind of development would endanger their prevailing power in the Central Asian region.

Above, we have explained foreign policy goals that the Russian government has adopted for the Central Asian region and the areas which Russian Federation is interested in Central Asia. Last, we are going to explain foreign policy goals and interests of Turkey in the Central Asian region, and foreign policy goals that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers in regard to this region.

f. Foreign Policy Goal/s of Turkey in the Central Asian Region

Under this title we will only explain foreign policy goals of Turkey in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics, but not foreign policy interests. Because Turkish decision-makers openly showed Turkish government’s interest in the region by being one of the first countries which recognized the newly-independent Central Asian republics, by conducting several official visits to the leaders of these republics, by realizing bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements in various fields from economy to politics, and by motivating some states to give economic and political support to the peoples and the regimes of these republics. Furthermore, both regional and external powers, which regard Turkey as an important and active actor in the Central Asian region, agrees to the idea that Turkey is deeply interested in the developments in this region and in the republics in the region taking its largely economic and partly political interests into consideration. So, depending on these reasons, we will only explain whether Turkish government has adopted any foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian republics, if any, what these foreign policy goals are, and also foreign policy goals that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region.

Foreign Policy Goals of Turkey in the Central Asian Region

Under this title we will only explain foreign policy goals of Turkey in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian republics, but not foreign policy interests. Because Turkish decision-makers openly showed Turkish government’s interest in the region by being one of the first countries which recognized the newly-independent Central Asian republics, by conducting several official visits to the leaders of these republics, by realizing bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements in various fields from economy to politics, and by motivating some states to give economic and political support to the peoples and the regimes of these republics. Furthermore, both regional and external powers, which regard Turkey as an important and active actor in the Central Asian region, agrees to the idea that Turkey is deeply interested in the developments in this region and in the republics in the region taking its largely economic and partly political interests into consideration. So, depending on these reasons, we will only explain whether Turkish government has adopted any foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian republics, if any, what these foreign policy goals are, and also foreign policy goals that should be adopted by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region.

Foreign Policy Goals of Turkey in the Central Asian Region

“...in policy, as in life, asking the right questions is the necessary precondition, not just for getting the right answers, but also for developing a sound program of action”. (Blank, 1997, p.57)

We find it quite proper to begin the explanation of this issue with the assessment of Stephen J. Blank. Considering the importance of this assessment, first of all we should make it clear that whether Turkish government has specific economic or political expectations in regard to the Central Asian region, if so, as the representatives of Turkish government, whether they have determined specific foreign policy goals for the region and for the republics in the region. When we examine the attempts that Turkish officials have made in order to maximize Turkish government’s economic and political expectations in regard to the Central Asian region, the answer to the question ‘whether Turkish officials have determined specific foreign policy goals for the region and for the republics in the region’ would be ‘yes, they did so.’

Turkish officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have had to develop policies in regard to the Central Asian region immediately after the republics in the region had declared their independence. Since the Central Asian region has been disregarded by Turkish officials particularly after the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish officials had rather rough idea about the necessities and expectations of the peoples of the region when the Central Asian republics had declared their independence. So, the mentioned handicap directly affected the period of the determination of Turkish foreign policy goals by Turkish officials for the Central Asian region. Despite this difficulty, the official line was adopted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this has remained one of the basic reference point in evaluating Turkish foreign policy trend in regard to the Central Asian region since 1991.

At that point, we should make it clear that under the title ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Goals in Regard to the Central Asian Region’, we will not comment on foreign policy goals determined by Turkish government for the region, and we will not explain the objectives and the aims of some Turkish officials, or political parties, or interest groups, or scholars, which are obviously based on pan-Turkic ideology, but we will only explain official foreign policy goals, which were adopted by Turkish government for the Central Asian region without commenting on the content of these goals. However, under the title ‘Foreign Policy Goal/s that Should be Adopted By Turkish Decision-makers for the Central Asian Region’, we will mention insufficiencies or faults with in foreign policy goals that were adopted by Turkish government for the Central Asian region through suggesting the more detailed foreign policy goals. So, official foreign policy goals adopted by Turkish government for the Central Asian region are as follows:

1. Turkish foreign policy goals for the region are based on pragmatic economic and foreign policy concerns rather than ideological concerns. (Hostler, 1993, p.162)

2. Turkish officials are more concerned about presenting herself as having a secular, laic and democratic society and state structure rather than as having a Muslim society and a Turkish-populated state.

3. Turkey is in favor of backing the Central Asian republics’ economies in order that they could afford to buy Turkish export products. By doing so, Turkish officials believe that Turkish government can enlarge its economic and political profile in the Central Asian region.

4. Turkish officials want to be backed by the West and be stronger supporters of the West, principally of the U.S. in order that she could materialize her foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region.

5. Turkish officials are willing to set up bi-lateral and multi-lateral economic, cultural or political relationship with the Central Asian republics.

6. Turkish officials are in favor of emphasizing its cultural, historical and ethnic ties with Turkish population inhabiting in Central Asian republics in order that she can best benefit from economic wealth in post-Soviet Central Asia.

7. Turkish officials are eager to give any kind of assistance to these republics which would help them integrate themselves with international community.

8. Turkish officials are ready to work with these republics in order that they could reinforce peace, stability and democracy in their societies. (Winrow, 1997, p.112)

9. Turkish officials expect to gain major economic benefits from Central Asian republics parallel to the development of closer relationship. (Hostler, 1993, p.162)

4. Foreign Policy Goal/s that Should be Adopted By Turkish Decision-makers for the Central Asian Region

When we observe quantity and quality of the progress made by Turkish officials in the Central Asian region since 1991, it can be said that Turkish government has gained some economic and political benefits from these republics but she could gain more through enlarging the content of foreign policy goals and through diversifying her foreign policy goals in regard to the region. However, it should be kept in mind that neither enlargement nor diversification of these foreign policy goals would be enough to give Turkish officials what they expect to gain from the region without developing a sound program of action, in other words without developing specific foreign policy strategy for the mentioned region. Under the title ‘Foreign Policy Goal/s that Should be Adopted By Turkish Decision-makers for the Central Asian Region’ we will only diversify foreign policy goals and enlarge the content of these goals. By doing so, we believe that Turkish government would gain more advantages in the Central Asian region.

1. Turkish government should be aimed at finding out the best ways to benefit from oil and natural gas reserves. Natural gas reserves in the Eurasian region consist 40 % of world natural gas reserves. While the Eurasian region has 54310 billion m3 natural gas reserves; Turkmenistan has 2700, Uzbekistan 1800, and Kazakhstan 1700 billion m3 natural gas reserves in the Central Asian region. As for the natural gas production of these Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan produces 100, Uzbekistan 45, and Kazakhstan 10 billion m3 natural gas. Furthermore, oil reserves in the Eurasian region consist 8 % world oil reserves. While Eurasian region has 800 million tons oil reserves; Kazakhstan has 720, Turkmenistan has 160 million tons oil in the Central Asian region. As for the oil production of these republics, Kazakhstan produces 27, and Turkmenistan 5 million tons oil. (Kodaloğlu, 1999, p.116)

Considering natural gas and oil reserves and production in the Eurasian region, particularly in the Central Asian region, and also considering Turkish government’s economic insufficiencies in regard to materializing pipeline projects, necessary for transporting Central Asian oil to the western markets through Turkey; motivating the U.S. administration to provide economic and political assistance for the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines in Turkey seems to be the most practical solution to the benefiting from Central Asia’s oil and natural gas wealth.

When we take the support given by the U.S. for the transportation of Turkmen gas by a pipeline under the Caspian, through Azerbaijan and thence to Turkey, and for the transportation of Azerbaijan’s oil by the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline through Turkey to western markets, but her determined negative stand against Iran’s attempts to transport Turkmen gas and Azerbaijan’s oil through herself (Economist, 24-30 January 1998) into consideration; Turkish governments should act commonly with the U.S. in order to realize her oil politics related with the Central Asian region.

2. Turkish governments should be aimed at enlarging its sphere of economic, and particularly political strength before the states with which it has some political problems parallel to the developing economic relations with the Central Asian republics.

3. Turkish governments should be aimed at overcoming the prevailing or potential dangers which would possibly threaten Turkey’s national unity, parallel to the political and economic strength to be obtained from the developing bi-lateral or multi-lateral relations with the Central Asian republics.

4. Turkish governments should be aimed at increasing its influence, reconstructing and continuing peace in the Central Asian region, and being regarded as leader by both Central Asian republics and by other states which are interested in post-Soviet Central Asia. By doing so, Turkish officials should be aimed at gaining prestige in international platforms.

5. Turkish governments should be aimed at presenting herself as a model based on the following areas: (see Öznal)
a. Democracy,
b. Human rights,
c. Laicism,
d. Liberal economy,
e. Transition to the Latin alphabet,
f. Education and culture,
g. Military training and cooperation,
h. Cooperation with the Western states,
i. Integration with the Western states,
j. Membership in Western institutions.

6. Turkish governments should be aimed at providing foreign economic assistance for the Central Asian states in order that these republics could transform their economies into liberal economy.

7. Turkish governments should be aimed at improving bi-lateral or multi-lateral relations particularly in the fields of education, health and culture.

8. At long last, Turkish governments should be aimed at extending Turkish state model to cover the Central Asian republics with the understanding that a Muslim country can maintain its independence, develop its economy and modernize its state structure within a secular and multiparty democracy on the Turkish model. (Sander, 1994, p.40)

Conclusion

Despite the motivating factors which encouraged Turkey to be more Central Asian-orientated in 1991, three years later Turkish decision-makers realized that policies adopted for the Central Asian region began to be ineffective due to some specific external and internal reasons. First of all, Turkey began to feel negative impact of the states in search of political and economic benefits from the region. Power rivalry emerged in the region just after Central Asian states’ declaration of independence has led the Central Asian states to recognize the presence of some other alternatives in the region such as U.S., Iran, Israel, Pakistan and India, and this early recognition, in a way, led these states to concentrate on improving relations with these newly-emerged alternatives in stead of following narrow-sighted relationship with a single state (Turkey). This resulted in the decrease of the Central Asian states’ interest toward Turkey.

Secondly, the change in Russian Federation’s policy in regard to the Central Asian states in 1993 also affected the stand of the relations between Turkey and these states. Along with the 1993-Consensus adopted by the liberal group under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev as the result of Eurasian group compultion, Russian Federation rearranged its policies toward the Central Asian states. According to this rearrangement, Russian Federation, which obviously neglected the region until 1993, included the Central Asian region in the list of important regions of the CIS regarding her security concerns. Following this policy change, the Russian Federation began to give the signals that she is still influential over these states and foreign states taking place in power rivalry in the region can not benefit from the economic wealth of the region without her approval. This development not only restricted Central Asian states to set up independent relations with other states but deprived Turkey of improving relations with these states.

Third reason which led the relations between Turkey and the Central Asian states to become ineffective is related with faulty policies adopted by Turkish decision-makers in regard to the region and the states in the region. First of all, Turkish government had given several promises in social, economic and political fields to the states in the region but could not materialize these promises and most of the plans remained only in official documents. So, while they upgraded bi-lateral relations with other states they became extremely cautious toward Turkey. Secondly, particularly in the very beginning of relationship Turkey developed rather severe and extremist political discourse in regard to these states. Turkey, disregarding their sensitivity toward having had to live under the hegemony of the Soviet Union for 70 years, had approached these states with pan-Turkist and hegamonic discourses. However, the Central Asian states, which had to live politically, economically and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union for years did not approve this way of behavior and they even began to isolate themselves from Turkey. This made Turkey’s policies over Central Asian states suspended. Thirdly, it is obvious that Turkey initiated relations with the Central Asian states with insufficient historical knowledge, without developing any strategy and any future projections. In fact, in foreign policy arena or in international relations it is rather unusual to see that decision-makers apply the academic circles in order to obtain necessary theoretical information in regard to any state or region, or develop strategies cooperating with academics, or plan the pros and cons possibly emerge in the future before any foreign policy attempt which would make their policies more effective and maximize advantages. The mentioned three factors have been affecting Turkish foreign policy for years.

In this article we have tried to present the ways which would help Turkish foreign policy strategy more effective in the Central Asian region. We explained the driving forces which necessitate Turkey to develop “cooperation strategy” model for the Central Asian region taking foreign policy interests and goals of some regional and global actors into consideration. By doing so, we also proved that Turkish decision-makers, through realizing slight changes in Turkish foreign policy in regard to the Central Asian states, would be able to maximize Turkish foreign advantages in the mentioned region.



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[1] While Irina Zviagelskaia regards the prevailing conflict between the institutions and individuals in Russian Federation as one of the obstacles before determining clear-cut foreign policy objectives for the Central Asian region, Stephen Blank; Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College and an Associate Professor of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, in his research “Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia” published by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute; argues that “Russian policy emerges from intense struggles among institutions and personalities”. (Blank, 1997, p.10)

[2] The information presented under this title is based on the articles by Graham Fuller “Russia and Central Asia: Federation or Fault Line?”, and by Robert O. Freedman “Russia and Central Asia Under Yeltsin”, and the paper by Irina Zviagelskaia The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia. (see Fuller, 1994, pp.94-129 ; Freedman, 1996, pp.19-23 ; Zviagelskaia, 1995, pp.8-15)